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Abstract 
Public stockholding for food security purposes refers to state acquisition of foodstocks in support 
of food security objectives. Public stockholding for food security purposes in developing countries 
returned to WTO agenda in the wake of the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food crises. During the 
WTO Ministerial Meeting at Bali in 2014, a group of developing countries (known as the G-33) 
proposed that disciplines on stockholding be relaxed to allow them to acquire large foodstocks in 
anticipation of future crises. They contended that stockholding was necessary because exporting 
countries often restrict food exports in times of crisis, which consequently affect importing 
countries’ food security. Food exporting countries, on the other hand, opposed the policy arguing 
that it could lead to increased subsidies to producers of importing countries and, consequently 
distort trade. Due to the absence of consensus, a Pease Clause was introduced to temporarily 
restrain member countries from challenging stockholding activities until a permanent solution is 
reached.  This thesis assessed three issues relating to WTO trade policy, food security and public 
stockholding in developing countries.  
The first paper, presented in Chapter 2, assesses the need for public stockholding in developing 
countries. In this paper, the research estimates the speed at which markets respond to restore 
consumption distortions in developing countries. This speed is referred to as market response to 
consumption shocks. Low responses implies that food security cannot be guaranteed by relying on 
the international market. Hence, stockholding to support consumption can be legitimate food 
security policy in these countries. The research is applied to wheat, corn and rice due to their 
importance in the food security of developing countries. The results shows that markets generally 
fail to restore close to 60 percent of the consumption distortions, following a shock, in developing 
countries. This poses a risk to food security without public stockholding.  Hence, the study 
concludes that stockholding will be a legitimate policy to consider in these countries.  
The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, also assesses the need for public stockholding for food 
security purposes in developing countries. However, the research investigates whether or not the 
current de minimis WTO rules on public stockholding constitute a restriction to food security in 
developing countries. The research posits that the proposal to relax stockholding policy will be 
justified if current regulations constitute a restriction to achieving food security. The research is 
applied to wheat, corn and rice. To analyse this question, optimal public stocks required to 
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achieving food security are compared with WTO allowable public stocks. The policy is restrictive 
if optimal public stocks is more than stock levels permitted under the WTO. The results found the 
de minimis policy to be substantially restrictive across some developing countries especially those 
which demonstrate a high food security risk. Hence, expanding stockholding policy for these 
category of countries should be considered.  
The third paper, presented in Chapter 4, examines the potential impact of stockholding on trade. 
Stockholding has two important activities that can affect trade: stock acquisition and stock 
disposal. While stock acquisition can increase trade, the disposal of accumulated stocks from 
stockholding programs in importing countries could lead to significant trade losses for exporting 
countries. Food exporting countries are particularly against stockholding programs policy due to 
these potential negative impacts on their markets. In this paper, a potential public storage policy 
aimed at meeting 6-months of domestic consumption is applied to rice, corn and wheat in order to 
gain insights into the impact of the proposed stockholding policies on trade. The research seeks to 
estimate the maximum impact on trade that can arise as a result of stock disposal and stock 
acquisition. The results suggest that stock disposal could significantly decrease trade by more than 
35 percent. Where stock acquisition does lead to increased trade, the overall negative impact of 
the policies will be relatively low. Moreover, the impacts on trade are relatively small when the 
policy is considered for small consumption countries. Thus, stockholding policy can be considered 
for small countries faced with considerable food security risk without generating significant trade 
impacts.  
In conclusion, the study suggests that stockholding policies can be legitimate for small countries 
faced with considerable food security risk. Large consumption countries seeking to implement 
stockholding policies must establish appropriate compensation schemes to minimise their policies 
impact on affected countries.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the issues 
Food security, as a concept, varies considerably in academic discourse and public policy practice. 
As of 1992, Smith et al. (1992) noted over 200 food security definitions with each suggesting 
different strengths, weaknesses and methods of measurement. The definitions include self-
sufficiency, self-reliance, and the entitlement approaches to food security, among others.  
Nonetheless, the World Food Summit’s (1996) view that “food security exists when all people, at 
all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” is the most widely accepted. This 
definition points to four core dimensions of food security: food availability; accessibility; stability 
of food supplies; and utilization. Based on these core dimensions Stevens et al. (2001) noted that 
food security, in essence, is the availability and access to sufficient food for a healthy living, and 
the guarantee of such at all times.  
Public food stockholding and international trade are two important food security policy 
instruments for developing countries. Public stockholding refers to state acquisition, storage and 
subsequent release of food stocks. Foodstocks typically covered under public stockholding 
programs are cereals (especially rice, corn and wheat) as they can be stored for extended periods 
and, also, because of their overall importance to food security. In developing countries, public 
foodstocks are primarily used for food security purposes to provide emergency food aid, stabilise 
food prices, serve as a market for poor resource farmers in order to minimise their production risk, 
and/or provide food to poor households (World Bank, 2012; Gilbert, 2011; Wiggins and Keats, 
2009). As such, public stockholding programs largely identify with the stability of food supplies, 
income and consumption components of food security.  
Public stockholding programs were, however, constrained as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations as part of reformed disciplines on agricultural subsidies. This is 
because they, arguably, possess trade distortionary attributes by virtue of their operations. In 
particular, stocks are acquired at government administered prices that are normally higher than 
prevailing market prices. The higher prices serve as a subsidy to farmers and induce a supply 
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response beyond levels conveyed by markets. For large importers, subsidy-induced domestic 
production can reduce imports, depress international prices and distort trade. Similarly, 
stockholding-induced domestic production can increase exports, depress international prices and, 
hence, distort trade as well. In some instances, stocks acquired under public stockholding programs 
can be sold in international markets at subsidized prices, which also has the potential to be the 
cause of trade losses for competing countries.   
Consequently, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) members agreed at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in 1994 to the following restrictions on public stockholding activities. For public 
stockholding to operate in member states: (1) the stock levels must be predetermined and acquired 
only for the purposes of enhancing food security; and (2) the sale and acquisition of public stocks 
shall be made at prices not noticeably different from the prevailing market price. More importantly, 
government subsidies for stockholding programs referred to as Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) shall not exceed 5 percent and 10 percent of the total value of domestic production in 
developed and developing countries respectively. Any evidence of violation may lead to a 
countervailing duty action against products of the affected nation. These provisions are found in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  
Recently, the need to revisit public stocks as a food security policy has moved on to the trade 
policy agenda. This time around, the debate focused on relaxing AMS rules to enable developing 
countries to acquire public stocks for food security purposes without threat of sanctions from other 
WTO members. The quest for regulatory reforms emerged at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the 
WTO in Bali in 2014 (ICTSD, 2014a). The proposal by a group of food insecure countries (known 
as the G-331), and led by India, argued that the 10 percent allowable subsidy for stockholding is 
restrictive on their ability to acquire adequate food stocks to mitigate supply shocks. Hence, the 
G-33 advocates the removal of the restrictions or having the constraints relaxed to accommodate 
larger stockholdings. However, whether or not the current de minimis regulation is restrictive on 
public stockholding for food security purposes in developing countries in general (or in India, to 
                                                          
1 The G-33 list include “Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, The Philippines, Peru, 
Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe” (WTO, 2016). 
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be specific) is an empirical question that has not been adequately explored. This is because 
countries have not been transparent with stock levels acquired for food security purposes.  
Nonetheless, the G-33 argues that public stockholding is imperative for developing countries for 
a number of reasons.  First, there is growing evidence that exporting countries often restrict food 
exports in times of food crises. During the 2007/2008 food crisis, for instance, Argentina - the 
world’s second largest exporter of corn - restricted corn, wheat and soybean exports. Similar 
policies were employed by, for example, India, Ukraine, China and Russia (Sharma, 2011). 
Giordani et al. (2012) noted that export restrictions contributed significantly in exacerbating the 
2008-09 food price spikes, affecting about 22% of global food trade while the World Bank (2009) 
indicates that the rise in food prices pushed over 75 million additional people into extreme hunger, 
especially in countries without stocks to support consumption. Rude and An (2015) demonstrated 
that export restrictions applied between the period of 2006 and 2011 translated to a significant 
increase in rice and wheat price volatilities. Where a significant proportion of people’s income is 
spent on food, increasing price volatilities raises uncertainty about future food prices, and does not 
guarantee stable food consumption in food security risk countries. Thus, the impacts of such export 
restrictions on trade and food security is a concern for food security risk countries. 
Secondly, the current WTO regulations on export restrictions do not provide any assurance that 
importing countries can reliably continue to depend on trade flows in their management of food 
security. Export taxes are permitted under the WTO without limits. Consequently, countries often 
apply them to restrict food exports in favour of domestic consumption in times of food market 
disruption thereby further limiting importers access to food. Recent studies also conclude that 
export restrictions will be challenging to discipline under the current WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, in part because of the time required to adjudicate a dispute (Cardwell and Kerr, 2014). 
Despite these regulatory lapses, agreements to discipline the use of export restrictions have not 
been reached (ICTSD, 2014b), and the likelihood of reaching agreement remains slight (Anania, 
2013). The absence of such disciplines have, therefore, exposed international markets to arbitrary 
government interventions with dire consequence for food security in importing countries (Gilbert, 
2011).   
Consequently, calls for relaxation of public stockholding rules to enable developing countries to 
build food reserves for food security purposes, increased. The United Nations Special Rapporteur 
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on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, for instance, called for developing countries to use food 
reserves in support of their food security without threat of sanctions from the WTO (UN News 
Center, 2013). De Schutter (2011) claimed that the WTO rules limit developing countries ability 
to achieve food security because they have been designed to help developed country’s farmers.  
This led the G-33 to table a proposal calling for new rules on public stockholding (ICTSD, 2014a).    
The G-33 proposal, however, proved contentious for some members of the WTO (ICTSD, 2014c). 
Some WTO members argued that the current WTO regulations provide sufficient policy options 
to enable developing countries to address their food security problems without expanding public 
stockholding.  Many opposing countries also fear that agreeing to the proposal will impede future 
trade due to the high levels of subsidies associated with stockholding. India, on the other hand, 
threatened to block the WTO deal on trade facilitation2 unless reforms on public stockholding 
were tabled for consideration. As an interim solution, a Peace Clause was introduced at the WTO 
to temporarily restrain countries from challenging stockholding programs of other member 
countries until lasting solutions are negotiated (Kerr, 2015). 
 
1.2 Research problem 
Studies exploring the need for public stockholding in developing countries are limited. First, the 
G-33 developing countries argued for restrictions on public stockholding policies to be lifted. 
However, a fundamental question lingers as to whether or not the current WTO regulations even 
constitute a restriction on achieving food security in these countries. Secondly, opponents of the 
G-33 proposal argued that developing countries accession to the WTO open them to alternative 
sources of imports. As such, disruptions in their domestic supply can be restored by imports. This 
reduce the need for stockholding programs in developing countries. However, the swiftness with 
which international markets can react in order to restore consumption in the event of a shock is 
unknown. Swiftness is a concern because a low response can lead to acute food shortage in times 
of crisis. Further, food exporting countries are particularly concerned that stockholding programs 
in importing countries can result in costly trade impacts for their exports. Nevertheless, no 
                                                          
2 A WTO agreement aimed at harmonising customs practices across member countries in order to minimize the 
delays of goods at national borders.   
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empirical studies have quantified the extent to which the proposed stockholding policy will affect 
trade. The following research questions are, hence, raised. 
1. Is there a justifiable need for public stockholding in developing countries?  
2. What are the impacts of the proposed stockholding policy on international trade?   
 
1.3 Research objectives 
This research has two main objectives.  
1. To assess the need for public stockholding in developing countries. Two specific objectives 
are used to assess the need for public stockholding in developing countries.  
a. To analyse the speed at which disruptions in consumption can be restored by relying 
on international markets in developing countries. 
b. To analyse the restrictiveness of the current de minimis AMS policy on stockholding 
for food security purposes in developing countries. 
2. To examine the impact of the proposed stockholding policy on trade.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure  
The objectives of the thesis are addressed in three essays relating to food security, trade and public 
stockholding. The essay format is preferred because it allows each objective to be extensively 
addressed, focusing on the literature, methodology, analysis, results and discussions and references 
for each paper.   
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, empirically assesses the need for stockholding by focusing 
on market response to cereal consumption shocks in developing countries. Market response to 
shocks measures the speed at which distortions in food consumption can be restored by relying on 
international markets. If market responses are swift, disruptions in consumption can be swiftly 
restored by imports. Such speedy responses reduce the need for government interventions.  
However, a slow response to consumption shocks provides a justification for government 
interventions including the use public stockholding. In line with the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations recommended stock durations and the current thinking 
on stockholding levels in importing countries, the study argues that a market response of less than 
50 percent is low. In other words, the market fails to restore more than half of a country’s food 
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needs. Such a low response can be critical for food security. Consequently, a panel error correction 
model is developed to estimate the speed of market responses in net food importing developing 
countries focusing on the major tradable staples of wheat, rice and corn.  
The second essay, presented in Chapter 3, also contributes to assessing the need for public 
stockholding policies in developing countries. However, the assessment focus on whether or not 
the current AMS policy constitute a restriction on public stockholding for food security purposes 
in developing countries. The paper argues that it will be justifiable for public stockholding policies 
to be expanded in developing countries if the current AMS regulations constitute a constraint on 
public stock levels needed to achieve food security.  To determine the restrictiveness of the policy, 
optimal public stocks required by countries are compared with public stocks permitted under the 
WTO stockholding policy. The paper focuses on wheat, corn and rice stocks in G-33 developing 
countries.  
The third essay, presented in Chapter 4, analyses the impact of the proposed stockholding policies 
on trade. The paper explores the concerns raised by food exporting countries about the potential 
impact of stockholding policies on trade. To do this, a spatial temporal equilibrium trade model is 
developed and used to analyse the impact of a hypothetical storage policy aimed at meeting 50 
percent of domestic consumption. The model is applied to rice, wheat and corn trade in selected 
countries including members of the G-33.  Finally, Chapter 5 provides conclusions and 
recommendations for future research.  
 
1.5 Research contribution 
This thesis contributes principally to expanding understanding of the interactions between food 
security and public stockholding for negotiations currently ongoing at the WTO. First of all, the 
assessment of the need for public stockholding in developing countries provides empirical 
evidence that can be used to support/refute the assertions of the G-33 proposal for stockholding. 
The study further analyses whether or not individual countries require differential treatment to 
enhance their respective food security. This is important because a universal application of 
stockholding policy (as currently practiced under the WTO) without considering food security 
risk can be detrimental to countries at a higher risk. Secondly, the impact of the proposed 
stockholding policy on trade assessment can form a strong basis for negotiating compensation 
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schemes if the policy produces costly trade impacts. The study also contributes by advancing 
the methodologies for assessing the need for public stockholding and food security policies in 
developing countries. In particular, the cereal consumption response and AMS restrictiveness 
analyses are novel approaches, introduced in this thesis, to determine the need for public 
stockholding policies in developing countries. This is the first study to explore such an 
approach.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Cereal consumption and market response to shocks in developing countries: 
Implications for food security and stockholding 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the need for public stockholding in developing countries by analysing 
the speed of market response to consumption shocks. Market response to consumption shock 
measures the speed at which distortions in consumption may be restored by relying on 
international markets. Focusing on wheat, rice and corn, a panel error correction model is 
developed and used to estimate the speed of market response to consumption shocks in net 
food importing developing countries. The estimated responses shows that trade may restore 
up to 46 percent, 41 percent and 31 percent of wheat, rice and corn consumption distortions 
respectively in developing countries. The responses are low because more than 50 percent 
of food consumption distortions cannot be restored by relying on international markets in 
the event of a shock. Hence, establishing public stockholding programs to support 
consumption in times of crisis can be a legitimate policy in these countries.  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Food security is a challenge in many developing countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations suggest that approximately 805 million people worldwide are at risk 
due to poor food security (FAO, 2014). Of these, approximately 98 percent live in developing 
countries where cereals are an integral part of food consumption and food security policies. Cereals 
constitute a large proportion of household food consumption in developing, where it provides over 
60 percent of daily caloric intake (Awika, 2011).  Aggregate cereal consumption increased by 
more than 300 percent in developing countries,  from 180 million tonnes (in 1961) to over 800 
million tonnes in 2011 (Fig 2.1), while per capita cereal consumption, likewise, grew by 50 
percent, increasing from 40 kilograms (in 1961) to 60 kilograms per person in 2011. The increased 
consumption has largely been attributed to expanding population and income growth. In terms of 
composition, rice, corn and wheat constitute more than 70 percent of aggregate cereals consumed 
(Fig 2.2). The growth in cereal consumption (rice, wheat and corn) largely signifies its importance 
in the food security of developing countries.  Consequently, corn, rice and wheat predominate in 
the food security policies of developing countries. Rice, wheat and corn are also preferred in 
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stockholding programs for food security purposes because they can store for an extended period 
relative to other food stuffs.  
 
 Fig 2. 1 Cereal consumption in developing countries3 
             
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
 
                                                          
3 Developing countries included are Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central 
African Republic, Chad, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
P
er cap
ita co
n
su
m
p
tio
n
 (kg)
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 (
m
ill
io
n
 t
o
n
n
es
)
Years
Consumption Per capita consumption
 12 
   
Fig 2. 2 Cereal consumption shares in developing countries (%)   
 Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
 
 
The importance of cereals in the food basket of developing countries raises concerns about the 
likely impact of a future consumption shock. A consumption shock in this study refers to a sudden 
increase in demand or decrease in quantity available for consumption leading to a major market 
disruption4. Consumption shocks often arise from crop failures due to weather and/or disease 
infestations. However, consumption shocks in food importing countries also extend to trade policy 
restrictions on exports by the food exporting countries. These restrictions include the use of export 
taxes and embargos to limit importers’ access to food. Moreover, while countries are unlikely to 
simultaneously restrict exports, the effect of a shock in one market can be transmitted to others 
through international commodity prices.  
                                                          
4 A major market disruption can be either a food shortage at prevailing prices, a spike in food prices or a combination 
of the two. Price spikes lead to deterioration in food security for the poor as they do not have sufficient income to 
acquire adequate food for an active and healthy life at higher prices.  
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Notwithstanding the diverse sources of consumption shocks that countries face, the duration of a 
shock and the extent of its impact on food security can be minimized where countries are more 
integrated into the international trade system, which allows a rapid import response. In an 
integrated trade system, a consumption shock may translate into increased prices in affected 
countries and induce imports to mitigate the impact of the shock. Hence, a country strongly 
integrated into the global trade system has the opportunity to access imports to respond to 
consumption shocks. A rapid response will reduce the shock duration and enhance food security 
in importing countries while a slow response can deepen food security crisis. Hence, ensuring a 
more responsive market are imperative institutional reforms that can enhance trade and food 
security in developing countries.  
Josling (2014) noted that the WTO’s objective to create a transparent global trade system had food 
security in mind.  The multilateral trade system is expected to contribute to food security by 
providing countries with alternative sources of imports. This is important for developing countries 
where food production often lags demand, and commercial food imports can be essential to 
meeting consumption needs in times of production shocks (Anderson, 2001; Matthews, 2014a, 
2014b; Rakotoarisoa et al., 2011).  Trade will, thus, distribute food from surplus to deficit regions 
and also reduce the need for stockholding because imports can arise from surplus regions in the 
event of shock. This is feasible if markets are efficient and sufficiently responsive to quickly 
restore consumption in the event of a food crisis. Where market responses are slow, a shock to 
domestic consumption can lead to an acute food shortage.  
Despite the liberalisation agenda of the WTO, developing countries still exhibit high transaction 
costs, limited trade openness and export restrictions that have the tendency to undermine the ability 
of trade to address food security in these countries. High transaction costs have the potential to 
delay swift responses to assure food security in times of shock. Transactions costs are often higher 
in developing countries because the institutions needed to support a rapid response from markets 
are not developed. As a result, the reliance on trade to induce food inflows may be problematic 
due to the slowness of the responses. Further, the conclusions from Zant (2010) indicate that high 
transaction costs can reduce economic incentives that could induce timely imports responses in 
developing countries. Thus, the speed at which consumption shocks can be mitigated for food 
import dependent countries, in effect, depends on the swiftness of access to imports. The 
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responsiveness to shocks also provides indications as to the type of alternative policies that 
governments can employ to enhance food security. For instance, short-term food security can be 
improved for countries with low response rates if they are permitted to hold stocks. In times of 
food crises, such stocks could be relied upon to stabilise markets or provide food directly to the 
vulnerable population. This is important for many developing countries because they are highly 
dependent on imports, and, hence, vulnerable to exporters’ trade policy restrictions.  
Developing countries are generally vulnerable to exporters’ trade policy restrictions because of 
high dependence on imports. The share of imported rice in their domestic consumption (referred 
to as cereal import dependency) has been approximately 10 percent. However, corn and wheat 
import dependency has risen considerably. Corn import dependency increased from 5 percent in 
1961 to approximately 30 percent in 2011; while wheat dependency grew from 35 percent in 1960s 
to over 50 percent in 2011 (Fig 2.3). The increasing import dependency implies that a trade 
restriction on exports can create acute food shortage in these countries and consequently affect 
their short-term food security.  
 
Fig 2. 3 Cereal import dependency in developing countries (%) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
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The degree of vulnerability is more evident when individual countries are examined.  In 2011, for 
example, the share of imported rice, corn or wheat constituted less than 5 percent of consumption 
in India and China (Fig 2.4, Fig 2.5 and Fig 2.6) making these countries less dependent on imports, 
and hence, less vulnerable to trade policy restrictions. However, shares of imported rice, corn and 
wheat in domestic consumption constitute approximately 100 percent in Angola (Fig 2.4), Algeria 
(Fig 2.5) and Burkina Faso (Fig 2.6) respectively, thus making them more vulnerable to trade 
policy restrictions. Thus, a restriction on imports could create an acute food shortage in countries 
such as Burkina Faso if it has no domestic stocks to rely upon in times of a consumption shock. 
Moreover, given the high degree of dependency, a slow response could produce devastating effects 
on consumption and, hence, food security in these countries. Nevertheless, the speed of 
consumption response to shocks among these countries are largely unknown. 
 
Fig 2. 4 Rice import dependency in developing countries (%) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
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Fig 2. 5 Corn import dependency in developing countries (%) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
 
Fig 2. 6 Wheat import dependency in developing countries (%) 
 
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
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Further, the potential for trade policy restriction on exports is high. Potential for policy restriction 
is high because the present WTO regulation on food security allows exporting countries to restrict 
exports in favour of domestic consumers. Moreover, recent studies suggest that export restrictions 
would be difficult to discipline under the current WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in part, 
because of the lengthy dispute resolution process (Cardwell and Kerr, 2014). Nonetheless, the 
developing countries’ proposal to build public foodstocks in support of food security has been 
opposed by some members of the WTO. Some countries argue that the current multilateral 
framework provides sufficient policy freedom for developing countries to achieve food security 
without the need for expanding public stocks.   
The chapter assesses the need for public food stockholding for food security purposes in 
developing countries by exploring the speed of market response to consumption shocks. The 
research argues that the length of time (speed) involve in accessing imports from international 
markets should any shock to domestic food system occur (in order to restore consumption) is an 
important issue that will determine whether or not countries need to hold foodstocks. If accessing 
imports is not timely then the trade response may not be sufficiently swift to assure food security 
in times of food crisis. This can be a justification for stockholding.  The study focuses on tradable 
staples that can be accessed on international markets to restore consumption in importing 
countries. Other factors such as market orientation, cultural practices, transaction costs and/or 
proximity to imports that may affect speed of consumption restoration are controlled for by 
including country specific fixed effects and trade openness. Similarly, the cost of food which can 
influnece how much food can be acquired to restore consumption are controlled for by including 
income and international prices in the model. The relationship between these and consumption 
response are fully specified in the empirical model.  
The specific objective is, therefore, to estimate the speed of market response to consumption shocks 
in developing countries.  A significant market response indicates that distortions in consumption 
can be restored to their long-run equilibrium (i.e. the acceptable consumption level) by relying on 
the international market. The magnitude of market response indicates the speed at which those 
distortions are mitigated. In this study, a response is said to be low when it does not restore up to 
50 percent of the food needs following a distortion, and vice versa. The study is conducted using 
a panel of 58 net food importing developing countries (NFIDCs) spanning the period of 1961 to 
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2011 on rice, corn and wheat. Further, statistical test did not indicate any structural changes in the 
consumption patterns over the years that could lead to potential differences in responses. Hence, 
the estimates use the full sample from 1961 to 2011 for the estimations. As a robustness check, 
consumption responses are also estimated for net food exporting developing countries (NFEDCs), 
net food importing developed countries (NFIDEVCs) and net food exporting developed countries 
(NFEDEVCs). The NFIDCs, NFEDCs, NFIDEVCs and NFEDEVCs used in the study are listed 
in the appendix.   
The study is justified for a number of reasons. First, the study focuses on NFIDCs because they 
are largely depended on international markets and are the most vulnerable to trade policies of 
exporting countries. Secondly, the speed of consumption response will inform policy as to whether 
or not developing countries have a case for wanting to include public stockholding in WTO subsidy 
exemptions. The study focuses on corn, wheat, and rice because of their high importance in trade, 
consumption and stockholding programs of developing countries. Hence, analysing these cereals 
together will provide a comprehensive assessment of consumption response to food security 
disruptions in NFIDCs.  
The chapter is organised in seven sections. Following the introduction, section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature on food security modelling, consumption and trade; section 3 focuses on recent 
studies on stockholding and food security; section 4 provides the theoretical framework that is 
developed; section 5 considers the empirical model; section 6 focuses on results and discussion; 
and section 7 presents the conclusions.  
 
2.2 Recent studies in trade, stockholding and food security 
The 2007-2008 food crisis - in which over 75 million additional people were pushed into extreme 
hunger and malnutrition (FAO, 2008; World Bank, 2009) - reignited research as to how countries 
could best enhance food security. The causes of the food crisis have been attributed to food export 
restrictions and panic buying following periods of low stocks and rising food prices (Childs and 
Kiawu, 2009; Hansen, 2013).  Following the food crisis, the World Bank (2012) provided a 
historical review of developing countries’ stockholding programs related to food security. The 
study concluded that public stockholding has generally not been effective when targeted at 
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stabilising domestic prices (as a food security measure) due to unsustainable budgetary cost. Public 
stocks have, however, been effective when used to provide targeted food aid.  
Dorosh (2009) notes that large stock accumulations can divert state resources meant for poverty 
reduction, agricultural investment, and general economic growth into stockholding. Demeke et al 
(2009), Jones and Kwiecinski (2010) and Maetz et al. (2011) noted a general shift  in policy among 
developing countries aimed at reducing reliance on food imports following the 2007-2008 crisis. 
In the same regard, Konandreas (2012) advised countries to hold modest stocks in anticipation of 
food crisis while initiating measures to enhance intra-regional trade. These studies generally 
indicate that public stockholding and trade should be used together to enhance food security.  
Consequently, a series of papers sought to model various public storage and trade policy 
combinations that countries can use to stabilise consumption and prices in developing countries.  
Gouel and Jean (2015) modelled the trade–public storage policy mix that stabilises food price in 
small open economies by expanding upon the rational expectation framework. They conclude that 
the optimal trade-stockholding policy mix crowds out private sector storage. This is because lack 
of private sector storage discourages competition and efficient use of resources.  Extending the 
framework to assess the impact on the global economy, their results further suggest that aggressive 
price stabilisation in developing countries could lead to higher global prices. Larson et al. (2014) 
used an extended form of the rational expectation storage-trade model to assess the objective of 
holding strategic regional wheat reserves in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
Their results show that moderate stocks could be used to mitigate price spikes in the MENA region. 
However, because the MENA is a major importer of wheat, large reserves tend to destabilise global 
wheat prices and consumption.  The next subsection discusses other studies related to food 
security, consumption, stockholding and trade that deploy non-rational expectation approaches.  
 
2.3 Food security and consumption modelling 
Food security modelling and its linkage with trade and public stockholding has taken a variety of 
approaches. Rocha (2007) argued that the classical economic approach to food security is one of 
a market failure problem which warrants government intervention like other forms of market 
failures. Market failures lead to insufficient food consumption in vulnerable societies. However, 
insufficient food consumption creates a social cost to the state in the form of increased social vices, 
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disease outbreaks, among others. This implies that the private benefits of food consumption are 
less than the benefits to society. Consequently, the state intervenes to improve consumption. Under 
the market failure approach, trade liberalisation and stockholding are government policies used to 
enhance consumption. For food importing countries, trade liberalisation entails lowering trade 
barriers to improve timely food supply.   
 
Food security has also been modelled using various trade theories. David Ricardo (1817) 
demonstrated that specialisation based on comparative advantage increase the production of each 
good for the global economy. Extending from this insight implies that specialisation, when 
combined with open trade, will increase production, availability and consumption of food in each 
country including those specialising in non-food production. Also, the efficiency gains associated 
with specialisation can increase income and economic growth in the general economy, enhance 
purchasing power and reduce vulnerability to food price shocks (Clapp, 2014).  A number of 
studies have, therefore, explored the impact of trade on food security based on these trade theories. 
Measuring food security by food availability, Benuzeh and Yiheyis (2014) analysed the impact of 
trade liberalization on food security among 37 developing countries. Food availability was 
measured by dietary energy supply while trade liberalization is measured through a dummy. A 
country assumes a value of 1 for the year it joined the WTO, and a zero for all other years.  The 
coefficient of liberalisation therefore measures the difference in food availability before and after 
accession to the WTO. Thus, a significant coefficient indicates that the period after acceding to the 
WTO increased food availability and hence, enhanced food security. However, their study finds 
no conclusive evidence that trade liberalization enhances food security.  
McCorriston et al. (2013) summarised the evidence from studies looking at trade impacts on food 
security over the period of 1990 to 2012. In all, 1176 papers were identified and then screened 
down to 34 based on the relevance to policy and quality of research evidence. Thirteen (13) of the 
34 papers concluded that agricultural trade liberalisation enhances food security. Ten (10) out of 
the 34 papers suggest trade liberalisation worsens food security while 11 were inconclusive, as the 
variable(s) measuring trade liberalisation were not significant. The general assessment is that there 
is no conclusive evidence that trade liberalisation unambiguously enhances food security. These 
studies, in themselves, do not provide any indication as to whether countries need to hold public 
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stocks.  These studies are largely static in nature in that the food security attributes are assumed to 
be held constant. As such, they can explain food security at a point in time but are unable to capture 
the dynamics of changes in food security over time. Consequently, various techniques to capture 
the dynamism in food security have since been explored.   
 
The dynamic approach to food security modelling argues that countries, households and 
individuals’ food security situation is unstable. Households move into or out of food insecurity 
depending on their income, socio-economic conditions at any point in time as well as 
macroeconomic factors such as economic recession, trade openness and international prices. 
Hence, adopting a static approach to food security will fail to capture these dynamics. 
Christiaensen and Boisvert (2000) proposed the basic economic model of vulnerability to food 
insecurity. Their model predicts the probability that a given household will consume an insufficient 
levels of food at a given point in time. These probabilities change depending on income and other 
factors that influence household access to food. Capaldo et al. (2010) applied vulnerability models 
to analyse food insecurity in Nicaragua. Their results suggest that a subset of households frequently 
fall into and out of food insecurity brackets thereby making it challenging to be able to design 
stable/targeted food security policies.  
 
Econometric models can also be adapted to capture dynamism in food security from the long-run 
and short-run perspective.  These models include, but are not limited to, Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) models using time series and panel data.  While time series provide useful insights over 
time, panel analysis captures the dynamism emanating from time and cross-sections.  The added 
advantage of a panel data approach to modelling is that there are efficiency gains in parameter 
estimates when data is pooled across time and cross sections into a single sample (Baltagi, 2008). 
Kornher and Karlkhul (2013) used a fixed effect dynamic panel data model to estimate 
determinants of food price volatilities (measuring food security) in developing countries. Their 
study shows that trade restrictions and stocks influence price volatilities.  Although these studies 
have been helpful in providing insights into food security, trade and stockholding, analysis from 
the perspective of consumptions response is limited.   
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This chapter makes a contribution to the stockholding literature by estimating market response to 
cereal consumption shocks in developing countries. Responsiveness also provides information 
about the underlying transaction cost that countries face in accessing imports. Where transaction 
costs are prohibitive, trade may not be responsive to food security shocks in developing countries. 
By using the dynamic panel model we are able to capture the influences that change over time and 
control for non-time varying effects that impact cereal consumption and food security.  
 
2.4 Theoretical framework  
The theoretical models of cereal consumption demand are conceptualised within the context of 
utility maximization. A net food importing developing country (NFIDC) is modelled as a 
representative consumer seeking to maximize utility in the international market subject to an 
income constraint.   Assuming wheat (Cw), rice (Cr) or corn (Cc) are the cereals consumed, a 
representative NFIDC’s utility (U) can be defined over consumption as U (Cw, Cr, Cc). Further, 
the research assumes that international prices largely determine cereal consumption since these are 
net food importing countries. Letting Pw, Pr and Pc represent international prices of wheat, rice and 
corn respectively, an income constraint implies that the value of wheat, corn and rice purchased 
cannot exceed a country’s income.  A representative NFIDC’s economic problem of maximizing 
utility subject to income (INC) constraint is stated as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶𝑤, 𝐶𝑟 , 𝐶𝑐)  𝑠. 𝑡  (𝑃𝑤𝐶𝑤 + 𝑃𝑟𝐶𝑟 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑐  ≤  𝐼𝑁𝐶)       (2.1) 
From equation (2.1), consumption demand for wheat (Cw), rice (Cr) and corn (Cc) are implicitly 
derived as functions of income, own price and prices of related cereals as: 
𝐶𝑤 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐, 𝐼𝑁𝐶)                                                           (2.2) 
𝐶𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐 , 𝐼𝑁𝐶)                                                            (2.3) 
𝐶𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐, 𝐼𝑁𝐶)                                                            (2.4) 
Cereal consumption demand augmented with trade openness (TO) and error term (ε) becomes: 
𝐶𝑤 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐, 𝑇𝑂, 𝐼𝑁𝐶, 𝜀)                                                  (2.5) 
𝐶𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐 , 𝑇𝑂, 𝐼𝑁𝐶, 𝜀)                                                   (2.6) 
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𝐶𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑤, 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑐, 𝑇𝑂, 𝐼𝑁𝐶, 𝜀)                                                   (2.7) 
In conclusion, cereal consumption demand is a function of own price, price of related cereals, 
trade openness and income. Based on this structure we make the following propositions:  
 
(1) Income (INC): An increase in income will raise a country’s purchasing power and increase 
its cereals consumption. Hence, income has a positive effect on cereal consumption.  
(2)  International price of cereal (own price): An increase in the price of cereal will lead to a 
decline in imports and consumption. Hence, own price has a negative effect on cereal 
consumption in NFIDCs. 
(3) International price of related cereals (price of substitute): A rising international price of 
one cereal will increase the consumption of another because wheat, corn and rice are 
substitutable. Price of substitutes have positive effect on consumption. Hence, the inclusion 
of prices of related cereals indicates that these commodities are substitutable5.  
(4) Trade openness (TO): Trade openness measures a country’s degree of integration into the 
world trade. Higher integration is an indication of low trade barriers which induce imports 
and enhance consumption. Moreover, high trade openness also induces a swift 
consumption response in times of shocks. Hence, trade openness has a positive effect on 
cereal consumption in NFIDCs. 
(5) The error term (ε): The error term captures all other unobservable factors capable of 
influencing consumption.  
 
Estimating the consumption functions above measures the effects of own price, price of related 
cereals, trade openness and income on consumption in the long-run. The estimated coefficients are 
long-run parameters.  This does not explain market responses to consumption shocks. To specify 
the model to capture consumption response to shocks, the data must have panel unit roots and a 
cointegration process. In this paper, the panel error correction approach is chosen as it allows the 
study to estimate the speed of consumption response which forms the principal objective in this 
Chapter. The requirements for panel error correction model specifications discussed in the next 
subsections.    
                                                          
5 Prices of related cereals are however dropped due to multi-collinearity issues in the data.  
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2.5 Methodology 
This section discusses panel unit roots (i.e. stationarity) and cointegration tests, model 
specification and the estimation techniques used in the paper.  
 
2.5.1 Panel unit root test 
Data is said to have unit roots if it is non-stationary in levels but becomes stationary after first 
differencing. Testing for stationarity is essential in order to avoid estimating spurious relationships 
(Kao, 1999). Unlike time series where unit root process is homogeneous, panel unit roots may be 
heterogeneous. Stationarity in panel data is also affected by contemporaneous correlation between 
panels known as cross-sectional dependence. The presence of cross-sectional dependence causes 
estimates to be inconsistent and, thus, affect hypothesis testing (Baltagi, 2008).  As such, varying 
techniques have been proposed to accommodate heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. 
Levin et al. (2002); Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000) proposed test methods that account for 
cross-sectional independence and homogeneity in the panel unit root process. The test leads to 
efficient estimates if the underlying unit root process is homogenous, otherwise the estimates are 
inconsistent.   
Further, the ‘Im, Pesaran and Shin Test’ (Im et al., 2003) and ‘Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP test’ 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001) were developed to accommodate heterogeneity in the unit 
root process.  The ‘Im, Pesaran and Shin Test’ has two short-comings. First, it does not account 
for contemporaneous correlation among cross-sections in the panel. Secondly, the ‘Im, Pesaran 
and Shin Test’ is developed for cases of balanced panels. Given that most panels are unbalanced, 
the test becomes very restrictive.  
In this chapter, the ‘Fisher Test’ is deployed as it accommodates a heterogeneous unit root process. 
Although originally developed under the assumption of cross-sectional independence, recent 
advances in panel data estimation using STATA allows for the implementation of a Fisher test that 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence. Also, Fisher tests are applicable where the data is an 
unbalanced panel.    
 
The Fisher Test developed in this chapter draws extensively from Baltagi (2008, Chapter 12). 
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Fisher test combines probability values of each cross-section’s unit root test to determine overall 
panel statistics. For a variable C (where C represents all variables to be tested for panel unit roots), 
the specified model of unit root test under Fisher assumes the following linear relationship:  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                              (2.8)  
Where 𝛽𝑖 is panel specific constant terms, i = 1, 2, ….., N unique cross-sections; t=1, 2, ….., T 
time frame and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term while J is the number of lags included, determined from lag 
selection criterion. The symbol  𝜌𝑖 is the heterogeneous unit root process which varies across 
panels. The hypotheses used to test for unit root process in panel data are stated as: 
Ho: |ρi| =1, all panels contain unit root 
Ha: |ρi| <1, at least one panel is stationary  
 
Four test statistics are used to test the hypothesis. These include:  
(a) Inverse chi-square statistic (P): The P statistic approximates a chi-square distribution, P =
−2 ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 → 𝜒
2(2𝑁) , with a degree of freedom equal to twice the sample size (N).  
(b) Inverse normal statistic (Z): The Z statistic approximates a normal distribution, 𝑧 =
1
√𝑛
∑ 𝛷−1𝑁𝑖=1 (𝑝𝑖), with  0 and 1 as its mean and variance respectively. 
(c)  The inverse logit statistic (L): The L statistic approximates a logistic distribution, 𝐿 =
∑ ln (
𝑝𝑖
1−𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ),   with 0 and π
2/3 as its mean and variance respectively. 
(d) The modified inverse chi-square statistic (Pm) is a standard normal distribution which 
assumes a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. Where, 𝑃𝑚 =
1
2√𝑁
∑ (−2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖 − 2)
𝑁
𝑖=1    
In each case, pi is the probability value of the ith panel unit root test. The null hypothesis is rejected 
if p-calculated exceeds p-critical values (Baltagi, 2008, Chapter 12).  .   
 
2.5.2 Panel cointegration 
Testing for long-run relationships between consumption, income, trade openness and international 
price of cereals is a test for cointegration. The condition for a cointegration requires that the 
variables are non-stationary in levels and integrated of order one.  Kao (1999) developed a residual-
based fixed effect cointegration test, assuming cross-sectional independence and homogenous unit 
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root process. Thus, Kao’s test restricts the cointegration vector to be the same across panels.  
Pedroni (1999, 2004) expands on Kao’s work and proposed a test assuming cross-sectional 
independence and heterogeneity in the cointegration vector.  
 
Westerlund (2007) and Persyn and Westerlund (2008) proposed a panel cointegration test based 
on an error correction specification, known as “Westerlund Cointegration Test”. This chapter uses 
the Westerlund Cointegration test as it allows for cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity in 
cointegration. Westerlund developed four statistics (Gt, Ga, Pt or Pa) for testing cointegration. The 
group-mean statistics (Ga and Gt) assumes that cointegration relationship is different across 
panels. Hence, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against the alternative that 
cointegration exists in at least one panel. The Panel Statistics (Pa and Pt) assumes a homogenous 
cointegration relationship; and test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative 
of cointegration. Where Group test (Gt, Ga) and Panel Test (Pt and Pa) leads to opposing 
conclusion, preference will be given to Panel Test since it focuses on the whole panel. Westerlund 
statistics are normally distributed under the null.   
 
2.5.3 Model specification  
Where unit roots and cointegration conditions are met, cereal consumption demand can be stated 
as a function of past and present own prices (OP) , prices of related cereals (PR),  income (INC), 
trade openness (TO); and previous consumption(C) as: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜕𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
                              +  ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                        (2.9) 
Where ‘i’ identifies countries and t is time; μi is country fixed effects; εit is error term; and ‘p’ is 
maximum lag included in the model.  The equation (2.9) can be specified to capture a consumption 
response using a panel error correction approach. Panel error correction has three components:   
(1) The long-run component: Long-run corresponds to the stable equilibrium consumption 
level of a country. Long-run consumption is assumed to be consistent with food security.  
(2) The short-run component: Short-run consumption denotes deviations from acceptable 
equilibrium consumption levels arising from shocks.  
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(3) The speed of adjustment or error correction term-measures the speed at which deviations 
from equilibrium consumption are restored.  The ‘speed of adjustment’ is operationalized 
in this paper as ‘market response to consumption shock’.    
Thus, equation (2.9) is specified in an error correction form as: 
∆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖(𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜕𝑖𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + ∑ ∅𝑖𝑗∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 +
           + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ ∆𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜕𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 ∆𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +   ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 ∆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                   
(2.10) 
Where, 𝛿𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 ), is the speed of adjustment term measuring market response to 
consumption shocks. Market response to consumption shocks measures the extent to which 
countries can rely on the market to restore consumption. Zero response implies consumption 
cannot be restored by relying on the market. This is a justification for stockholding.  
Similarly, the corresponding long-run and short-run consumption relationships in the model are:  
 (𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜕𝑖𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) and (∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑃
𝑗=0 ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ ∅𝑖
𝑃
𝑗=0 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑡−𝑗 +
∑ 𝜗𝑖
𝑃
𝑗=0 ∆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑃
𝑗=0 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑃
𝑗=0 𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑗) respectively. The estimated coefficients of 
prices, income and trade openness in the long-run and short-run components of the error correction 
model measures their (prices, income and trade openness) impact on cereal consumption in the 
long and short-runs respectively.  
 
 
2.5.4 Model estimation 
Pesaran et al. (1999) developed models for estimating non-stationary panel data with 
heterogeneous parameters. These include the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimators.  The MG model assumes that the long-run consumption relationship, speed of 
adjustment (i.e. response to shocks), short-run dynamics (i.e. short-run consumption) and intercept 
terms are different across panels.  
 
The PMG estimator, on the other hand, assumes that the long-run consumption patterns is the same 
across panels but short-run parameters, intercepts and response to shocks are allowed to vary.  We 
have reasons to impose these assumptions. Given that NFIDCs are low income countries there is 
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tendency to agree that they have the same consumption pattern in the long-run. However, we have 
no reason to believe that each country’s response to shocks is equal, particularly, when income, 
trade openness and other transaction cost are likely to vary among countries. The PMG model, by 
restricting long-run parameters to be equal across countries, leads to efficient and consistent 
estimates if the restriction is valid (Blackburne III and Frank, 2007).  The PMG is, however, 
inconsistent if the restriction is false. The MG estimator produces consistent estimates but are 
inefficient when the restrictions are true.  Hence, a Hausman Test is conducted to select the best 
model.  
 
The MG and PMG degenerate into a dynamic fixed effects model (DFE) when assumption of 
parameter homogeneity is imposed across long-run, short-run and speed of adjustment with the 
exception of country fixed effects. The counterpart of DFE in stationary data is the standard 
fixed/random models which assumes that all parameters are homogenous with the exception of 
individual fixed effects.  The characteristics of MG, PMG and DFE are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2. 1 Comparing MG, PMG and DFE models 
Source: Author presentation summarised from literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Group (MG) Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Dynamic fixed effect (DFE) 
Long-run  Different for each country Same for each country   Same for each country 
Short-run  Different for each country Different for each country Same for each country 
Speed of adjustment 
(response to shocks) 
Different for each country Different for each country Same for each country 
Country fixed effects Different for each country Different for each country Different for each country 
Best model selected using Hausman test 
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2.5.5 Model selection 
The Hausman Test compares parameters from PMG and MG models. The hypothesis are:  
Ho: Difference in coefficients not systematic (PMG is preferred) 
Ha: Difference is parameters is systematic (MG is preferred).  
 
The Hausman Test approximates a chi-square distribution with N-degrees of freedom, where N is 
the number of long-run parameters. The hypothesis can also be tested by comparing DFE and MG 
or PMG using the same technique. The DFE is efficient compared to MG/PMG because of the 
extent of parameter pooling. The panel error correction are fitted to wheat, corn and rice data 
separately using maximum likelihood estimation. The models were estimated and tested using 
STATA.  The hypotheses for each cereal are: 
 
2.5.6 Rice model6 
Ho: International price of rice has no effect on rice consumption 
Ha: International price has a negative effect on rice consumption 
 
Ho: Income has no effect on rice consumption 
Ha: Income has a positive effect on rice consumption 
 
Ho: Trade openness has no effect on rice consumption 
Ha: Trade openness has a positive effect of rice consumption 
 
2.5.7 Corn model 
Ho: International price of corn has no effect on corn consumption 
Ha: International price has a negative effect on corn consumption 
 
                                                          
6 Prices of related cereals are excluded due to multi-collinearity problems.  The empirical reasons are shown at the 
results and discussions section.  
 30 
   
Ho: Income has no effect on corn consumption 
Ha: Income has a positive effect on corn consumption 
 
Ho: Trade openness has no effect on corn consumption 
Ha: Trade openness has a positive effect of corn consumption 
 
2.5.8 Wheat model 
Ho: International price of wheat has no effect on wheat consumption 
Ha: International price has a negative effect on wheat consumption 
 
Ho: Income has no effect on wheat consumption 
Ha: Income has a positive effect on wheat consumption 
 
Ho: Trade openness has no effect on wheat consumption 
Ha: Trade openness has a positive effect of wheat consumption 
 
2.5.9 Variable measurement and data  
The panel consist of data on fifty-eight (58) net food importing developing countries (NFIDCs) 
spanning the period from 1961 to 2011. The NFIDCs are members of countries listed under the 
WTO Marrakesh Decision7 which were considered to be at food security risk following the 
Uruguay Round reforms; and/or the FAO’s low-income food-deficit countries. The list of countries 
included in the study are presented in Table 2A.18 in the appendix.  The data sources include: 
Cereal consumption (wheat, rice, corn): Consumption of each cereal is measured as the sum of 
domestic production, imports, and change in stock minus exports. Data on production, imports, 
exports and stock variations are available at FAOSTATS from 1960-2014.  
                                                          
7 Marrakesh Decision pertains to developing countries which could face short-term food security risk as a result of 
trade liberalization reforms after the Uruguay Round.  
8 Table and/or Figure numbers containing letters are listed in the appendix.  
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International price of corn, wheat and rice: Cereal prices are available at the World Bank 
Commodity Statistics from 1960-2013. The World Bank collects data on cereal prices in 
international markets important to developing countries, extending from 1961 to 2013. In this 
regard, it identifies US as the leading corn market and accordingly collects data on free on board 
number 2 yellow corn prices at the Gulf port. The US corn export price is therefore used as the 
international price of corn. For wheat, Canada and United States are identified as the most 
important wheat markets for developing countries. However, data on Canada were discontinued 
in 2013 without any stated explanation. As a result, United States number 1 hard red winter wheat 
is used as the international wheat price. In the case of rice, Thailand and Vietnam are noted as the 
most important markets but data on Vietnam are not consistently available. Hence, the Thai market 
price is used as the international market price. All prices are measured in United States dollars per 
tonne.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and trade openness:  GDP (in current US dollars) is used as a 
measure of income. Trade openness is measured as ratio of total trade to GDP expressed in percent. 
Trade openness and GDP data are available from the World Bank from 1960-2014. The dates and 
times at which the data was downloaded are presented in Table 2.2.  
 
 
Table 2. 2 Data sources and download dates 
Variable Date  Time*  Source 
GDP November 20, 2014 3:00pm  World Bank 
Trade openness November 20, 2014 3:00pm  World Bank 
Price of rice November 20, 2014 3:00pm World Bank Commodity Group 
Price of corn November 20, 2014 3:30pm World Bank Commodity Group 
Price of wheat November 20, 2014 3:30pm World Bank Commodity Group 
Rice consumption November 20, 2014 3:30pm FAO 
Corn consumption November 20, 2014 3:30pm FAO 
Wheat consumption November 20, 2014 3:30 pm FAO 
*Saskatoon local time. 
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2.6 Results and discussion 
The results are presented in three parts: the descriptive statistics; panel unit roots and cointegration 
tests; and the estimated panel error correction models. 
 
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the data are summarized, by model, in Table 2.3. All variables are in 
logarithms.  The panel consist of data on fifty-eight (58) NFIDCs extending from 1961 to 2011.  
 
 Table 2. 3 Descriptive statistics 
Model Variable Mean Between 
variation 
Within 
Variation 
Overall 
variation 
Sample 
Size 
Rice  Consumption 12.19 2.34 0.73 2.43 2540 
International price of rice 5.54 0.07 0.42 0.42 2540 
Trade openness 4.00 0.44 0.33 0.55 2540 
Income (GDP) 22.32 1.57 0.96 1.87 2540 
Corn  Consumption 12.49 2.27 0.86 2.32 2543 
International price of corn 4.62 0.09 0.39 0.40 2543 
Trade openness 3.98 0.44 0.36 0.55 2543 
Income (GDP) 22.32 1.57 0.96 1.87 2543 
Wheat  Consumption 12.22 2.10 0.43 2.22 2560 
International price of wheat 4.88 0.11 0.43 0.44 2560 
Trade openness 3.99 0.44 0.34 0.55 2560 
Income (GDP) 22.30 1.57 0.96 1.87 2560 
  Source: Author’s computation 
 
 
Countries, however, differ in their choices of commodity consumption, thereby, resulting in 
different sample sizes for wheat, corn and rice. The difference in sample size is also attributed to 
missing data associated with some countries for some years. Total wheat consumption 
observations sum up to 2560. The overall variation about the mean for wheat consumption (12.22) 
is estimated at 2.22. The data reveals that wheat consumption varies more between countries (2.10) 
than it is within countries (0.43). Corn consumption spans over fifty-eight (58) countries with a 
total sample size of 2543 observations. The average of log-corn consumption is estimated at 12.49 
with an overall deviation of 2.32 about the mean. The data indicates a wider variation in corn 
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consumption between countries (2.27) than it does within (0.86) countries. Further, rice 
consumption also spans over fifty-eight (58) countries summing up to 2540 observations. The 
average log-rice consumption of 12.19 varies at 2.43 about the mean. The data shows that variation 
in rice consumption is larger from one country to another than it is within countries. The average 
log-income deviates about 1.87 about the mean (22.30). The data reveals that income varies more 
between countries than within countries. Trade openness varies considerably between and within 
countries.  While overall variation in trade openness is estimated at 0.55, openness varies more 
from one country to another (0.44) than it does within countries (approximately 0.33) over the 
study period. This implies that some countries are structurally more open to trade than others.   
 
2.6.2 Panel unit roots and cointegration tests  
The panel unit root tests for: corn consumption; rice consumption; wheat consumption; trade 
openness; per capita income; and prices of wheat, corn and rice are presented in Table 2A.2 (in 
appendix). The probabilities of P, Z, L* and Pm are not significant in levels when a ‘trend term’ 
is included but becomes significant when variables are in first difference. Hence, we conclude that 
the data contains panel unit roots.  Similarly, the Pa and Pt statistics are significant for wheat, corn 
and rice models. Thus, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in favour of the alternative 
that cointegration exist in the panel (Table 2A.3 in appendix). Thus, the requirements for 
estimating a panel error correction model are satisfied.  
 
2.6.3 Estimated market responses to consumption shocks 
Econometric issues in model estimation: Correlation between: rice and corn is approximately 
+0.87; rice and wheat is +0.89; and rice and corn is approximately +0.96 (Fig 2.7). The high 
correlation led to multicollinearity issues in the models. As a result, only own prices were 
incorporated in the estimations. The estimated panel error correction models for rice, corn and 
wheat are presented and discussed by commodity in the next sub-section. 
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   Fig 2. 7 Correlation between rice, corn and wheat prices 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation using World Bank data. 
 
 
2.6.3.1 Consumption response to shocks: rice  
The Table 2.4 shows the estimated error correction models of rice consumption in NFIDCs. The 
test for overall significance for MG, PMG and DFE are all significant at 1 percent. This implies 
that trade openness, income and price jointly explain rice consumption in developing countries. 
Hence, the models are valid. Prices of wheat and corn — which measures effects of related cereals 
— were excluded due to multicollinearity issues. The results are discussed by impacts of 
international prices, trade openness and income; and estimated market responses.  
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 Table 2. 4 Rice model results 
Dependent variable: Rice consumption  
                                  Variable MG  PMG DFE 
Long-run  International price of rice (-1) -0.1192 -0.2626*** -0.1601 
   (0.1020) (0.0401) (0.1335) 
  Trade openness(-1) 0.2119 0.7684*** 0.1116 
   (0.1549) (0.0611) (0.1368) 
      
  GDP(-1) 0.5213*** 0.5808*** 0.6009*** 
   (0.0887) (0.0194) (0.0584) 
      
Short-run  ∆ International price of rice 0.0526** 0.0081 -0.0064 
   (0.0221) (0.0208) (0.0218) 
      
  ∆ Trade openness -0.1381* -0.0688 0.07572** 
   (0.0787) (0.0533) (0.0341) 
      
  ∆ GDP -0.1824* -0.0213 0.0188 
   (0.0718) (0.0396) (0.0358) 
      
Response  −(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒊𝒋) -0.4102*** -0. 1718*** -0.1203*** 
   (0.0481) (0.0445) (0.1112) 
      
Overall model significance (Chi-square(7)) 248.96***   2639.97***    302.81*** 
Hausman stat. (chi-square (3))  13.66**  0.03 
Sample size                   2540                2540                   2540 
***, ** and * are 1 percent, 5 percept and 10 percent significance level. 
Model performance: DFE>MG>PMG. Hence, DFE is the statistically selected model. 
Note: values in parentheses are standard errors
 
 
 
2.6.3.1.1 Impact of prices, trade openness and income on rice consumption 
International price of rice, trade openness and income have the expected effects on long-term rice 
consumption under the MG, PMG and DFE models.  
 
International price negatively affect rice consumption as expected in the long-run. This implies 
that rising prices reduces purchasing power and, hence, negatively affect consumption. However, 
its impact is found to be significant (1 percent) only under the PMG model. The results shows that 
a 1 percent increase in rice price leads to decrease in long-run consumption of rice by 0.26 percent 
in developing countries. In the short-run international price does not have significant impact on 
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rice consumption for all cases though it does have the expected negative effect under the DFE. 
This implies that a price increase generally leads to a more devastating impact on long-term 
consumption and food security than in the short-term. This is because the attempt to substitute one 
cereal for another as a result a price increase lead to rising prices for all cereals in the long-term. 
The increased substitution drives up prices of all cereals in the long-term leading to a greater 
impact on consumption. The results, thus, agree with the FAO’s (2008) assertion that global food 
crises will increase food security risk for developing countries in the long-term.  
Further, trade openness and income positively affect long-term rice consumption in developing 
countries as expected. This implies that long-term cereal consumption can be enhanced in 
developing countries with improved trade openness. Trade openness impacts are, however, only 
significant (1 percent) under the PMG estimation. The results shows that a 1 percent improvement 
in openness will lead to an increase in long-run rice consumption by 0.77 percent in developing 
countries. In the short-term, trade openness has a significant positive effect on rice consumption 
under the DFE estimation although its economic importance is relatively small compared to the 
long-run case. In the short-run, a 1 percent enhancement in trade openness leads to an increase in 
consumption by 0.08 percent under DFE. Under the PMG case, trade openness is not significant 
in the short-term and, also, does not meet the expected sign under MG. This results suggest that 
the benefits to rice consumption and food security as a result of trade openness improvements are 
more noticeable in the long-term. Their impacts on food security may not necessarily be 
immediate. A possible explanation is that the benefits of trade openness arise from efficiency gains 
which leads to resource use adjustments in the long-run. Without resource adjustment (as happens 
in the short-run), such benefits cannot be captured.   
Income has a significant positive effect on long-term rice consumption as expected under all 
models. The results shows that a 1 percent increase in income leads to an increase in rice 
consumption by 0.52 percent, 0.58 percent and 0.60 percent under the MG, PMG and DFE 
respectively in the long-run. Income also has the expected positive effect on short-run rice 
consumption but not significant (under DFE). This suggest that an increased national income 
translates to increased purchasing power which enhances consumption and food security. 
However, its impacts are greater in the long-term.  
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2.6.3.1.2 Estimated market response to consumption shocks  
Market response to consumption shocks are low in developing countries. The estimated responses 
are multiplied by 100 and interpreted in percentages. Market response to shocks under the DFE 
model is estimated at 12.03 percent (and significant at 1 percent).  This means that when countries 
are assumed to have same consumption patterns in the short- and long-runs, the market corrects 
about 12.03 percent of distortions per year. This constitute a slow response because more than 50 
percent of the consumption shock cannot be restored by relying on international markets.  The 
slow response suggest that trade does not restore consumption swiftly to assure food security in 
developing countries, and, hence, should not be relied upon.  This is because approximately 88 
percent of the cereal consumption shock cannot be restored following a disruption. In the event of 
a large shock, the slow response will drive up food prices and likely consign a considerable 
proportion of food security risk people into extreme hunger. For instance, if a country’s average 
food consumption stands at 100 million tonnes and the shock leads to a fall in supply by a million 
tonne, this will not affect consumption considerably. However, where the shock leads to a fall in 
stock available for consumption by 40 million tonnes, the slow response will create considerable 
impact on food security. The latter is likely to be the case because consumption shocks are 
relatively large in many developing countries. Consumption shocks relative to means deviates 
about 30 percent on average across developing countries (Table 2.3) but the impacts are fairly 
large (more than 50%) for some individual countries including Haiti, Malawi, and Chad among 
others9.  
The second case of market response to consumption shock is estimated under the PMG model, 
where countries are assumed to have the same consumption patterns in the long-run. Under this 
assumption, the estimated consumption response to shock improves to 17.18 percent, and is 
significant at 1 percent. Thus, the market restores approximately 17.18 percent of distortion per 
year following a disruption. Although, response to shocks improved compared to the DFE case, 
more than 80 percent of consumption shock will still not be restored without public stockholding. 
The response to shock is slow and, hence, not sufficiently swift to assure food security in 
                                                          
9 International markets allocates global production to consumption in an open economy. The amount produced in the 
country is determined by international prices relative to domestic prices. Hence, the response to shocks are attributed 
to trade even though part of it might be coming from domestic production.  
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developing countries. As a result, holding public stocks to support consumption may be legitimate 
in these countries.  
The third case of market response to consumption shock is estimated under the MG model, where 
countries are assumed to have different consumption patterns and response to shocks. Under this 
assumption the estimated consumption response to a shock improves to 41.02 percent (and 
significant at 1 percent). The market restores approximately 41 percent of distortion per year 
following a disruption. The response to shocks is an improvement compared PMG and DFE case. 
However, it is still slow because more than 50 percent of the shock cannot be corrected following 
a disruption. As a result, holding public stocks to support consumption may be legitimate in these 
countries.  
The Hausman test for model selection between PMG and MG is significant at 1 percent. This 
implies that the MG model under which countries have different consumption patterns and 
responses to shocks is preferred to the PMG. However, the comparison between PMG and DFE is 
not significant which implies that the DFE is superior.  Consequently, it is possible to generalise 
that the market mechanism (i.e. trade) corrects approximately 12 percent of rice consumption 
distortions in NFIDCs developing countries. However, the choice of model has no consequence 
on the main conclusions reached because responses are slow under each model. The DFE, MG and 
PMG all suggest that food stockholding can be a legitimate policy in developing countries because 
responses are slow. Hence, the conclusion remains the same irrespective of which model is used. 
As a result, this study generalises that market response to rice consumption shocks ranges from a 
minimum of 12 percent to maximum of 41 percent in developing countries. This is risky for food 
security because more than 50 percent of distortions to consumption following a shock cannot be 
restored. This is a concern because consumption distortions are relatively large in developing 
countries. Hence, allowing public stockholding in support of food security is a legitimate policy 
consideration in these countries. 
 
2.6.3.2 Consumption response to shocks: corn 
The estimated error correction models for corn are presented in Table 2.5. Price of wheat and rice 
were excluded due to multicollinearity issues. The chi-square test for overall model significance 
 39 
   
for MG, PMG and DFE models are each significant at 1 percent. This implies that international 
price of corn, trade openness and income jointly explain corn consumption in developing countries. 
Thus, the estimated models are valid. The results are discussed by impacts of international prices, 
trade openness and income; and the estimated market responses. 
 
Table 2. 5 Corn model results 
Dependent variable: Corn consumption  
                                  Variable MG  PMG DFE 
Long-run  International price of corn (-1) -0.2347 -0.0884 -0.3615* 
   (0.2425) (0.0575) (0.2052) 
  Trade openness (-1) 0.3725 0.0082 0.1678 
   (1.1411) (0.0553) (0.1551) 
      
  GDP (-1) 0.6736*** 0.5612*** 0.7016*** 
   (0.2033) (0.0189) (0.0800) 
      
Short-run  ∆ International price of corn 0.1401 0.0658 0.0436 
   (0.0835) (0.0437) (0.0386) 
      
  ∆ Trade openness -0.0230 -0.0790 0.0627 
   (0.1040) (0.1887) (0.0454) 
      
  ∆ GDP -0.0460 0.1078 0.0603 
   (0.0572) (0.0911) (0.0470) 
      
Response  −(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒊𝒋) -0.3125*** -0.1564*** -0.1384*** 
   (0.0302) (0.0235) (0.0100) 
      
Overall model significance (chi-square(7))  141.66***             1919.68*** 381.92*** 
Hausman stat. (chi-square(3))               0.33                            6.26  
Sample size  2543                      2543    2543 
***, ** and * are 1 percent, 5 percept and 10 percent significance level. 
Model performance: DFE>PMG>MG. Hence, DFE is the statistically selected model. 
Note: values in parentheses are standard errors 
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2.6.3.2.1 Impact of prices, trade openness and income on corn consumption 
The international price of corn, trade openness and income have the expected signs on long-term 
corn consumption in developing countries.  
 
The international price of corn negatively affect long-run consumption as expected. This implies 
that rising prices reduces purchasing power and, hence, negatively affect food consumption. 
International prices are, however, found to be only significant (10 percent) under the DFE. In the 
long-run, a 1 percent increase in price leads to a decrease in corn consumption by 0.36 percent in 
developing countries. In the short-term, price increase have no significant effects on corn 
consumption. This suggest that price increases have more devastating effects on cereal 
consumption and food security in the long-run. The effects are larger in the long-term because the 
substitutability between cereals/food stuffs end up increasing food prices in the long-term, leading 
to greater impact on consumption.  
National income has the expected positive effect on long-run corn consumption in developing 
countries, and is significant at 1 percent.  As such, a rise in the national income leads to an increase 
in consumption. This is because an increase in income enhances purchasing power ceteris paribus. 
The results shows that a 1 percent increase in GDP leads to an increase in corn consumption of 
0.67 percent, 0.56 percent and 0.70 percent under the MG, PMG and DFE respectively in the long-
run. In the short-term, national income has no significant impact on rice consumption. Thus, the 
results implies that growth in incomes will enhance these countries corn consumption and food 
security in the long-term.  In the short-term, such impacts are not significant in the case of corn.  
Trade openness has no significant impact on corn consumption in developing countries. This is 
not surprising because most corn trade is targeted at poultry and animal feed and the production of 
biofuels, which are largely based in developed countries. Corn consumption in developing 
countries often arise from domestic production.   
 
2.6.3.2.2 Estimated market response to consumption shocks  
Consumption responses to shocks are considerably low in NFIDCs. For the case of DFE, where 
countries are assumed to have the same consumption patterns in the long and short-runs, the market 
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restores about 13.84 percent of consumption distortions per year. As such, over 85 percent of food 
consumption distortion cannot be restored. This does not assure food security in that large shocks 
could create significant food deficit, drive up food prices and consign a significant population into 
extreme hunger in developing countries. Thus, the availability of public food stocks in these 
countries could enable governments to alleviate these potential impacts.  Where countries are 
assumed to have same consumption patterns (PMG) in the long-run, the estimated response to a 
shock is 15.64 percent, and, is significant at 1 percent. The market therefore corrects only 
approximately 15.64 percent of consumption distortions per year. As a result, restoring 
consumption will therefore require countries to have some stocks in anticipation.  
Under the MG, where countries are assumed to have different consumption patterns and response 
to shocks, the estimated response is 31.25 percent (and is significant at 1 percent). The response 
to shocks is an improvement over PMG and DFE but it is still low because more than 50 percent 
of consumption cannot be restored by relying on the market in the event of a shock. This poses a 
risk to food security especially when the shock is considerably high. As a result, holding public 
stocks to support consumption may be legitimate in these countries.  
The DFE is the selected model based on Hausman test.  Consequently, it is possible to generalise 
that the market mechanism (i.e. trade) corrects approximately 13.84 percent of corn consumption 
distortions in NFIDCs developing countries. However, the choice of model has no consequence 
on the conclusions reached from this study. This is because responses are slow under each model. 
The DFE, MG and PMG all suggest that food stockholding can be a legitimate policy in developing 
countries. Hence, the conclusion remains the same irrespective of which model is used. As a result, 
it is generalised that market response to corn consumption shock ranges from minimum of 13 
percent to maximum of 31 percent in developing countries. This may be risky for food security 
because more than 50 percent of consumption distortion are unlikely to be restored in the event of 
a shock. Hence, allowing public stockholding in support of food security can be a legitimate policy 
consideration in these countries.  
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2.6.3.3 Consumption response to shocks: wheat 
The error correction models for wheat are presented in the Table 2.6. The price of rice and corn 
were excluded due to multicollinearity problems. The estimated MG, PMG and DFE models are 
each significant at 1 percent. Thus, trade openness, income and international price of wheat jointly 
explain wheat consumption in developing countries, and the estimated models are valid. The 
results are discussed by impacts of international prices, trade openness and income; and the 
estimated market responses. 
 
Table 2. 6 Wheat model results 
Dependent variable: Wheat consumption  
                                  Variable MG  PMG DFE 
Long-run  International price  of wheat (-1) -0.4283*** -0.2902*** -0.2831*** 
   (0.0761) (0.0305) (0.0989) 
  Trade openness (-1) 0.4423*** 0.2101*** 0.2596*** 
   (0.1030) (0.0349) (0.0788) 
      
  GDP(-1) 0.7094*** 0.5688*** 0.6119*** 
   (0.0608) (0.0123) (0.0431) 
      
Short-run  ∆ International price of wheat 0.0721** -0.0213 -0.0449 
   (0.0285) (0.0251) (0.0304) 
      
  ∆ Trade openness -0.0197 0.0204 0.0335 
   (0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0365) 
      
  ∆ GDP -0.03457 0.0558 0.0496 
   (0.0490) (0.0470) (0.0380) 
      
Response  −(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒊𝒋) -0.4615*** -0.2464*** -0.2241*** 
   (0.0407) (0.0334) (0.0119) 
      
Overall model significance (Chi-square(7)) 155.39*** 4835.02*** 884.50*** 
Hausman stat.(Chi-square(3))              5.06        0.97 
Sample size 2560  2560  2560 
***, ** and * are 1 percent, 5 percept and 10 percent significance level. 
Model performance: DFE>PMG>MG. Hence, DFE is the statistically selected model. 
Note: values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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2.6.3.3.1 Impact of prices, trade openness and income on rice consumption 
The international price of wheat, trade openness and income have the expected effects on long-
term wheat consumption under the MG, PMG and DFE models.  
The international price of wheat has the expected negative effects on wheat consumption, and is 
significant at 1 percent for all cases. Thus, a rise in wheat price will reduce consumption in 
developing countries. The results show that a 1 percent increase in international price of wheat 
leads to 0.43 percent, 0.32 percent and 0.29 percent decrease in consumption under the MG, PMG 
and DFE respectively in the long-run. Wheat price has the expected negative effects on 
consumption under DFE and PMG in the short-run but is not significant. This implies that price 
increases have more negative consequences on long-run consumption than it does in the short-
term.  The effects are larger in the long-term because the substitutability between cereals/food 
drive up long-term food prices leading to greater impact on consumption.  
Further, trade openness and income have significant (1 percent) positive effects on long-run wheat 
consumption in developing countries. For instance, the results shows that a 1 percent increase in 
trade openness increase wheat consumption by 0.44 percent, 0.21 percent and 0.25 percent under 
MG, PMG and DFE respectively in the long-run. Trade openness has no significant effects on 
short-term wheat consumption. A possible explanation for why openness to trade largely has an 
impact on the long-run is that the benefits of trade openness arise from efficiency gains which 
leads to changes in resource use in the long-run. Without resource adjustment (as happens in the 
short-run), such benefits cannot be captured.  In the case of income, the results shows that  a 1 
percent increase in national income will lead to an increase in wheat consumption of 0.71 percent, 
0.57 percent and 0.61 percent under MG, PMG and DFE respectively in the long-run. Income has 
no significant impact on short-run consumption.  
  
2.6.3.3.2 Estimated market response to consumption shocks 
Wheat consumption responses are low in developing countries. The estimated response to shocks 
under the DFE is 22.41 percent and significant at 1 percent.  This implies that the market restores 
about 22.41 percent of consumption distortions when countries are assumed to have the same 
consumption patterns. Consequently, over 75 percent of the distortions to cereal consumption may 
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not be corrected in the event of a shock. This poses a risk to food security in developing countries 
since shock to consumption are considerably large in these countries. Thus, holding public stocks 
can be justified in these countries.  Under the PMG where countries are assumed to have same 
long-run consumption patterns, the market corrects about 24.64 percent of consumption distortion 
annually. In the case of MG, where countries are assumed to have different consumption patterns 
and response to shocks, the market corrects approximately 46.15 percent of a consumption 
distortion annually.   
The DFE is the selected model based on Hausman test.  Consequently, it is possible to generalise 
that the market mechanism (i.e. trade) corrects approximately 22.41 percent of wheat consumption 
distortions in NFIDCs developing countries. However, the choice of model has no consequence 
on the conclusions reached in this study. This because responses are slow under each model. The 
DFE, MG and PMG all suggest that food stockholding can be a legitimate policy in developing 
countries. Hence, the conclusion remains the same irrespective of which model is used. As a result, 
the study generalises that market response to a wheat consumption shock ranges from a minimum 
of 22 percent to a maximum of 46 percent in developing countries. This is risky for food security 
in developing countries because more than 50 percent of distortions may not be corrected in the 
event of a food shock in developing countries. Since these countries face a considerably large 
shocks, allowing public stockholding in support of food security can be a legitimate policy 
consideration.  
 
2.7 Summary results and implications for stockholding 
This chapter investigated the speed of market response to consumption shocks and its implication 
for food security and public stockholding in developing countries. Response to shocks measured 
the extent to which a disruption in consumption can be mitigated by relying on the market. It is 
posited that where responses are low, then relying on the market to restore consumption is a risk 
to food security. This analysis was explored using a panel error correction model applied to wheat, 
rice and corn. The results established key findings that are relevant to public stockholding and food 
security policy in developing countries. More importantly, the results provide useful insights for 
the ongoing WTO policy debate regarding food security and public stockholding in developing 
countries.  These results are summarized below (Table 2.5). 
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   Table 2. 7 Estimated market responses 
 Mean Group 
(MG) 
Pooled mean Group 
(PMG) 
Dynamic Fixed Effect 
(DFE) 
Rice 41.02 17.18 12.03* 
Corn 31.25 15.64 13.84* 
Wheat 46.15 24.64 22.41* 
  Asterisk (*) mask the statistically selected model.  
 
The results suggest that distortions in cereal consumption cannot be swiftly restored to assure food 
security in times of shock. For instance, the estimated consumption response indicates that the 
market mitigates at most: 41 percent of a rice consumption distortion; 31 percent of a corn 
consumption distortion; and 46 percent of a wheat consumption distortion in times of shock. 
Conversely, the market fails to restore approximately 59 percent of rice consumption shocks; 69 
percent of corn consumption shocks; and 54 percent of wheat consumption shocks in times of food 
crisis. Thus, over 50 percent of the distortions to consumption cannot be restored by relying on the 
market.  In developing countries, where cereals are an integral part of food consumption, a 
considerably short-fall in consumption availability can significantly increase prices and consign 
several vulnerable population into extreme hunger given the low responses. It therefore follows 
that consumption responses are not sufficiently swift to assure food security in developing 
countries. Hence, government intervention, including the use of public stocks, could be justified. 
Further, while the econometric test suggest that the DFE model is best in each case, this has no 
consequence on the conclusions reached. This is because responses are slow under each model. 
The DFE, MG and PMG all suggest that food stockholding can be a legitimate policy in developing 
countries. Hence, the conclusion remains the same irrespective of which model is used. 
As a robustness check to these results, a similar estimate from net food exporting developing 
countries (NFEDCs) faced with comparable levels of food security risk, however, reveals a 
stronger response. Food security is also a concern for NFEDCs. However, NFEDCs’ markets can 
restore more than 50 percent of rice, corn and wheat consumption distortions per year. A possible 
explanation for the higher response (compared to NFIDCs) can be attributed to their ability to limit 
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food exports in times of shocks. The NFEDCs governments are able to limit food exports in 
response to public outcry when food prices rise in order to enable a swifter restoration of domestic 
consumption, unlike NFIDCs. Even though this has negative influence on importers food security, 
limiting exports in favour of domestic consumption is permitted under the WTO.  
Further, estimates for net food exporting developed (NFEDEVCs) and net food importing 
developed (NFIDEVCs) countries shows that  the markets mitigates close to 60 percent of rice, 
corn and wheat consumption distortions. The higher response is attributable to low transaction 
costs and higher market integration which enhances quicker responses compared to developing 
countries. First of all, food security is not a substantial issue in developed economies. Hence, the 
use of trade policies to limit exports in favour of domestic consumption is not common. Secondly, 
many developed countries are involved in regional trade agreements which reduced tariffs to zero. 
These, together with significant transport infrastructure supports speedy responses. Thus, these 
countries can afford to rely on trade to restore a significant proportion of their food needs without 
stockholding, unlike developing countries.  
In terms of the relevance of the conclusions to WTO policy debates on public stockholding, the 
results suggest that food security can be negatively affected in countries without stocks to support 
consumption in the event of a shock. This is because market responses are too slow to assure food 
security. Trade cannot be relied upon to swiftly restore consumption or address food security in 
the event of a food crisis. The slow responses have been found to be peculiar to only NFIDCs. 
Thus, there is the need for government interventions in these countries. Hence, public stockholding 
in NFIDCs can be a legitimate policy. Public stocks are also important in NFIDCs because current 
WTO regulations on export restrictions have not been resolved. This renders food importing 
countries without public stockholding programs to be vulnerable to export restrictions.   
The research results also show that trade openness and income enhances food security to a greater 
degree in the longer term. Such impacts are not substantial, for the most part, in the short-run.  
Further, while international prices have larger negative consequences on long-run cereal 
consumption and food security in NFIDCs10, their short-term impacts are not significant. The trade 
                                                          
10 The results discussed were estimated without prices of related cereals due to multi-collinearity. As a robustness 
check, price of wheat, corn and rice where summed and divided by 3. This served as an average cereal price index 
which is an embodiment of all cereal prices. Similarly, rice, corn and wheat were aggregated and divided by 3 to 
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openness results generally agree with the recommendations of Konandreas (2012) and Dorosh 
(2008) suggesting that countries facilitate trade in order to enhance food security in developing 
countries. The results also finds evidence that income enhances consumption in NFIDCs as 
established in Konandreas (2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
obtain average cereals consumption for each country. This was then regressed against trade openness, average cereal 
prices and income. The estimated market response was still low (less than 34 percent).  
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Appendix  
 
Table 2A. 1 List of countries used in the study 
NFIDCs NFEDCs NFIDEVCs NFEDEVCs 
Afghanistan Madagascar Argentina United States Italy 
Algeria Malawi Brazil Canada Japan 
Bangladesh Mali Ukraine Australia Portugal 
Belize Mauritania Thailand New Zealand Sweden 
Benin Mongolia South Africa Netherlands Switzerland 
Burkina Faso Morocco Russia Spain United Kingdom 
Central African Republic Mozambique    
Cambodia Namibia    
Cameroon Nepal    
Chad Nicaragua    
China, mainland Niger    
Cote d’Ivoire Nigeria    
Cuba Pakistan    
Dominican Republic Panama    
Egypt Peru    
El Salvador The Philippines    
Gabon Senegal    
Gambia Sierra Leone    
Ghana Tanzania    
Guatemala Togo    
Guinea Trinidad and Tobago    
Guinea-Bissau Tunisia    
Guyana Uganda    
Haiti Venezuela    
Honduras Vietnam    
India Zambia    
Indonesia Zimbabwe    
Jamaica     
Kenya     
Lao     
Liberia     
 
Key 
NFIDCs – Net food importing developing countries 
NFEDCs - Net food exporting developing countries 
NFIDEVCs – Net food importing developed countries 
NFEDEVCs – Net food exporting developed countries 
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Table 2A. 2 Fisher-Panel unit root test 
                    Levels Difference 
Variable  Test Constant Trend Constant Trend 
 P 105.0055* 12.1174 488.7723* 401.5658* 
Wheat consumption Z -3.1076* 7.7034 -18.3000* -15.4245* 
 L* -3.2894* 8.2430 -24.2585* -19.7997* 
 Pm  3.8620* -4.4796  38.3253*  30.4939* 
      
 P 236.1912* 60.1577 822.8082* 628.3863* 
Corn consumption Z -5.4759* 5.1654 -22.9749* -17.4256* 
 L* -6.2762* 5.6503 -31.7060* -23.6669* 
 Pm 9.3953* -2.9295 50.4667* 36.8544* 
      
 P 201.1818* 38.6396 774.3030* 611.7578* 
Rice consumption Z -4.5517* 8.0547 -22.4260* -17.8126* 
 L* -4.5605* 8.4678 -30.0954* -23.2528* 
 Pm 7.1546* -4.6924 47.6804* 36.1867* 
      
 P 152.8271*** 76.7204 512.1582*** 180.2825*** 
GDP Z -3.9983*** 1.8859 -16.9592*** -4.6461*** 
 L* -3.7923*** 1.8145 -19.6298*** -4.8958*** 
 Pm  3.5586*** -1.7699 28.7168*** 5.6909*** 
      
 P 101.4789* 102.2952 520.5261* 280.5729* 
Rice export price  Z -5.6006* -0.3796 -17.7219* -9.0970* 
 L* -11.017* -0.3942 21.1231* -10.3119* 
 Pm 15.4430* 0.7590 31.5914* 13.9020* 
      
 P -11.1306* -0.3796 -17.7219* -9.0970* 
 Z -11.8017* -0.3942 21.1231* -10.3119* 
Wheat export price L* 15.4430* 0.7590 31.5914* 13.9020* 
 Pm -9.8493* 3.0742 -18.2504* -7.7392* 
      
 P 0.0000 0.0000 -17.7219* -9.0970* 
Corn export price Z - - 21.1231* -10.3119* 
 L* - - 31.5914* 13.9020* 
 Pm - -7.1414 -18.2504* -7.7392* 
      
 P 390.4014*** 129.8669** 777.4799*** 639.0078*** 
Trae openness Z -13.3687*** -1.0932 -22.5530*** -19.5328*** 
 L* -14.7521*** -1.5893 -30.0144*** -24.5774**** 
 Pm -20.1921*** 1.9511** 47.2931*** 37.5981*** 
      
Note: *; **; *** indicate significance at 1%; 5% and 10% levels, at 2 lags.  
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Table 2A. 3 Westerlund panel cointegration test 
 
Ho: No cointegration in each panel 
Ha: At least cointegration exist in one panel  
 
    Panel cointegration test: Rice model (with constant and trend) 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -3.659 -5.027 0.000*** 
Ga -20.405 -2.783 0.003*** 
Pt -14.209 -3.104 0.001*** 
Pa -16.885 -2.839 0.002*** 
  Note: *; **; *** indicate significance at 1%; 5% and 10% levels.  
 
  Panel cointegration test: Corn model (with constant and trend) 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -2.641 0.323 0.627 
Ga -15.226 0.167 0.566 
Pt -13.766 -2.922 0.002*** 
Pa -18.167 -3.523 0.000*** 
  Note: *; **; *** indicate significance at 1%; 5% and 10% levels.  
 
   Panel cointegration test: Wheat model (with constant and trend) 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -3.089 -2.028 0.021** 
Ga -16.593 -0.608 0.272 
Pt -12.957 -1.773 0.038** 
Pa -14.289 -1.282 0.100* 
 Note: *; **; *** indicate significance at 1%; 5% and 10% levels.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Restrictiveness of aggregate measure of support on public stockholding for 
food security purposes  
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the restrictiveness of the de minimis aggregate measure of support 
(AMS) restriction on public stockholding for food security purposes in developing countries. 
The chapter focuses on rice, corn and wheat in the G-33 countries. Using a two-period 
intertemporal storage model, optimal public stocks required to ensure food security are 
estimated and compared with stock levels permitted under the WTO. The policy is restrictive 
if optimal public stocks required to achieve food security are constrained by WTO permitted 
stock levels. The results shows that the current de minimis AMS policy is restrictive on 
stockholding for food security in selected countries. Hence, expanding the regulation to 
enhance stockholding can be justified in the case of these countries. The policy is, however, 
not restrictive on stockholding in India and China.  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Public stockholding is an important facet of food security policy because food scarcity can lead to 
catastrophic social and economic costs (Gardner, 1979). The Great Chinese Famine (1959-1961), 
arguably the most devastating famine of the 20th century, is estimated to have caused between 16 
million to 45 million deaths due to food scarcity (Meng et al, 2015).  A number of studies also 
attribute the recent political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, at least in part, to the 
2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food crises (Lagi et al, 2011;  Malik and Awadallah, 2013; Sternberg, 
2012). According to Zurayk (2011) as reported by The Observer newspaper, in Egypt for instance: 
 
“When grain prices spiked in 2007-2008, Egypt's bread prices rose 37%. With unemployment 
rising as well, more people depended on subsidized bread – but the government did not make 
any more available. Egypt's annual food price inflation continued and had hit 18.9% before the 
fall of President Mubarak”. 
 
In an integrated global economy, public stockholdings for food security purposes is usually 
pursued in countries where market supplies are inadequate to achieve food security. Consequently, 
 56 
 
countries exposed to higher degrees of food security risk, in particular, tend to hold public 
stockpiles to mitigate its potential impact.  This is important for developing countries because a 
considerable percentage of their people face high food security risk.  
The renewed interest in public stockholding, in recent years, follows the challenges faced by food 
importing countries during the 2007/2008 food crisis.  The spike in global food prices (Fig 3.1) 
threatened food security in exporting and importing developing countries (DFID, 2013). 
Consequently, food exports were restricted from some major agricultural countries including 
Ukraine, Russia, China and Argentina in order to protect their domestic food security (Sharma, 
2011).  The absence of food stocks in low-income food deficit countries pushed over 75 million 
additional people into extreme hunger (FAO, 2008; World Bank, 2009).  Rapsomanikis (2009) 
notes that the rapid increase in food prices also translated into unanticipated and large import bills 
for food and foreign exchange problems for most countries which were already facing a range of 
food security challenges.  
 
         Fig 3. 1 Rice, maize and wheat price indices 
 
              Source: IMF, cited in DFID (2013). 
 
While these events suggest a role for stockholding in developing countries, the amount of stocks 
a country can hold is restricted under WTO agreement. The WTO limits are focused on the trade 
distortionary aspects of public stockholding programs because stock acquisition provides a direct 
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subsidy to producers  (Matthews, 2012, 2014a, 2014b)11. Public stocks can be an important social 
intervention for countries faced with food insecurity. However, because stocks are acquired at an 
intervention price usually above the competitive market prices, the price difference becomes a 
subsidy which induces additional production beyond the competitive market level. For large 
importers, subsidy-induced domestic production can reduce imports and depress international 
prices. Similarly for large exporters, stockholding can increase exports, depress international 
prices and discourage long-term agricultural production and reduce food security in other 
economies. Thus, domestic subsidies, including those used to acquire public stocks, are part of 
country’s Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The aggregate domestic support levels were 
negotiated down and bound during the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations as a result of their 
perceived trade distortions. Consequently, countries remain critical about the levels of support 
provided to industries because the violation of these limits can attract disciplinary measures from 
other WTO members.   
 
Support to public stockholding is one of the major ways through which countries are likely to 
violate their bound subsidy levels. In the case of public stockholding, the total subsidy/support 
provided to stock acquisition is determined based on the price difference between the intervention 
and an external reference price. Mathematically, the total AMS provided in public stock 
acquisition is stated as,  
 
 𝐴𝑀𝑆 =  
[𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒]
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 100           (3.1) 
 
The intervention price, also known as government administered price, refers to the price at which 
public stocks were acquired from domestic producers (Montemayor, 2014). The fixed external 
reference price is the base price upon which the government administered price is compared to. 
The fixed external reference price is the 1986-1988 average of the cost insurance freight (c.i.f.) 
                                                          
11 It is largely understood that all forms of subsidies are trade distortionary including public stock acquisition but the 
WTO restrictions, however, exempt subsidies for research and development, environmental protection and other 
regional development programs (the “green box” subsidies) because they are perceived to have minimal trade impacts. 
Whether the latter is a correct presumption is, of course, an empirical question. 
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prices of product notified to the WTO (Montemayor, 2014).  The WTO text does not explicitly 
state what constitute eligible production. As a result, eligible production has been operationalized 
either as total production or total stock acquired.   
The potential for stockholding to distort trade has therefore brought limits on the extent to which 
countries can subsidies stockholding. The maximum agreed limit of AMS allowed under the WTO 
is known as the de minimis limit. For developing countries, de minimis AMS on actionable 
subsidies to farmers, including the acquisition of public stockholding, cannot exceed 10 percent of 
the total value of production. The de minimis limit for developed countries is 5 percent of the value 
of domestic production. Any evidence of de minimis violation may attract countervailing duty 
action against products of the affected country.  
To illustrate how the de minimis AMS feeds into bound AMS, assume the total value of a cereal 
(e.g. corn) produced in a given year is $100 million. Further assume the subsidy provided by 
government in stock acquisition is $9 million.  In this instance, the AMS for stockholding 
constitutes 9 percent of the value of domestic production. Since this is below the de minimis 
requirement (i.e. 10 percent), the entire $9 million will not count towards the bound AMS. In 
another instance, if subsidy provided in stock acquisition was $30 million, this will amount to 30 
percent of the value of domestic production. Since this is above the de minimis requirement, the 
entire $30 million will count towards the bound AMS level. Bound subsidy levels were relatively 
low (or even zero) for most developing countries because agricultural subsidies, in general, were 
low. Consequently, any violation of the de minimis AMS requirement immediately pushes 
countries towards their bound subsidy limits or causes them to violate their bound limits.   
The de minimis limit, in effect, determines the maximum annual levels of public stocks a country 
can acquire without violating its WTO commitment irrespective of a country’s food security risk 
level. This is a non-issue if the de minimis permitted stocks are optimal to achieve food security. 
De minimis is also not a concern if private sector storage is sufficient to achieve food security 
without the need for government intervention. However, for many developing countries whose 
private sector is faced with diverse forms of transaction costs and market failures, a stringent 
requirement for governments to limit stockholdings may be injurious to food security if private 
market storage is inadequate. The impact of such a restriction can be more severe for countries 
exposed to a higher degree of food security risk. For this group of countries, relaxing the AMS 
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policy to enable them expand their stockholding can be legitimate. The number of G-33 countries 
that have, however, reached their de minimis limit are unknown because countries have not been 
transparent with their stockholding data. Notwithstanding, there has been challenges on 
stockholding activities  of developing countries (including India, China, Indonesia) which seem to 
suggest that these countries might be exceeding their limits. Though countries typically do not 
reveal their stock levels, inferences about their de minimis subsidy are based on notified external 
references prices to the WTO, current prices in their domestic economies and actual production 
levels even though affected countries disagree with the use of actual production12.   
The de minimis limit on stockholding was largely a non-issue prior to the 2007/2008 food crisis 
because stockholding acquisitions in developing countries were low (Konandreas and Mermigkas, 
2014). With growing uncertainty about future food security, the incentive to support agriculture 
and acquire public stocks for food security purposes intensified. For instance, the New Food 
Security Act of India hopes to distribute foods from public stocks to an estimated 75 percent of its 
population. This represents a dramatic expansion in stockholding expenditure for India (Dreze, 
2013; Fritz, 2014).  In Brazil - a country with the largest public stocks, government expenditure 
on stockholding is expected to increase considerably as it prepares to double the number of 
beneficiaries under its zero hunger project (Fritz, 2014). With these intended expansions in 
stockholding activities across developing countries, the de minimis restriction is set to become a 
significant barrier to government’s ability to support stockholding for food security purposes.   
Consequently, a group of developing countries, referred to as the G-33, petitioned the WTO for 
regulatory changes to the limits on public stockholding (WTO, 2013). The G-33 argued that the 
manner in which AMS is calculated puts vulnerable developing countries at risk of breeching their 
de minimis limit. This is because, first, the fixed external reference price upon which AMS values 
were based (the 1986-88 average c.i.f.) does not account for inflation. Secondly, global prices were 
depressed over 1986-88 period thereby widening the gap between the intervention and reference 
                                                          
12 Countries use actual production level because the WTO text does not explicitly specify what constitute “eligible 
production” in the AMS determination (equation 3.1).  As such stockholding countries argue it should be the actual 
stock levels acquired (which they do not reveal) while countries challenging stockholding argue it is total 
production (which is observed). Consequently, countries challenging the de minimis AMS often use actual 
production even though affected countries disagree.   
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price (ICTSD, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Matthews, 2014a; Montemayor, 2014).  The two effects 
combine to inflate the AMS figure and increase the likelihood of violating the de minimis limit. 
Consequently, the G-33 wants public stockholding for food security purposes to be allowed 
without limits.  
Even under the current policy, contention remains among countries on how the AMS should be 
determined. This is because the WTO’s legal text does not explicitly define what constitutes 
“eligible production” in the determination of AMS. Whereas some interpret “eligible production” 
to mean total production, others suggest it should be actual stock levels acquired (DTB, 2011, 
2014). Notwithstanding the fact that “total production” increases the chance of violating de 
minimis, data on actual stocks procured for public stockholding programs for most countries are 
not readily available (ICTSD, 2015).   The failure to reach agreement on appropriate subsidy levels 
led to the introduction of the Peace Clause which temporarily protect stockholding programs from 
being challenged by other WTO member countries while a lasting solution is sought in the coming 
years (Haberli, 2014). Finding a lasting solution to stockholding is one of the contemporary issues 
being considered under the WTO.  
As a result, a number of proposals have been made regarding public stockholding restrictions 
following the petition. These include: (1) expanding the de minimis limits for developing countries; 
and (2) adjusting AMS for the rate of inflation associated with the fixed external reference price 
(Diaz-Bonilla, 2013; Matthews, 2014a). Using total production, Montemayor (2014) undertakes 
simulations which indicate that strict application of AMS increases the likelihood of de minimis 
violation. Further, applying AMS to foodstocks notified to the WTO revealed that India’s rice 
program did not violate AMS when reference prices are adjusted for inflation (Konandreas and 
Mermigkas, 2014) consequently giving credence to calls to account for inflation in the AMS 
determination. Although these studies provide useful insights into AMS restrictions, public stocks 
needed to achieve food security or adjustment to AMS such that food security can be achieved in 
developing countries have not been examined. Moreover, no empirical studies have examined as 
to whether or not the current AMS regulation even constitute a restriction on food security in 
developing countries.  
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The chapter contributes to assessing the need for public stockholding policies in developing 
countries. However, the assessment focuses on whether or not the current de minimis AMS policy 
constitutes a restriction on public stockholding for food security purposes. The research argues 
that it will be legitimate for public stockholding policies to be expanded in developing countries if 
the current de minimis AMS regulations constitute a constraint on stock levels needed to achieve 
food security.  The specific objective of this chapter is, therefore, to evaluate the restrictiveness of 
de minimis AMS policy on optimal public stockholding for food security purposes in developing 
countries, focusing on G-33. Further, while the de minimis limits does not consider the level of 
risk faced by countries, there are, however, considerably reasons to believe that a stringent 
regulation that limits government’s ability to provide public stock will be more severe on countries 
faced with higher food security risk. Consequently, the restrictiveness analysis is conducted by 
categorising countries as having high, moderate and low food security risk levels. 
 
A key assumption is made in order to undertake this analysis. The research primarily assumes that 
public stocks are required only when the market fails to provide sufficient stocks to achieve food 
security. Based on this assumption, the following steps are taken to evaluate the de minimis AMS 
policy’s restrictiveness on public stockholding for food security purposes. 
1. Optimal stock levels needed to achieve food security in each country are determined. 
This is referred to as ‘food security consistent stocks’.  
2. Optimal public stocks required in each country is determined. Optimal public stocks is 
the difference between ‘food security consistent stocks’ and the ‘observed market 
storage’. 
3. Public stock levels permitted under the WTO (i.e. de minimis permitted stocks) are 
estimated.  
4. Finally, the restrictiveness is evaluated by comparing ‘optimal public stock levels 
required to achieve food security’ with ‘permitted public stocks levels under the WTO’. 
Optimal public stocks in excess of permitted public stocks indicates that the de minimis 
AMS policy is restrictive. 
The restrictiveness of the de minimis AMS policy often arises during a major food crisis where 
countries desire to hold stocks but are not permitted to do so as a result of the policy. While some 
countries can still be constrained in normal years, the availability of alternative market 
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opportunities (through which countries can imports) reduces such concerns. Under normal years, 
markets are not typically interrupted. Consequently, a shock to a country’s consumption can be 
resolved by importing from other countries.  The AMS restrictiveness analysis therefore requires 
specific years where a food crisis occurred. This study uses the most recent food crisis of 
2010/2011. While a number of food crisis occurred prior to 2010/2011, the recent 2010/2011 food 
crisis is preferred because it will provide the most current information about the extent of 
restriction posed by the de minimis policy. The restrictiveness analysis focus on stocks to be carried 
from 2010/2011 to 2011/2012. The research is conducted using wheat, corn and rice because these 
cereals form the core of food security stock programs in developing countries.  
The study is important because the evaluation of AMS restrictiveness on public stockholding for 
food security purposes will be helpful to parties negotiating stockholding policy at the WTO. 
Specifically, knowledge of AMS restrictiveness is important in determining whether or not the 
current AMS should be expanded for developing countries. The remainder of the chapter is 
organized as follows: section 3.2 is an overview of food security and cereal stocks in the G-33 
developing countries; section 3.3 reviews the relevant literature on AMS and public stockholding; 
section 3.4 develops the methodology used in the paper; section 3.5 provides the results and 
discussion; and section 3.6 offers conclusions and recommendations.  
 
3.2 The current state of food security in G-33  
The FAO employs a number of metrics for measuring food security. These metrics cover food 
availability, accessibility, stability of supply and utilization.  The most widely used measure for 
comparing food security across countries is ‘Prevalence of Undernourishment’ (PoU). In the 
FAO’s (2014) report titled The State of Food Insecurity In the World, PoU forms the primary 
indicator for comparing food security across countries. The PoU measures the probability that a 
randomly selected individual of a country is undernourished (Naiken, 2003). A country is 
considered ‘hunger free’ and ‘food secured’ when probability of undernourishment falls below 5 
percent.  The  PoU is calculated as a 3-year moving average for each country. Hence the most 
current data (i.e. 2012-2014 average) is used to describe the current state of food security risk of 
G-33 members in this chapter. 
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Food security risk for 2012-2014 is shown in Fig 3.2. Food security risk is less than 5 percent in 
Europe, North America, Australia and, parts of Africa and South America. These are the food 
secure regions. Food security risk is high (i.e. greater than 5 percent) in sub-Saharan Africa, parts 
of Central and South America, and Asia. These are considered food security risk countries. Food 
security risk also varies among countries.  For instance, the risk is less in Nigeria (5-15 percent) 
compared to Madagascar where the chance of undernourishment is about 30 percent. 
 
Juxtaposed on the food security risk are the G-33 countries. Comparing the two maps,  it is revealed 
that G-33 members are largely food security risk countries. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World shows that, for 2014, about 65 percent of the world’s food insecure population (805 million) 
live in G-33 countries (FAO, 2014).  Food security issues are politically topical in G-33 because 
of their high dependency on food imports, which makes them vulnerable to trade policies of 
exporting countries (Konandreas, 2012).  As a result, food security policies in many countries have 
shifted towards building public foodstocks (especially cereals) in anticipation of shocks from 
domestic and international sources.   
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 Fig 3. 2 Food security risk and the G-33 group of developing countries 
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3.2.1 Cereal stocks in G-33 developing countries 
Cereal stocks comprise of public and private stocks. However, the proportions of public and 
private stocks are unknown because governments are usually unwilling to reveal the levels of 
stocks acquired. As a result, stocks reported in most countries are aggregated comprising of both 
private and public stockholdings. Cereal stocks discussed in this section are the aggregate stocks 
(private and public) reported for each country by the USDA.   
The G-33 account for a considerable proportion of global cereal stocks (Table 3.1). Average cereal 
stocks in the world over the period of 1960 to 2011 is approximately 313 million tonnes. Of these, 
168 million tonnes representing 53.8 percent of global stocks have been held in G-33 developing 
countries. The G-33 also held about 88 percent, 48.1 percent and 40.3 percent of the average global 
rice, corn and wheat stocks respectively from 1960 to 2011.  
 
Table 3. 1 Cereal stocks in G-33: 1960 - 2011 averages 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation using USDA data. 
 
In terms of trend, cereal stocks in the G-33 countries experienced three major changes over the 
period of 1960 to 2011 (Fig 3.3).  First, aggregate stocks increased considerably from 1960 to 
2000. Rice, corn and wheat stocks each increased from approximately 7 million tonnes in 1960 to 
130 million tonnes by 2000, representing over 1700 percent growth. This dramatic accumulation 
of stocks translated into an increased proportion of global stocks held in the G-33 countries. 
Cereal World (000 tonnes) G-33 (000 tonnes) % of world 
Rice  71,216.0 62,626.6 88.0 
Corn 107,595.0 51,775.7 48.1 
Wheat 134,210.0 54,027.2 40.3 
Total stocks 313,021.0 168,429.4 53.8 
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Fig 3. 3 Cereal stocks in G-33: 1960 - 2011 
  
Source: Author’s computation from USDA FAS data. 
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For instance, the G-33’s share of global rice stock increased from 60 to 88 percent while corn and 
wheat shares rose from 5 to 66 percent, and 8 to 60 percent, respectively.   The growth in stocks 
emanated primarily from East Asia (Fig 3.4) where devastating famines in China (the Great 
Chinese Famine13) and India (the Bengal Famine in 1943) are said to have influenced policies 
towards public stockholding. Consequently, stocks between 1960 and 2000 are arguably public 
stocks held to mitigate future supply shocks. The growth in stocks increased food security due to 
improvements in countries’ ability to support consumption in times of a food crisis.  
The second phase of change in cereal stocks occurred from 2000 to 2006 where wheat, rice and 
corn stocks declined considerably. Rice stocks declined from 130 million (in 2000) to 60 million 
tonnes (in 2006), signifying an over 50 percent reduction. Consequently, the G-33’s share of global 
rice stock declined from 88 percent to 76 percent. Corn and wheat stocks declined from 120 and 
122 million tonnes (in 2000) to 40 million and 45 million respectively by 2006, leading to decline 
in global shares from 60 percent to 30 percent in 2006. The decline in stocks can be attributed to 
two sources. First, China’s (the global leading stockholder) accession to WTO (in 2001) brought 
disciplines on government stockholding. Consequently, China and East Asian stocks declined 
considerably. This reaction, together, with a series of crop failures in major production regions 
including Ukraine, US and Argentina, and the increasing use of cereals for biofuel lead to a decline 
in stocks (Hansen, 2013). The decline in stocks eroded countries ability to mitigate food security 
risk and support consumption in times of a shock. Stocks reached their lowest level in 2007/2008 
and coincided with the 2007/2008 food crisis.  
The third phase of change to cereal stocks follows 2007 food crisis. Wheat, rice and corn stocks 
have been increasing since 2007. Corn, wheat and rice each increased from 40 million, 45 million 
and 58 million (in 2007) to 87 million, 92 million and 81 million tonnes (in 2014) respectively. 
The increase in stocks following 2007 is attributable to the food crisis of 2007, which reignited 
interest in building stocks for food security purposes in developing countries. Consequently, global 
corn, wheat and rice stocks began rising following 2007. This is in accordance with plans and 
policies to reduce food security risk in times of shocks.  Notwithstanding the change in stocks, the 
                                                          
13 The Bengal Famine led to over 3 million deaths (Sen, 1981). 
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amount of stocks directly under government control (i.e. public stocks) are largely unknown due 
to the unwillingness of countries to disclose their stock levels.  
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  Fig 3. 4 Rice, corn and wheat stocks by region: 1960 - 2011 
     
Source: Author’s computation from USDA FAS data. 
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3.2.2 Stock shares among G-33 developing countries  
Despite the significant accumulation of stocks in the G-33, most stocks are actually concentrated 
in China.  In 2010/2011, for example, China held approximately 60 percent, 74 percent and 83 
percent of total rice, wheat and corn stocks in G-33 countries (Fig 3.5). Other countries with 
considerable rice stocks include India, Indonesia and the Philippines, with approximately 20 
percent, 9 and 7 percent of rice stocks respectively. Thus, nearly 96 percent of rice stocks in G-33 
are controlled by China, India, Indonesia and Philippines. A considerable proportion of wheat 
stocks is also held by India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey, each holding 11 percent, 7 percent, 2 
percent and 2 percent respectively. Hence, approximately 96 percent of total wheat stocks in G-33 
have been held by China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey14.  
The importance of these stocks to the food security of their respective countries cannot be 
overemphasized. At risk countries desire to store against supply shocks. However, examining the 
volume of stocks alone provides no information about the comparative food security risk/strength 
across countries. This is because large countries will likely possess large stocks due to their high 
consumption relative to smaller countries. Thus, using aggregate stocks as a measure of food 
security risk/strength (without considering stocks on per capita basis) can be misleading, and can 
also be biased against smaller countries. Consequently, per capita stocks are examined, in the next 
section, in order to provide a comparative picture of the food security risk/strength provided by 
the stocks of each country.   
 
 
   
                                                          
14 Even though China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey have most stocks, whether or not these countries will 
require public stockholding programs is unknown. Further, it is also unknown which G-33 countries will require 
public stockholding. Hence, the study explores the entire G-33 countries to determine which ones could potentially 
benefit from stockholding programs.  
 71 
 
 
Fig 3. 5 Stock shares among G-33 countries: 2010/2011 
        
Source: Author’s computation from USDA FAS data. 
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3.2.3 Per capita stocks as a food security risk measure 
The high aggregate stocks in China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey may provide misleading 
indications about food security (without considering stocks on per capita basis) relative to other 
countries. This is because they are high population countries which store more tocks relative to 
other countries. Per capita stocks measures the stocks available to support individual consumption 
in times of shocks across countries. Hence, countries with high per capita stocks are more food 
secure and vice versa. The indicator also eliminates bias against smaller countries and provides a 
comparative measure of the strength of protection provided by food stocks in each country.   
To analyse the overall food security risk based on per capita stocks, wheat, corn and rice are 
converted to cereal equivalent. The cereal equivalent conversion, developed by FAO, assumes that 
rice, wheat and corn have the same amounts of calories per volume. Hence, 100kg of rice is 
equivalent to 100 kg of corn or wheat (see Rask and Rask, 2014). Consequently, wheat, corn and 
rice were converted to aggregate cereal equivalent (kg) and their per capita stocks determined (Fig 
3.6). The conversion is also important because countries usually stock less of commodities which 
constitute less in their consumption. This introduces bias when food security risk is analysed on 
per capita basis. Therefore, by converting cereals to aggregate equivalent, the bias against 
commodities less important in the consumption baskets are eliminated. Based on per capita stock, 
the study classified countries into three food security risk groups: high food security risk countries; 
moderate food security risk countries; and low food security risk countries.  
High food security risk countries have per capita stock of less than 30 kilogram per person. Some 
of the high food security risk countries face extreme risk because per capita stocks are zero. High 
food security risk countries include Barbados, Mauritius, Mongolia, Botswana, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Haiti, Nigeria, Benin, Uganda, Senegal, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Kenya, Zambia and Panama.  
Moderate security risk countries are classified as countries with per capita stock levels greater than 
30 kg and up to 60 kg. Moderately food security risk countries include India, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Venezuela, Peru, Turkey and Philippines.  
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Low food security risk countries are classified as countries with per capita stocks greater than 60kg.   
Low food security risk countries in this study include Laos, Guyana and China.  
 
Fig 3. 6 Aggregate per capita stocks in G-33 countries (kg) 
Source: Author’s computation using USDA FAS data.  
 
The ‘per capita stock’ classification is for the convenience of organising countries into food 
security risk groups and, hence, limited to this study. The main challenge with most indicators 
seeking to classify countries is identifying appropriate cut-off points at which a country may be 
classified as high, low or intermediate risk (Perez-Escamilla and Segal-Correa, 2008). The ‘per 
capita stock’ indicator, used here, faces a similar challenge. However, the classification to a large 
extent is chosen to be consistent with the recent State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO, 2014) 
especially the extreme cases (Fig 3.2). For example, low food risk countries are mostly countries 
where the probability of undernourishment (measuring food security risk) is between 5 - 15 
percent; while high food security risk countries are largely consistent with countries where 
probability of undernourishment is greater than 28 percent.  
 
 
3.3 Literature on Public stockholding, AMS and the WTO 
The AMS restriction on subsidies and public stockholding has remained contentious among WTO 
trading nations. In 1999, the US alleged that South Korea’s price support to the beef industry 
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violated its AMS limit. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body, in 2000, sustained the US argument 
and ruled that South Korea’s domestic support for 1997 and 1998 had actually surpassed its de 
minimis commitment (WTO, 2000). A number of studies suggest that AMS will become more 
contentions in coming years. Brink (2009), for instance, predicted developing countries’ demands 
for higher AMS will intensify because their ability to support agriculture and food security policies 
is rising due to economic growth.  
A study by DTB Associates (2011) on subsidization in selected developing countries (Brazil, India, 
Thailand and Turkey) showed substantial violation of total AMS commitments.  A revised study 
in 2014 focusing narrowly on wheat, rice and corn in Brazil, India, Turkey, Thailand and China 
also reveals substantive violation of product specific AMS limit15 (DTB Associates, 2014). 
Nonetheless, implicated countries have consistently rejected the findings, arguing that the 
calculations were inaccurately determined. For instance, while DTB Associates (2011, 2014) used 
total production (citing the case for Korea-beef as justification for their choice), affected countries 
argue AMS should be based on actual procured stock levels. Notwithstanding these objections, the 
study reveals that support prices for public stockholding in India, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand and 
China had substantially risen in 2010/2011. For instance, the wheat support price in Brazil, India, 
Turkey and China stood at $243, $288, $324 and $285 respectively, compared to $152 per tonne 
support price in U.S. for 2010/2011 production year (DTB, 2011). Montemayor (2014) undertook 
a range of simulations showing that the strict application of the AMS formula, as currently defined 
under the WTO, increases the likelihood that developing countries will violate their de minimis 
limit.  
A number of studies also cast doubts on the efficacy of public stockholding programs in addressing 
food security and, thus, do not see AMS relaxation as a panacea to food security problems. For 
instance, Haberli (2014) argues that decisions on public stockholding may only increase 
governmnet support but not necessarily enhancing food security in developing countries. 
Similarly, the World Bank (2012) argues that public food stocks usually come with a large fiscal 
cost that outweighs the associated benefits of consumption and price stabilization. Deuss (2014), 
                                                          
15 Product specific AMS are limits on specific products such as wheat, corn or rice. This is different from total (or 
non-specific) AMS which refers to total support to agriculture which is also limited by 10 percent.  
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however, argues that public stockholding has advantages and disadvantages for food security. 
According to Deuss (2014), effective targeting of food stocks can improve the food security of 
vulnerable individuals on one hand, but large stockholding can result in higher international food 
prices. Sadler and Magnan (2011) proposed a private and public storage policy mix as a strategy 
to resolve food security issues in the Middle East and North Africa.   
Matthews (2014b) proposes two measures to help resolve food security and AMS restriction 
among developed and developing countries of the WTO: (1) harmonise food security and trade 
rules; and (2) expand AMS for developing countries. While these studies examined aspects of 
AMS stockholding, they do not particularly relate to the issues being addressed in this thesis 
regarding whether or not de minimis limits will lead to restrictions on optimal public stockholding 
for food security purposes.   
 
3.4 Storage, public stocks and food security determination 
Public stocks were first conceived as a means to make up for the difference between projected 
consumption and supply. Where supply is projected to fall below consumption, the government’s 
responsibility was to estimate the difference and provide it as public stocks (Eaton, 1980). This 
approach, however, lacks theoretical underpinnings. The approach also fails to take into account 
that stocking for the future involves a cost on current consumption, which needs to be taken into 
consideration. Consequently, storage based on projected consumption differences led to huge stock 
accumulation and enormous social cost.  
The fundamental economic theory of storage, both private and public stockholding, focuses on 
optimal allocation of available stocks between current and future consumption. Private storage 
occurs under competitive market conditions with the objective of maximising the intertemporal 
profit involved in carryover stocks from one period to another (Williams and Wright, 1991; Makki 
et al, 2001; Karali, 2007). Given current price (Pt), cost of storage (h), cost of capital (r) and 
expected future price (Pt+1), a profit-seeking storage agent maximizes the intertemporal profit of 
storing a unit si from period t to t+1. Grain will be stored from t to t+1 whenever the discounted 
future price is large enough to cover the current stock price and cost of storage (equation (3.2)). 
Conversely, no storage occurs (i.e. zero storage) if the discounted future price does not to cover 
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the current price and cost of storage (equation (3.3)). Williams and Wright (1982, 1991) 
summarised the decision-making process of competitive storage as:  
𝑃𝑡 + ℎ − 𝐸𝑡 [𝑃𝑡+1] (1 + 𝑟)⁄ = 0, 𝑆𝑡 > 0: 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠    (3.2) 
𝑃𝑡 + ℎ − 𝐸𝑡 [𝑃𝑡+1] (1 + 𝑟)⁄ ≥ 0, 𝑆𝑡 = 0: 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒            (3.3) 
 
Where, St is aggregate market storage obtained by summing individual stocks (si) of all agents.   
Competitive storage has been adapted in studies to accommodate public food security by setting a 
ceiling and floor price and then managing reserves to achieve them. Larson et al (2014) assumed 
that government was focused on price hikes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. 
Hence, hypothetical ceiling prices were set and the corresponding reserves needed to achieve those 
consumer prices in the MENA region were determined. The reserves formed optimal public stocks. 
Their results shows that higher reserves are needed to keep domestic prices substantially lower.  
Despite manipulating private storage conditions to achieve public stocks there remains a striking 
difference between public stockholding and private stockholding motives.  
The objective of public storage deviates from private storage. While private storage seeks to 
maximize intertemporal profit, public storage seeks to maximize society’s welfare including food 
security. Estimating stocks levels that maximizes society’s welfare was pioneered by Roberts L. 
Gustafson (1958). Gustafson developed a dynamic optimization framework for estimating optimal 
grain reserves by viewing the decision maker as a social planner. The social planner is a 
government or that “all-knowing person” capable of incorporating consumption needs of every 
person in the society. The planner then chooses consumption and carryover levels that maximizes 
social welfare.  The estimated stocks are optimal stocks in that the food consumption needs of 
every member of the society are met. These technically constitute levels of carryovers needed so 
that food security is achieved in a society. Johnson and Sumner (1976) applied Gustafson’s 
framework to determine optimal grain reserves in developing countries for 1975.  
Gustafson’s framework produces the same storage outcome as competitive storage in the absence 
of market failures (Gardner, 1979; Williams and Wright, 1991; Karali, 2007).  Hence, public 
storage is only justified where the market does not provide sufficient stocks as a result of a market 
failure. This framework aligns with some economists who argue that food security is a market 
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failure problem. For example, Rocha (2007) argued that the classical economic approach to food 
security is one of a market failure problem which warrants government intervention like other 
incidents of market failures. To her, although food in itself is a private good, food security is public 
good because food insufficiency can impose significant economic and social costs, a cost born by 
all. Outbreaks of disease emanating from deficient food consumption can affect the wider society 
irrespective of one’s social and economic status. Further, with regards to market failure, Kotagama 
et al (2008/2009) estimated the level of government intervention required to induce sufficient food 
production to address food security in the Oman district of Sri Lanka.  
In effect, studies wanting to estimate public stocks using Gustafson’s framework will normally 
base the analysis on the size of distortion introduced by the market failure. The approach is, first 
of all, to estimate stocks levels in the absence of market failure. Secondly, estimate stocks levels 
with market failure. Third, the difference in stocks should therefore constitute public stocks. 
Subsequently, Gardner (1979) assumed that inefficiency in financial markets can create a 
significant difference in cost of capital borrowed from private markets. This will result in public 
and private grain storers being charged different interest rates. A high interest rate increases the 
opportunity costs of holding grain relative to returns on commercial savings and, therefore, leads 
to sub-optimal storage. With a difference in cost of capital, the associated levels of public stocks 
can be estimated. To illustrate this, Gardner assumed discount rates of 9 and 3 percent for private 
and public stockholders respectively and estimated associated stocks.  
Williams and Wright (1982) modeled the interaction between private and public storage in 
managing oil import disruptions. To create an opportunity for public storage, they assumed that 
government is concerned about price hikes and will respond with a price ceiling. A price ceiling 
is market distortionary. Their model, therefore, incorporated private behavior and consequently 
estimated optimal public stocks. Gouel and Jean (2015) and Gouel (2013) introduced risk aversion 
on the part of consumers and incomplete contracts as market failure reasons for public storage in 
small open developing economies. The aforementioned means that optimal public stocks needed 
to achieve food security should equal the difference between total demand and the quantity of 
stocks provided by private storage. Thus, when a policy curtails public stocks to some fixed level 
(as the case of AMS) it could lead to sub-optimal public stocks. This has serious implications for 
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food security, especially if the government is restricted in its fiscal outlays at the same time as the 
market is unable to provide sufficient stocks to meet food consumption demands.  
This study follows suit by arguing that public storage is only necessary where private storage is 
insufficient. Consequently, Gustafson’s framework is employed to determine optimal stock levels 
needed in each country. The research also argues that the estimated stocks are consistent with 
levels needed to achieve food security because every member of the society’s consumption is 
incorporated. Hence, estimated stocks are total stocks (private plus public) needed for food security 
in each country.  
The study recognize that market failures cause stocks supplied in the market to be less than optimal 
for food security. However, this study does not introduce market distortion as in the case of 
Gardner (1979); Williams and Wright (1982) or Gouel and Jean (2015). The research argues that 
sources of market failures facing developing economies are numerous. As such, considering only 
one source of market failure may lead to underestimating the effects of market failures. However, 
the effect of the market failures can be revealed by examining the difference between optimal 
stocks needed to achieve food security and actual stocks observed in an economy. Optimal stocks 
needed to achieve food security should therefore be the same as actual stock levels observed in an 
economy in the absence of market failures. However, market stocks will deviate from optimal 
stocks needed to achieve food security in the presence of market failures.  The difference in stocks 
is what constitute optimal public stocks for food security. Hence, the study determines optimal 
public stocks by taking the difference between optimal stocks needed to achieve food security 
(estimated from Gustafson framework) and observed stock levels (i.e. market/private stocks) in 
the economy. The observed stocks (market stocks) refers to carryover stocks reported for each 
country by USDA.  
Further, the research recognizes that optimal public stocks may differ from public stock levels 
permitted under the WTO. The study recognizes two different kinds of public stocks: public stocks 
optimal to achieve food security; and public stocks permissible under WTO such that AMS de 
minimis is not violated. For simplicity, it is assumed that maximum public stock levels permitted 
under WTO cannot exceed 10 percent of the value of domestic production. The AMS permissible 
stocks are compared with optimal public stocks to determine the restrictiveness of AMS on food 
security. 
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3.5 Theoretical framework and methodology 
This section focuses on the theoretical models underpinning food security stocks, the methods used 
to evaluate the restrictiveness of the de minimis AMS policy and the data sources. These are 
discussed in steps below.  
 
3.5.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical model is developed chronologically as follows: 
 
Step 1: The theoretical model for estimating food security consistent stocks  
The ‘food security consistent stocks’ are estimated using Gustafson’s framework which is based 
on the social planner’s approach. The social planner’s framework is consistent with food security 
because it optimises social welfare in the presence of production shocks with the objective of 
smoothening consumption (subject to a given storage cost). The research assumes that 
government, as a social planner, incorporates every individuals demand into the society’s 
consumption function and simultaneously determines consumption and carryover levels that 
maximize social welfare. The estimated stocks are assumed to be consistent with levels needed to 
ensure food security.  Cereal consumption demand at time t (Ct) is specified as inverse function of 
price (Pt) as: 
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑡)               (3.4) 
Imposing linear functional form, the inverse consumption demand is stated explicitly as: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛽𝐶𝑡            (3.5) 
Where θ is a positive intercept term and β is negative coefficient measuring the inverse of unit 
change in price on consumption. Williams and Wright (1982) assumes that the domestic supply 
arises primarily from current production, Zt, with mean production  𝑍 and additive random 
shock  𝜇𝑡. Thus, domestic supply is stated as: 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍 + 𝜇𝑡            (3.6) 
The random shock captures unexplained factors causing production fluctuations, and has mean 
zero (0) and standard deviation σ. The standard deviation, σ, is derived from the yield distribution 
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of a specific cereal. Williams and Wright (1982) estimated the likelihood of a given shock 𝜇𝑡 as: 
𝜇𝑡 which approximates 1 2√3𝜎⁄   within the range of ±√3𝜎, and  zero for all other places. The 
probaility distribution of the random term is used to form expectation about future production and 
prices.  
Incorporating trade: The intertemporal storage used in this paper covers two years. It is assumed 
that countries will not allow trade deficits from each other in the final year because the world is 
ending.  Trade must therefore balance in the second year. Given this, total consumption in each 
year is estimated as the sum of production, net trade and change in stocks. The change in cereal 
stocks is estimated as the difference between stocks brought in from the previous year (St-1) and 
stocks carried out from the current period t (St) to the next period, while net trade refers to the 
difference between imports (I) and exports (X) of a country. Thus, Ct is defined as: 
                                         𝐶𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑡          (3.7)  
Letting At ( = 𝑍𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡−1) denote total available stocks, Ct will equals stocks available 
for consumption (At) minus carryout: 
                                                             𝐶𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡               (3.8) 
Formulating the stockholding problem: From the standard economic analysis, welfare is obtained 
by integrating over the inverse demand curve (i.e. ∫ 𝑃(𝐶𝑡)𝑑𝐶
𝐴𝑡−𝑆𝑡
0
)) taking into consideration the 
amount of stocks consumed and stocks carried out into the future. It is assumed that every market 
stock taken out of the current period t to t+1 (i.e. the following year) incurs a per unit storage cost 
of “h”. As a result the total cost of carrying St from t to t+1 is  ℎ𝑆𝑡.  The net benefit to society for 
consuming Ct and cost of storing St for future use equals consumer surplus (∫ 𝑃(𝐶𝑡)𝑑𝐶
𝐴𝑡−𝑆𝑡
0
) 
minus cost of storage, hSt.  In summary, net welfare in period t is defined as:  
 
                                                     ∫ 𝑃(𝐶𝑡)𝑑𝐶
𝐴𝑡−𝑆𝑡
0
− ℎ𝑆𝑡              (3.9)  
 
However, the carry-out stocks from period t yield a value to society when consumed in period t+1. 
Consequently, the welfare in period t+1 must be discounted and added to the welfare in period t to 
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estimate total welfare for carrying out St from t to t+1. That is, where storage is done over several 
years, the expected benefits are discounted over time. The objective of the social planner is, 
therefore, to choose stocks (St) and consumption levels that maximize the discounted social 
welfare (Wt) over T periods. This is stated mathematically as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒      𝑊𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [∫ 𝑃(𝑐𝑡)𝑑𝑐
𝐴𝑡−𝑆𝑡
0
− ℎ𝑆𝑡)] /(1 + 𝑟)
𝑡−1𝑇
𝑡=1               (3.10) 
                                                            Subject to St ≥ 0 
Where, 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operator.  
Solving the stockholding problem: As a 2-year model, the storage decision is to determine stock 
levels to be carried from t to t+1. No carry out from period t+1 to t+2 occurs because the world 
ends in period t+1. Consequently, final year storage (St+1) is set equals zero (0). Having set St+1=0, 
the problem is reduced to determining how much stock will be carried from t to t+1. This optimal 
carryover stocks from t to t+1 (i.e. St) is determined by differentiating equation (3.10) and setting 
the resultant product to zero as:  
                                         
𝜕𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡
= (
𝜕𝑃𝑡
𝜕𝐶𝑡
) (
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡
) − ℎ + (1 + 𝑟)−1𝐸𝑡 (
𝜕𝑊𝑡+1
𝜕𝑆𝑡
) = 0 
                                                 = −𝑃(𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡) − ℎ + (1 + 𝑟)−1𝐸𝑡𝑃(𝑍𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝑡) 
            𝑃𝑡(𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡) + ℎ = (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1(𝑍𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝑡)                             (3.11) 
Substituting for inverse consumption demand and expectation:   
𝜃 + 𝛽(𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡) + ℎ = (1 + 𝑟)
−1(1 2√3𝜎⁄ ) ∫ (𝜃 + 𝛽(𝑍 + 𝜇𝑡+1 + 𝐼𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝑡))
√3𝜎
−√3𝜎
𝑑𝑢       (3.12)  
Since trade balances in the final year, imports must equal exports (i.e.  𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝑋𝑡+1).  Hence, equation 
(3.11) is re-written as: 
𝜃 + 𝛽(𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡) + ℎ = (1 + 𝑟)
−1(1 2√3𝜎⁄ ) ∫ (𝜃 + 𝛽(𝑍 + 𝜇𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝑡)
√3𝜎
−√3𝜎
𝑑𝑢           (3.13) 
Consequently, optimal carryout stocks from period t is solved for as:  
 𝑆𝑡
∗ =
(1+𝑟)𝐴𝑡−𝑍
(2+𝑟)
+ (
1+𝑟
2+𝑟
) ∗ (
ℎ
𝛽
) + (
𝑟
2+𝑟
) ∗ (
𝜃
𝛽
)                                                     (3.14) 
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Thus, optimal storage is negatively explained by expected future production, storage cost and cost 
of capital, while current availability increases storage. Where expected production is in excess of 
consumption, no storage occurs from period t to t+1, and,  𝑆𝑡
∗ = 0. Hence, the optimal storage 
policy, according to Karali (2007) and Williams and Wright (1982) can be summarised as: 
𝑆𝑡
∗ = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 {
(1+𝑟)𝐴𝑡−𝑍
(2+𝑟)
+ (
1+𝑟
2+𝑟
) ∗ (
ℎ
𝛽
) + (
𝑟
2+𝑟
) ∗ (
𝜃
𝛽
) , 0 }                                            (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) is used to estimate the ‘optimal food security consistent stocks’ of corn, wheat and 
rice for G-33 countries.   
 
Step 2: Estimating optimal public stocks  
Optimal public stocks equals optimal food-security-consistent-stocks (i.e. St*) minus stock levels 
observed in the market. The market stocks are carryover stocks observed in each country from 
2010/2011 (i.e. t) to 2011/2012 (t+1).  
 
Step 3: Estimate WTO permissible public stocks 
The WTO permissible public stocks are estimated as 10 percent of the total value of domestic 
production. The research assumes that the maximum allowable public stocks permitted under 
WTO cannot exceed its de minimis limit. This is, however, a monetary measure. To determine the 
physical stocks associated with the de minimis level, the estimated monetary value must be divided 
by prices. Accordingly, the resulting WTO permissible stocks becomes equal to 10 percent of total 
domestic production. Consequently, the WTO permissible public stocks were estimated directly 
as 10 percent of total domestic production. 
 
Step 4: AMS restrictiveness evaluation  
The de minimis AMS restrictiveness is evaluated by computing the ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ 
to ‘WTO permissible public stocks’. This is stated mathematically as:  
       𝐴𝑀𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝐴𝑀𝑆 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
                          (3.16) 
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The ratio is a measure of public stocks needed to achieve food security (i.e. optimal public stocks) 
compared to public stocks allowed under WTO (i.e. AMS permissible public stocks). Therefore: 
1. If public stock allowed under WTO equals public stock levels needed to achieve food 
security, the restrictiveness ratio will be equal 1. In that case, AMS is not restricting on 
optimal stockholding.  
2. If stock levels allowed under WTO are more than public stock levels needed to achieve 
food security, the restrictiveness ratio will be less than 1. In that case AMS is still not 
restricting on optimal stockholding 
3. However, where public stocks permitted under AMS is less than public stocks needed to 
achieve food security, the ratio will be greater than 1; which implies that the AMS policy 
is constraining on optimal public stockholding for food security.  
 
Step 5: Determining optimal AMS needed to achieve food security  
The AMS required to achieve food security is calculated for countries constrained by AMS. Since 
10 percent AMS produces the permitted stock levels, then the AMS required to produces optimal 
public stocks can be determined as: 
                                                𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑀𝑆 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠∗10%
𝐴𝑀𝑆 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
                        (3.17) 
 
3.5.2 Implications of two-period analysis for longer-duration models  
This study employs a two-period storage model to analyse the restrictiveness of the de minimis 
AMS policy on public stockholding for food security purposes. However, the implications of this 
method for longer duration models can easily be ascertained. To illustrate this, let us assume that 
a country has a stock of food, F, to consume over some period of time. Let us also assume that the 
country consumes equal amounts of food in a period. 
Case 1:  If the country lives for two years then 0.5F will be consumed in the 1st year while 0.5F is 
carried over and consumed in the 2nd year. Optimal stocks carried from 1st to 2nd period 0.5F.  
Hence, optimal storage for this country is 0.5F.   
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Case 2: What if the country lives for 3 years? In a 3-year case, 0.33F will be consumed in the 1st 
period. However, the optimal stocks to be carried from 1st to 2nd period is 0.66F. This is higher 
compared to the 2-period case.  
The issues with storage are obviously more complicated than illustrated above but the simplified 
cases provide key understanding of how longer duration models work. The implication is that 
longer duration models have higher optimal storage levels compared to short-duration. Longer 
duration models decrease consumption per period while increasing storage; while shorter duration 
models increase consumption per period while reducing storage between periods.  Longer duration 
models (such as an infinite horizon model) have higher optimal carryover stocks compared to 
shorter duration models (e.g. two-period storage model) because the value of future stocks are less 
important in shorter duration models. The shorter duration models, thus, underestimate optimal 
carryover stocks compared to longer duration models. Consequently, optimal public stocks 
required to achieve food security are relatively higher with longer-duration models. Hence, any 
evidence of restrictiveness under the two-period model suggest that the restrictiveness will be 
higher for longer duration models because of their relatively high optimal public stocks. The 
restrictiveness analysis from shorter duration models can also provide insights into the extent of 
restriction that will arise if a much severe food crises were to occur. A more severe food crisis will 
have a relatively low market stocks. Consequently, public stocks required to ensure food security 
are higher with severe food crisis. Consequently, the chance of a restriction is higher with severe 
food crisis (e.g the 2007/2008 food crisis).  
 
3.5.3 Data 
Production, consumption and trade data were obtained from the USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Services Division.  Similarly, cost of storage is assumed to be $25 per tonne per year based on a 
World Bank study on storage cost in developing countries.  Further, the World Bank Development 
Indicators show that interest rates varied across developing countries in 2010/2011, ranging from 
a minimum of 5 percent to a maximum of 35 percent in most countries. An average rate of 20 
percent per annum was, however, calculated and used in the estimation. The expected future 
production, 𝑍, is assumed to approximate a three-year moving average of production. 
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Consequently, production values of 2008/2009, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 were used to estimate 
the expected production of 2011/2012 for wheat, corn and rice for each country. 
The commodity elasticities were derived from varied sources in the literature. The averages of 
these were used to estimate coefficients of inverse demand functions of rice, corn and wheat. 
Intercept terms of the inverse demand functions represent the maximum price per tonne at which 
consumption will not occur.  The research assumes that the maximum price each country is willing 
to pay for food, in the event of a food crisis, is the same. Consequently, intercept terms – 
representing maximum prices – are equal across countries for a given commodity. Further, the 
coefficients – representing the responsiveness of price to consumption – are allowed to vary across 
countries because countries have different consumption elasticities.  For example,   a 0.01 
coefficient (for rice in China) means that a dollar increase in rice price will lead to a decrease in 
consumption by 100 thousand tonnes (i.e. 1/0.01) in China. The full list of parameters used in the 
estimation are presented in Table 3A.1 in the appendix. 
 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
The estimated results for rice, corn and wheat models are presented in Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and 
Table 3.4 respectively. The estimations were done in Excel Spreadsheets. The estimates cover G-
33 countries and commodities for which production, consumption, trade and stock data are 
available for 2010/2011 year. As a result, countries, where reliable elasticities could not be 
obtained, were excluded.  
The results are discussed in two parts. The first part (section 3.6.1) presents optimal food security 
consistent stocks, optimal public stocks, and WTO allowable public stocks (i.e. AMS public 
stocks). The components of these Tables are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. The 
second part (section 3.6.2) focus extensively on the restrictiveness of AMS policy and the risk 
posed to food security. 
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Table 3. 2 Estimates for rice (000 tonnes) 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal food 
security stocks 
Market 
stocks 
Optimal 
public stocks 
AMS public 
stocks 
Restrictiveness 
ratio 
Barbados - -        - - - 
Benin 110.0 0.0 110.0  8.0 13.8 
Botswana - - -  - - 
China 31228.0 42574.0 0.0  13700.0 0.0 
Guatemala 30.0 0.0 30.0  2.1 14.3 
Guyana 20.0 25.0 0.0  36.1 0.0 
Haiti 207.0 20.0 187.0  7.8 24.0 
Honduras 71.5 28.0 43.5  2.8 15.6 
India 18414.0 23500.0 0.0  9597.0 0.0 
Indonesia 7882.2 7131.0 751.2  3550.0 0.2 
Kenya 200.0 57.0 143.0  5.7 25.0 
Laos 182.0 78.0 104.0  140.0 0.7 
Madagascar 676.0 0.0 676.0  303.2 2.2 
Mauritius 35.0 0.0 35.0  0.1 350.0 
Mongolia - - -  - - 
Mozambique 222.4 0.0 222.4  16.8 13.2 
Nigeria 1671.6 538.0 1133.6  281.8 4.0 
Pakistan 0.0 300.0 0.0  500.0 0.0 
Panama 59.7 22.0 37.7  17.9 2.1 
Peru 457.0 424.0 33.0  193.9 0.2 
Philippines 3492.0 2459.0 1033.0  1053.9 1.0 
Senegal 592.0 108.0 484.0  40.8 12.0 
Tanzania 212.0 0.0 212.0  132.0 1.6 
Turkey 368.3 292.0 76.3  50.2 1.5 
Uganda 49.1 0.0 49.1  14.2 3.5 
Venezuela 242.0 251.0 0.0  35.8 0.0 
Zambia 4.0 0.0 4.0  3.5 1.1 
Zimbabwe     -  - -  -              - 
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Table 3. 3 Estimates for corn (000 tonnes) 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal food 
security stocks 
Market 
stocks 
Optimal 
public stocks 
AMS public 
stocks 
Restrictiveness 
ratio 
Barbados - - - - - 
Benin 116.0 41.0 75.0 101.3 0.7 
Botswana 87.4 0.0 87.4 1.1 80.0 
China 46767.7 49415.0 0.0 17724.5 0.0 
Guatemala 589.0 125.0 464.0 163.4 2.8 
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Haiti 54.0 0.0 54.0 25.0 2.2 
Honduras 322.1 89.0 233.1 54.8 4.3 
India 2492.0 561.0 1931.0 2172.6 0.9 
Indonesia 2322.3 697.0 1625.3 680.0 2.4 
Kenya 853.1 420.0 433.1 346.5 1.2 
Laos 267.0 250.0 17.0 102.1 0.2 
Madagascar 57.0 42.0 15.0 41.2 0.4 
Mauritius - - - - - 
Mongolia - - - - - 
Mozambique 406.0 143.0 263.0 209.0 1.3 
Nigeria 1077.5 266.0 811.5 880.0 0.9 
Pakistan 787.4 789.0 0.0 370.7 0.0 
Panama 234.0 57.0 177.0 8.5 21.0 
Peru 1388.4 287.0 1101.4 151.6 7.3 
Philippines 1217.4 691.0 526.4 727.1  0.7 
Senegal 0.0 14.0 0.0 18.6 0.0 
Tanzania 1046.0 802.0 244.0 473.3 0.5 
Turkey 682.0 367.0 315.0 360.0 0.9 
Uganda 543.0 370.0 173.0 237.4 0.7 
Venezuela 879.0 314.0 565.0 130.0 4.3 
Zambia 870.4 900.0 0.0 280.0 0.0 
Zimbabwe 389.0 25.0 364.0 100.0                    3.6 
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Table 3. 4 Estimates for wheat (000 tonnes) 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Optimal food 
security stocks 
Market 
stocks 
Optimal 
public stocks 
AMS public 
stocks 
Restrictiveness 
ratio 
 
Barbados  7.0 0.0 7.0  0.1 
70.0  
Benin  80.5 0.0 80.5  0.1 805.0  
Botswana  - - -  - -  
China  41421.0 59091.0 0.0  11518.0 0.0  
Guatemala 359.3 134.0 225.3  0.1 2253.0  
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
Haiti  135.2 0.0 135.2  0.1 1352.0  
Honduras  118.7 0.0 118.7  0.1 1187.0  
India  15992.3 15360.0 632.3  8080.4 0.1  
Indonesia 4172.6 1615.0 2557.6  0.1 25576.0  
Kenya  680.2 65.0 615.2  25.6 24.0  
Laos  - - -  - -  
Madagascar 55.3 0.0 55.3  0.1 553.0  
Mauritius  68.5 0.0 68.5  0.1 685.0  
Mongolia  58.0 0.0 58.0  34.5 1.7  
Mozambique 322.5 0.0 322.5  1.8 179.2  
Nigeria  2037.5 200.0 1837.5  10.0 183.8  
Pakistan  3919.2 3168.0 751.2  2390.0 0.3  
Panama  68.5 0.0 68.5  0.1 685.0  
Peru  1099.8 384.0 715.8  23.0 31.2  
Philippines 2104.7 658.0 1446.7  0.1 14467.0  
Senegal  230.5 7.0 223.5  0.1 2235.0  
Tanzania  313.7 0.0 313.7  6.2 50.6  
Turkey  3107.3 2885.0 222.3  1700.0 
0.1  
Uganda  65.0 0.0 65.0  2.0 32.5  
Venezuela 864.3 84.0 780.3  0.1 7803.0  
Zambia  57.5 25.0 32.5  17.2 2.0  
Zimbabwe 121.5 8.0 113.5  1.8 63.1  
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3.6.1 Estimated stock levels 
3.6.1.1 Optimal food security consistent stocks  
The estimated optimal food security stocks of rice, corn and wheat for G-33 developing countries 
are summarised in Table 3.5. The estimates are optimal carryover stocks needed to achieve 
consumption security in each country, referred to as ‘food security consistent stocks’. 
 
Table 3. 5 Optimal food security consistent stocks (000 tonnes) 
Country Rice Corn Wheat 
Barbados - - 7.0 
Benin 110.0 116.0 80.5 
Botswana - 87.4 - 
China 31228.0 46767.7 41421.0 
Guatemala 30.5 589.0 359.3 
Guyana 20.0 0.0 0.0 
Haiti 207.0 54.0 135.2 
Honduras 71.5 322.1 118.7 
India 18414.0 2492.0 15992.3 
Indonesia 7882.2 2322.3 4172.6 
Kenya 200.0 853.1 680.2 
Laos 182.0 267.0 - 
Madagascar 676.0 57.0 55.3 
Mauritius 35.0 - 68.5 
Mongolia - - 58.0 
Mozambique 222.4 406.0 322.5 
Nigeria 1671.6 1077.5 2037.5 
Pakistan 0.0 787.4 3919.2 
Panama 59.7 234.0 68.5 
Peru 457.0 1388.4 1099.8 
Philippines 3492.0 1217.0 2104.7 
Senegal 592.0 0.0 230.5 
Tanzania 212.0 1046.0 313.7 
Turkey 368.3 682.6 3107.3 
Uganda 49.1 543.0 65.0 
Venezuela 242.0 879.0 864.3 
Zambia 4.0 870.4 57.5 
Zimbabwe - 389.0 121.5 
Source: Author’s computation. 
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Generally, optimal carryover stocks  of rice, corn or wheat are less than 3 million tonnes in most 
countries including Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Optimal stocks are low in these countries primarily because of low 
consumption. The countries, together, consume less than 10 percent of aggregate wheat, corn, or 
rice in G-33 (Fig 3.7). As a result, stockholding in anticipation of consumption shortfalls are also 
low.  
Optimal carryover stocks are comparatively high in China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines 
and Turkey. This is because aggregate consumption relative to production is high in these 
countries. Hence, storage in anticipation of shocks must be high, ceteris paribus. For instance, 
China’s corn, wheat and rice consumption as shares of totals consumed by G-33 are approximately 
68 percent, 43 percent and 45 percent respectively (Fig 3.7). It is the highest among G-33 
developing countries. Hence, comparatively high stocks must be kept in anticipation of shortfalls 
for each cereal. Thus, China’s food security stocks of approximately 47 million, 41 million and 31 
million tonnes for corn, wheat and rice respectively (Table 3.5) are the highest among G-33 
countries.  
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Fig 3. 7 Cereal consumption shares in G-33(%): 2010/2011 
 
Source: Author’s computation using USDA data.  
 
Further, India as the second largest consumer of wheat and rice, also requires high stocks to 
maintain food security. For instance, India’s corn consumption constitutes approximately 7 percent 
of aggregate corn consumed in G-33 while its rice and wheat shares are 30 percent and 32 percent 
respectively (Fig 3.7). Unlike wheat and rice, corn is neither a major cereal produced nor consumed 
in India. Hence, its importance in India’s food security is low compared to rice and wheat. Corn 
contributes about 10 percent of cereal consumption compared to 47 percent and 43 percent by rice 
and wheat respectively in India (Fig 3.8). Consequently, food security stocks are predictably low 
for corn (2.5 million tonnes) but high for wheat (16 million tonnes) and rice (18 million tonnes) 
accordingly (Table 3.5). The high stocks of rice and wheat relative to corn also reflects in India’s 
new food security policy under which rice and wheat are targeted cereals for its public 
stockholding programs (Fritz, 2014)).  
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Fig 3. 8 Shares of rice, corn and wheat in consumption (%): 2010/2011 
 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
In Turkey and Pakistan, wheat constitutes a basic input to the dietary staple bread which raises its 
consumption substantially relatively to rice and corn. Wheat constitutes approximately 80 percent 
of cereal consumption in Turkey and Pakistan. Optimal food security wheat stocks are, thus, high 
in Pakistan (approximately 4 million tonnes) and Turkey (3 million tonnes) compared to rice and 
corn (Table 3.5). Similarly, Indonesia’s optimal stocks of approximately 8 million, 2.3 million and 
4 million tonnes also corresponds to the 5 percent, 3 percent and 1 percent consumption shares of 
rice, corn and wheat respectively approximately. In Tanzania, where corn constitute over 80 
percent of cereal consumption, the estimated stocks of rice, corn and wheat are less than 0.4 million 
tonnes for rice and wheat while corn stocks are about 1 million tonnes. Similarly, optimal stocks 
of corn are relatively higher compared to rice and wheat in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Venezuela, 
Uganda, Peru, Panama, Mozambique, Kenya, Guatemala and Benin because of its high importance 
relative to rice and wheat. Optimal rice stocks are relatively high in Madagascar, Senegal and 
Indonesia due to their importance in consumption. Optimal rice stocks are relatively high in 
Madagascar, Senegal and Indonesia due to their importance in consumption. 
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In conclusion, optimal carryover stocks vary considerably across countries and commodity. For 
countries with high consumption levels, appreciable stock volumes are needed to maintain 
consumption in those markets. This explains why stocks are high in China and India compared to 
other countries. Moreover, stocks vary by commodity within a country based on the importance of 
the cereal to its food security. Cereals which contribute more to consumption within a country are 
stored to a greater degree in relative terms.  While this results suggest that countries tend to store 
cereals that constitute a greater proportion of their consumption, it should be interpreted with 
caution as it applies mostly to net food importers, or countries with a high consumption relative to 
production levels. These category of countries require high storage to mitigate uncertainty in 
consumption. Countries with large domestic production relative to consumption (or net exporters) 
have no incentive to store because expected future production are usually higher than required for 
consumption. Hence, the incentive to stock for future consumption is reduced. This explains why 
Nigeria has relatively small optimal stocks of corn compared to rice and wheat (though corn 
constitute over 51 percent of its consumption. Nigeria’s is an exception because its corn production 
is substantially high relative to consumption (see, for example, USDA FAS data). This raises 
expected production levels relative to consumption and reduce storage compared to rice and wheat. 
 
 
 
 94 
 
3.6.1.2 Optimal public stocks for food security 
The estimated optimal public stocks of rice, corn and wheat are summarised in Table 3.6 for all 
countries. Optimal public stocks for food security is the difference between ‘food security 
consistent stocks’ and the ‘observed market storage’. The market stocks refers to carryover levels 
observed from 2010/2011 to 2011/2012 marketing years.  
 
Table 3. 6 Optimal public stocks in G-33 (000 tonnes) 
Country Rice Corn Wheat 
Barbados - - 7.0 
Benin 110.0 75.0 80.5 
Botswana - 87.4 - 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 30.0 464.0 225.3 
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Haiti 187.0 54.0 135.2 
Honduras 43.5 233.1 118.7 
India 0.0 1931.0 632.3 
Indonesia 751.2 1625.3 2557.6 
Kenya 143.0 433.1 615.2 
Laos 104.0 17.0 - 
Madagascar 676.0 15.0 55.3 
Mauritius 35.0 - 68.5 
Mongolia - - 58.0 
Mozambique 222.4 263.0 322.5 
Nigeria 1133.6 811.5 1837.5 
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 751.2 
Panama 37.7 177.0 68.5 
Peru 33.0 1101.4 715.8 
Philippines 1033.0 526.4 1446.7 
Senegal 484.0 0.0 223.5 
Tanzania 212.0 244.0 313.7 
Turkey 76.3 315.0 222.3 
Uganda 49.1 173.0 65.0 
Venezuela 0.0 565.0 780.3 
Zambia 4.0 0.0 32.5 
Zimbabwe - 364.0 113.5 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
The results shows that public stockholding is required in most G-33 developing countries.  This is 
because the current market storage is not sufficient to achieve food security. Countries where 
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stockholding is required across all commodities (i.e. rice, corn and wheat) include Benin, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the 
Philippines, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. For instance, Kenya requires 
approximately 0.1 million, 0.4 million and 0.6 million tonnes of rice, corn and wheat respectively 
to achieve food security (Table 3.6). Further, most of these countries are faced with considerably 
high food security risk.  
Public stock levels, nonetheless, vary by commodity and country. For instance, China and Guyana 
do not need public storage of rice, corn and wheat because the market provides sufficient stocks 
to achieve food security in these countries. Hence, China and Guyana’s optimal public stocks for 
corn, rice and wheat are zero. These are relatively low food security risk countries. Similarly, while 
Venezuela does not require public stockholding of rice, it does require about 0.6 million and 0.8 
million tonnes of corn and wheat respectively in public storage programs.   
One of the countries leading the demand for policy freedom on public stockholding is India. The 
estimated optimal public stock of rice for India is zero. This implies that the current market storage 
of rice is sufficient to achieve food security in India. Thus, India does not require stockholding of 
rice. The results, however, shows that India’s food security with regards to corn and wheat will be 
at risk without public stockholding. Consequently, the government is expected to store 
approximately 2 million and 0.6 million tonnes of corn and wheat respectively to ensure food 
security. Further, while Pakistan does not require public stockholding of rice and corn, it does 
requires approximately 0.7 million tonnes of wheat in public stocks to ensure food security.   
Considerable public stockholding of rice and wheat are also required in Indonesia, Turkey, 
Philippines and Nigeria. Optimal public stocks of corn required in Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines 
and Turkey are estimated at 1.6 million, 0.8 million, 0.5 million and 0.4 million tonnes 
respectively.  Similarly, optimal public stockholding of rice in Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines and 
Turkey are approximately one million each while wheat stocks are estimated at 0.7 million, 1.1 
million, 1.2 million and 76000 tonnes respectively.  
In conclusion, public stockholding is required in most G-33 countries. This is because market 
storage is insufficient to achieve food security without public intervention. Further, the results 
reveals that the market supplies of rice are sufficient to achieve food security for China, India, 
Pakistan and Venezuela. Hence, public stockholding of rice in these countries are not necessary. 
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While this results suggest that public stockholding is required in many G-33 countries, it does not 
particularly provide indications as to whether or not these required public storage levels are 
constrained by the current de minimis requirement. To understand this restrictiveness, the 
estimated optimal public stocks levels must be compared with de minimis permitted stocks. 
Consequently, the next section focuses on the WTO permitted public storage levels.  
 
3.6.1.3 Estimated AMS permissible public stocks  
The Table 3.6 show results for optimal public stock levels of corn, wheat and rice expected in each 
country to ensure food security. This section presents results for optimal public stock levels 
allowable under WTO per de minimis requirement.  The estimated AMS permissible public stock 
levels of rice, corn and wheat are summarised in Table 3.7 below. The AMS allowable stocks are 
estimated as 10 percent of domestic production. Applying this regulation strictly implies that 
countries with zero production levels will have zero permissible stocks. A division by zero AMS 
permissible stock will result in an undefined restrictiveness index. To avoid this, a value of 1000 
tonnes was assumed for countries with zero production levels. The 1000 tonnes is also appropriate 
because production levels below 1000 are usually approximated to zero and not reported. 
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Table 3. 7 AMS allowable public stocks in G-33 (000 tonnes) 
Country Rice Corn Wheat 
Barbados - - 0.1 
Benin 8.0 101.3 0.1 
Botswana - 1.1 - 
China 13700.0 17724.5 11518.0 
Guatemala 2.1 163.4 0.1 
Guyana 36.1 0.5 0.0 
Haiti 7.8 25.0 0.1 
Honduras 2.8 54.8 0.1 
India 9597.0 2172.6 8080.4 
Indonesia 3550.0 680.0 0.1 
Kenya 5.7 346.5 25.6 
Laos 140.0 102.1 - 
Madagascar 303.2 41.2 0.1 
Mauritius 0.1 - 0.1 
Mongolia - - 34.5 
Mozambique 16.8 209.0 1.8 
Nigeria 281.8 880.0 10.0 
Pakistan 500.0 370.7 2390.0 
Panama 17.9 8.5 0.1 
Peru 193.9 151.6 23.0 
Philippines 1053.9 727.1 0.1 
Senegal 40.8 18.6 0.1 
Tanzania 132.0 473.3 6.2 
Turkey 50.2 367.0 1700.0 
Uganda 14.2 237.4 2.0 
Venezuela 35.8 130.0 0.1 
Zambia 3.5 280.0 17.2 
Zimbabwe - 100.0 1.8 
Source: Author’s computation.  
 
The AMS allowable public stocks are generally below a million tonne in all countries except 
China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and the Philippines (Table 3.7).  The WTO permissible 
public stocks of rice, corn and wheat in Nigeria are estimated at 281800 tonnes, 880000 tonnes 
and 10000 tonnes respectively. Similarly, Tanzania can hold public stocks up to 473300 tonnes, 
132000 tonnes and 6200 tonnes of corn, rice and wheat respectively.  
Countries with high permissible public stocks include China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Philippines and Turkey. These are countries with high production and consumption levels. China 
has the largest permissible public stocks among the G-33 developing countries. China’s WTO 
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permissible public stocks of corn, rice and wheat are approximately 18 million, 14 million and 12 
million tonnes respectively. Hence, China has opportunity to hold more stocks in corn than with 
rice and wheat due to its high production of corn. For India, WTO permissible public stocks for 
corn, rice and wheat are about 2.2 million, 10 million and 8 million tonnes respectively. India 
therefore has opportunity to put more stocks of wheat and rice in its public stock programs than it 
does with corn. The opportunity for high wheat and rice stocks, coupled with its consumption, is 
in line with India’s New Food Security Act aimed at providing subsidised grain to some estimated 
800 million people.   
Indonesia, on the other hand, has low corn and wheat stocks but relative high permissible public 
rice stocks. Estimated public stocks of corn and wheat are about 680000 and 100 tonnes   
respectively compared to about 4 million tonnes of rice. Similarly, Turkey and Pakistan have high 
permissible public wheat stocks relative to rice and corn. Turkey’s permissible public stocks for 
wheat are about 2 million tonnes, rice and wheat are however below a million metric. Further, the 
estimated public wheat stocks in Pakistan are approximately 2.4 million tonnes compared to 
300000 tonnes and 50000 tonnes for rice and corn respectively. WTO permissible wheat stocks 
are high in Pakistan and Turkey relative to corn and rice because of the relatively high production 
of wheat in these countries.  
 
3.6.2 De minimis AMS restrictiveness on optimal public stockholding   
The restrictiveness of AMS is determined by the ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘WTO 
permissible public stocks’.  The results of AMS restrictiveness is summarised in Table 3.8 below. 
The ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘AMS permissible public stocks’ is greater than 1 for most 
G-33 developing countries. This means that public stocks permissible under WTO are insufficient 
to achieve food security in these countries.  Hence, expanding/relaxing the de minimis AMS 
requirement can enhance food security in these countries. To gain better insights about the 
restrictiveness,   the results are further organised and discussed in greater detail according to food 
security risk below.  
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Table 3. 8 AMS restrictiveness on public stockholding  
Country Rice Corn Wheat 
Barbados - - 70.0 
Benin 13.8 0.7 805.0 
Botswana - 80.0 - 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 14.3 2.8 2253.0 
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Haiti 24.0 2.2 1352.0 
Honduras 15.6 4.3 1187.0 
India 0.0 0.9 0.1 
Indonesia 0.2 2.4 25576.0 
Kenya 25.0 1.2 24.0 
Laos 0.7 0.2 - 
Madagascar 2.2 0.4 553.0 
Mauritius 350.0 - 685.0 
Mongolia - - 1.7 
Mozambique 13.2 1.3 179.2 
Nigeria 4.0 0.9 183.8 
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Panama 2.1 21.0 685.0 
Peru 0.2 7.3 31.2 
Philippines 1.0 0.7 14467.0 
Senegal 12.0 0.0 2235.0 
Tanzania 1.6 0.5 50.6 
Turkey 1.5 0.9 0.1 
Uganda 3.5 0.7 32.5 
Venezuela 0.0 4.3 7803.0 
Zambia 1.1 0.0 2.0 
Zimbabwe - 3.6 63.1 
Source: Author’s computation.  
 
 
3.6.2.1 De minimis AMS restrictiveness and food security risk in G-33 countries    
The restrictiveness of the de minimis AMS requirement on public stockholding across different 
food security risk countries are presented in Table 3.9 below. The results are organised and 
discussed according to food security risk in order to show clarity in terms of the de minimis AMS 
restrictiveness implication for different food security risk groups. Secondly, adjustments to de 
minimis AMS needed to achieve food security in countries constrained by the policy are also 
discussed.  
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 Table 3. 9 AMS restrictiveness on public stocks for food security purposes16 
Risk Country Rice Corn wheat 
 Barbados - - 70.0 
 Benin 13.8 0.7 805.0 
 Botswana - 80.0 - 
 Guatemala 14.3 2.8 2253.0 
 Haiti 24.0 2.2 1352.0 
High food security risk 
countries 
Honduras 15.6 4.3 1187.0 
Kenya 25.0 1.2 24.0 
Madagascar 2.2 0.4 553.0 
 Mauritius 350.0 - 685.0 
 Mongolia - - 1.7 
 Mozambique 13.2 1.3 179.2 
 Nigeria 4.0 0.9 183.8 
 Panama 2.1 21.0 685.0 
 Senegal 12.0 0.0 2235.0 
 Tanzania 1.6 0.5 50.6 
 Uganda 3.5 0.7 32.5 
 Zambia 1.1 0.0 2.0 
 Zimbabwe - 3.6 63.1 
 India 0.0 0.9 0.1 
 Indonesia 0.2 2.4 25576.0 
Moderate food security  
risk countries 
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Peru 0.2 7.3 31.2 
Philippines 1.0 0.7 14467.0 
 Turkey 1.5 0.9 0.1 
 Venezuela 1.0 4.3 7803.0 
Low food security risk  
countries 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Guyana 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Laos 0.7 0.2 - 
 Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
3.6.2.1.1 High food security risk countries 
The ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘AMS permissible public stocks’ is greater than 1 for all 
high food security risk countries. The de minimis requirement is restrictive for all high food 
security risk countries for wheat and rice. This means that public stocks permissible under WTO 
are insufficient to achieve food security.  As such, AMS policy is restrictive on stockholding across 
                                                          
16 Analysis was also done by aggregating all cereals to account for substitutability in cereal consumption. However, 
the results did not change dramatically except for Zambia and Turkey which became less restrictive.  
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high food security risk countries for wheat and rice. These include Barbados, Benin, Botswana, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Panama, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The de minimis requirement is also 
highly restrictive in the case of corn for all high food security risk countries with the exception of 
Benin, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.  The high restriction across 
rice and wheat — two highly important consumption commodities in developing countries — 
raises a concern for food security.   
The level of de minimis AMS restrictiveness, however, varies across high food security risk 
countries. In Benin, for instance, the levels of public rice stocks required to achieve food security 
is approximately 14 times higher than what is currently allowed under WTO (Table 3.9). Hence, 
substantive expansion in AMS is required to achieve food security. Thus, Benin requires AMS to 
rise from the current 10 percent to 140 percent of domestic production to achieve security in rice 
(Table 3.10). Moreover, public rice stocks required to achieve food security in Panama is about 2 
times higher than amounts allowed under WTO. Consequently, AMS must increase from the 
current 10 percent to approximately 21 percent of domestic production in order to address rice 
food security problems.  Similarly, the de minimis limit must be at least 40 percent and 35 percent 
of domestic production for Nigeria and Uganda to acquire optimal public stocks for food security 
in rice. Considerably higher AMS are also required in Haiti (240%),   Honduras (156%), 
Guatemala (143%), Kenya (250%), Senegal (120%), among others, to achieve rice security (Table 
3.10).  
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 Table 3. 10 Optimal AMS for food security risk countries (%) 
Risk Country Rice Corn wheat 
 Barbados - - 700.0 
 Benin 138.0   8050.0 
 Botswana - 800.0 - 
 Guatemala 143.0 28.0 22530.0 
 Haiti 240.0 22.0 13520.0 
High food security risk 
countries 
Honduras 156.0 43.0 11870.0 
Kenya 250.0 12.0 240.0 
Madagascar 22.0   5530.0 
 Mauritius 3500.0 - 6850.0 
 Mongolia - - 17.0 
 Mozambique 132.0 13.0 1792.0 
 Nigeria 40.0   1838.0 
 Panama 21.0 210.0 6850.0 
 Senegal 120.0   22350.0 
 Tanzania 16.0   506.0 
 Uganda 35.0   325.0 
 Zambia 11.0   20.0 
 Zimbabwe - 36.0 631.0 
 India       
 Indonesia   24.0 255760.0 
Moderate food security  
risk countries 
Pakistan       
Peru   73.0 312.0 
Philippines     144670.0 
 Turkey 15.0     
 Venezuela   43.0 78030.0 
Low food security risk  
countries 
China       
Guyana       
Laos     - 
 Non-AMS constraining countries 
 
The restriction on public stockholding of corn varies across high food security risk countries. In 
Botswana, for instance, the optimal public corn stocks required to achieve food security is 80 times 
higher than stock levels currently allowed under the WTO. Thus, AMS is strictly constraining on 
public stockholding for food security in Botswana. Consequently, Botswana will require a 
substantive expansion of AMS to 800 percent of domestic production to achieve security. Other 
countries with considerably high AMS restriction on corn holding thereby requiring AMS to adjust 
significantly include Haiti (22%), Honduras (43%), among others.  In Kenya, however, the levels 
of public corn stocks required to achieve food security is only 1.2 times higher than stocks 
permitted under WTO. Accordingly, Kenya requires, at least, a de minimis limit of 12 percent of 
domestic production to achieve food security.   
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Further, the AMS restrictiveness on public wheat stockholding varies considerably across high 
food security risk countries.  In Mongolia, optimal public wheat stocks required to achieve food 
security is 1.7 times higher than current public stocks permissible under the WTO. Consequently, 
Mauritius requires AMS to be set at 17 percent of domestic production to achieve food security. 
However, AMS is more restrictive across a number of countries including Barbados, Guatemala, 
Senegal, among others.  
 
3.6.2.1.2 Moderate food security risk countries  
The ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘permissible public stocks’ is less than 1 for some 
commodities across moderately food security risk countries. In the case of rice, ratio of ‘optimal 
public stocks’ to ‘permissible public stocks’ is less than 1 in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, the 
Philippines  and Venezuela. This implies that public stocks permissible under WTO are sufficient 
to achieve food security in these countries.  Hence, the AMS policy is not restrictive on rice 
stockholding in India, Indonesia, Peru, Pakistan, the Philippines and Venezuela.  
 
The policy is, however, restrictive on rice stockholding in Turkey. The ratio of ‘optimal public 
stocks’ to ‘permissible public stocks’ is approximately 1.5 (Table 3.9). In Turkey, optimal public 
rice stocks required to achieve food security is 1.5 times higher than current public stocks 
permissible under the WTO. Consequently, Turkey, requires AMS to be set at least 15 percent of 
domestic production to achieve food security (Table 3.10).  
In the case of corn, the ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘WTO permissible public stocks’ is 
greater than 1 for all moderately food security risk countries with the exception of India, Pakistan, 
the Philippines and Turkey. The ratio for Indonesia, Peru and Venezuela are 2.4, 7.3 and 4.3 
respectively (Table 3.8).  This means that public corn stocks permissible under WTO are sufficient 
to achieve food security in all moderate food security risk countries with the exception of 
Indonesia, Peru and Venezuela.  Hence, substantive expansion of AMS is required to achieve food 
security in these countries. In Venezuela, for instance, the levels of public stocks of corn required 
to achieve food security is 4.3 times higher than what is currently allowed under WTO. Thus, 
Venezuela requires AMS to rise from current 10 percent to 43 percent to achieve security in corn 
 104 
 
(Table 3.10). Further, considerably higher AMS are also required in Indonesia (24%) and Peru 
(73%) to achieve corn consumption security.  
 
In the case of wheat, the ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘WTO permissible public stocks’ is 
greater than 1 for all moderate food security risk countries with the exception of India, Pakistan 
and Turkey. This means that public stocks permissible under WTO are sufficient to achieve wheat 
consumption security in India, Pakistan and Turkey. Hence, the AMS policy is not restrictive on 
wheat stockholding in these countries. The policy is, however, restrictive on wheat stockholding 
in Indonesia, Venezuela, Peru and Philippines. The AMS policy needs considerable expansion in 
Indonesia (255760%), Venezuela (78030%), Peru (312%) and Philippines (144670%) to achieve 
wheat consumption security. While these large expansions need to be interpreted with caution, 
they are in line with some policy intuition. The extra-large AMS figures suggest that some 
countries need AMS to be treated as “green box” policies to enable them to achieve food security. 
In order words, these countries require the removal of all restrictions on AMS in order to achieve 
food security.   
 
3.6.2.1.3 Low food security risk countries  
The low food security risk countries in this paper are Laos, Guyana and China.  In the case of rice, 
the ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘WTO permissible public stocks’ is less than 1 for all low 
food security risk countries. This implies that public rice stocks permissible under WTO are 
sufficient to achieve food security for all low food security risk countries.  In the case of corn, the 
ratio of ‘optimal public stocks’ to ‘WTO permissible public stocks’ is less than 1 for all low food 
security risk countries. Thus, public stocks permissible under WTO are sufficient to achieve food 
security in all low food security risk countries. Hence, the AMS policy is not restrictive on corn 
stockholding for food security purposes in Laos, Guyana and China.  The ratio of ‘WTO 
permissible public stocks’ to ‘optimal public stocks’ is also less than 1 for all low food security 
risk countries in the case of wheat. Thus, the public wheat stocks permissible under WTO are 
sufficient to achieve food security in Laos, Guyana and China.  The results therefore suggest that 
low risk countries such as China, Laos and Guyana are not constrained by the de minimis 
requirement.  
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3.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
Public stockholding is an essential aspect of food security policy in developing countries. 
Stockholding in member countries is governed by the AMS disciplines agreed by member 
countries of the WTO during the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations. Recently, some 
member countries (especially the G-33) are arguing that current AMS regulations on public 
stockholding are restrictive for food security purposes.  This paper explored the restrictiveness of 
the AMS policy on optimal public stockholding for food security purposes in developing countries.  
Specifically, the paper categorised countries into high, moderate and low food security risk 
countries and assessed the levels of restrictiveness for rice, wheat and corn. It should also be noted 
that this paper assumes all of the allowed AMS is allocated to acquiring public stockholdings. 
Thus, the current AMS restrictions of 10 percent leaves no flexibility for countries to provide other 
forms of actionable subsidies to their farmers.  
The results shows that AMS policy on public stockholding is restrictive for almost all high food 
security risk countries. These include but not limited to, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Mauritius 
and Mongolia. In most cases, the levels of public stocks required to achieve food security is over 
10 times the stock levels currently permissible under the WTO regulations. The high food security 
risk countries therefore require considerable freedom on AMS stockholding policy to ensure food 
security. This restrictions operate across, corn, wheat and rice.  In other cases, the results shows 
that some countries are not constrained by current stockholding policies. The AMS is only 
restrictive on selected countries and commodities of moderate food security risk and low food 
security risk countries. The non-AMS restricted countries include India, Guyana, Laos, Pakistan 
and China.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that AMS is restrictive on most G-33 countries. The result also 
suggests that countries require different levels of AMS in order to achieve their food security.  
Hence, strict application of AMS without regards to food security risk can be restrictive on optimal 
public stockholding food security purposes in developing countries. This strongly supports the 
request by G-33 for an expansion in AMS.  However, not all G-33 countries require the policy. 
For example, the current WTO policy on public stockholding does not pose risk to food security 
to India and China. Such countries can be exempted from considerations.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3A. 1 Intercepts and coefficients of inverse consumption demand functions for G-33 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
 Intercept Coefficient Intercept Coefficient Intercept Coefficient 
Barbados - - - - 210 -42.40 
Benin 300 -41.0 200 -38.0 210 -39.13 
Botswana - - 200 -5.75 - - 
China 300 -0.01 200 -0.02 210 -0.09 
Guatemala 300 -21.4 200 -4.00 210 -1.48 
Guyana 300.0 -0.81 200 -1.2 210 -0.58 
Haiti 300 -8.60 200 -11.0 210 -41.38 
Honduras 300 -7.60 200 -11.0 210 -6.28 
India  300 -0.02 200 -0.04 210 -0.05 
Indonesia 300 -0.64 200 -2.00 210 -0.28 
Kenya 300 -0.17 200 -7.00 210 -32.14 
Laos 300 -7.0 200 -18.0 - - 
Madagascar 300 -0.13 200 -5.60 210 -39.60 
Mauritius 300 -40.0 - - 210 -1.84 
Mongolia - - - - 210 -0.91 
Mozambique 300 -9.80 200 -6.00 210 -12.54 
Nigeria 300 -0.54 200 -1.30 210 -0.11 
Pakistan 300 -0.08 200 -3.50 210 -0.07 
Panama 300 -41.0 200 -5.30 210 -39.1 
Peru 300 -12.0 200 -5.60 210 -0.79 
Philippines 300 -0.23 200 -12.0 210 -1.50 
Senegal 300 -0.08 200 -3.60 210 -3.06 
Tanzania 300 -0.63 200 -5.40 210 -7.53 
Turkey 300 -1.12 200 -0.22 210 -0.02 
Uganda 300 -3.40 200 -5.30 210 -9.65 
Venezuela 300 -0.68 200 -5.70 210 -43.37 
Zambia 300 -7.00 200 -5.20 210 -3.67 
Zimbabwe - - 200 -7.50 210 -1.91 
Source: Author’s calculation from literature.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Trade sensitivity to food stockholding policies in developing countries 
 
Abstract 
The potential for developing countries’ public stockholding programs to distort  
international trade has raised tension among WTO countries. This concern, in part, arises 
because the effects of trade losses associated with stockholding can be important for food 
exporters. In this paper, a hypothetical public stockholding policy aimed at meeting 50 
percent of domestic consumption is considered in order to understand the policy’s effect on 
trade. Using  a spatial temporal equilibrium trade model, the impact of stock acquisition 
and stock disposal activities of stockholding on trade are explored: stockholding by all 
importing countries; stockholding by G-33 importing countries; and stockholding by small 
G-33 importing countries. The implications of the results for future trade and food security 
are then dicussed. The model is applied to rice, wheat and corn across selected countries.  
The results suggest that stockholding impacts (either positive/negative) can be significant 
for food exporters. However, such impacts are minimal (i.e. less than 5%) when the policy 
is considered for a relatively small group of countries.    
 
4.1 Introduction 
Public stockholding for food security purposes is a contentious issue under the WTO. During the 
WTO Agriculture Committee meeting on 26 September 2013, “a number of countries expressed 
concerns that fellow-members’ stockholding of food and other agricultural products could depress 
prices and affect their exports….” (WTO, 2013a). This was in reaction to the then pending proposal 
by G-33 countries for expanded subsidies on public stockholding for food security purposes in 
developing countries. Canada, Pakistan and the United States raised concerns about stockholding 
activities in India and China and whether these constitute a violation of their WTO commitment 
(WTO, 2013b).  Pakistan expressed concerns about stock levels to be released from India’s public 
stockholding programs ahead of each harvesting season and the extent to which this could 
influence international prices and trade (WTO, 2013b).  The effects of public stockholding was 
again a topic of interest during the WTO Agriculture Ministerial Meeting in Nairobi in 2015. As 
put by the EU to India (WTO, 2015, p. 11):   
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“…., the European Union remains concerned about the potential adverse spill-over effects of the stockholding 
operations aimed at maintaining stocks of food grains and asks India to explain how it intends to address them 
in line with its WTO commitments.”   
Public stockholding for food security purposes is contentious because its acceptance is perceived 
to come at the expense of trade benefits. Food exporting countries (the main opponents of the G-
33 proposal) argue that stockholding activities in importing countries will negatively affect trade 
in a number of ways. First, public stockholding programs for food security purposes are designed 
to purchase and sell stocks in order to keep prices within acceptable limits. However, the 
artificially high prices at which stocks are usually acquired often induce a supply response which 
tend to distort trade. Specifically, the difference between the prevailing market price and the price 
at which public stocks are acquired serves as a subsidy to induce a supply response beyond levels 
conveyed by the market. This is not a concern when the implementing country has little influence 
on international prices. For large countries, however, the additional subsidy-induced production 
may affect trade in the following: 
 
Case 1: If all the subsidy-induced production are channelled into stockholdings programs such 
that no excess stocks are sold in the market, the policy will have no impact on trade in the short-
term. The short-term cost is borne by the implementing country as the opportunity cost of tying up 
resources in grain storage. The short-term impact does not affect trade and, hence, is less important 
to exporting countries. However, the disposal of stocks accumulated under public stockholding 
programs, in future, can increase supply, decrease imports, depress international prices and 
negatively affect exports of food exporting countries.  
 
Case 2: If the additional production induced by subsidies is higher than levels required for 
stockholding programs, the excess stocks will be channelled into the market. For large food 
importing countries, this will increase domestic supply, decrease imports and cause trade 
distortions in the short-term.  Further, the disposal of accumulated stocks in public stockholding 
programs, in future, can increase future supply, decrease imports, depress international prices and 
negatively affect exports of food exporting countries. Food exporting countries are primarily 
against public stockholding in importing countries because of the short-term impacts of excess 
production and the long-term effects arising from the disposal of accumulated stocks.  
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Moreover, food exporting countries are concerned about stockholding in developing countries 
because cereals, which are the main focus of stockholding in G-33 countries, largely come from 
imports. For instance, aggregate cereal imports by G-33 has grown considerably from 60 million 
tonnes (in 2000) to approximately 100 million tonnes in 2013 (Fig 4.1). In terms of value, cereal 
imports amounted to US$35 billion dollars in 2013.  This is a market served largely by food 
exporting countries. Hence, the effects of a trade reduction as a result of stockholding could be 
significant for grain sector incomes in food exporting countries. Nonetheless, the extent to which 
the intended stockholding activities in importing countries may affect trade is unknown.  
 
Fig 4. 1 Cereal import by value and quantity: 2000-2013 
 
Source: Author’s computation using FAO data. 
 
A number of countries have downplayed the concerns of stockholding activities having any 
significant impact on international prices and trade. This was revealed in a question to China 
regarding its cotton stock management. The United States expressed concern about how China 
intends to dispose of its cotton stocks without affecting trade. In a response, China suggested that 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Im
p
o
rt
 v
al
u
e 
(U
S$
 B
ill
io
n
s)
Im
p
o
rt
 q
u
an
ti
ty
 (
m
ill
io
n
 t
o
n
n
es
)
YearsImport Quantity Import Value
 115 
 
its stocks will be sold in the domestic market and, hence, will have no impact on international 
markets. As put by China’s Committee (WTO, 2013b, p. 7): 
 “…….Cotton stocks are distributed in the domestic market and are not for export. The Chinese government 
will distribute the stocks according to domestic market variables. The stocks bear no negative effects on the 
world market”  
 
China’s response is premised on the assumption that stockholding activities in the domestic 
markets have no effects on world market. This is the case where markets are not integrated. In an 
integrated global market system, public stockholding activities in one market can be transmitted 
to others through prices. It is in line with this thinking that the United States argued that internal 
distribution of large stocks can have negative effects on world market (WTO, 2013b). The United 
States disagreed with China’s explanation and expect to raise further issues and challenges in the 
coming years against China’s stockholding programs. Consequently, whether or not stockholding 
activities will have any negative impact on trade therefore remains an empirical question. That is 
one of the issues addressed in this paper.  
Further, despite the opposition by food exporting countries, there are considerable reasons to 
believe that stockholding activities in importing countries can enhance trade in a manner that 
benefits exporting countries. Agricultural production is dependent on availability of land and 
favourable climatic conditions. In some net food importing countries, such factors of production 
may be a constraining such that no amount of subsidies provided to domestic producers can yield 
the requisite stock levels defined by their food security objectives. For such countries, the 
likelihood of buying from markets to build their public stocks objectives is high which will tend 
to drive trade. Further, exporting countries argue that the lifting of limits on AMS will lead to 
stocks being accumulated solely from domestic producers. While this is possible, there are no 
reason to believe it will reduce trade between countries. In an integrated international trade system, 
public stocks acquired from domestic producers tend to reduce quantities available for domestic 
consumption. Particularly for net food importing countries where production lags demand, the 
pursuant of large stockholding policies could divert large stocks into storage. This has the tendency 
of raising domestic prices and inducing imports to the benefits of exporting countries. Nonetheless, 
the extent of such positive impacts on trade are also unknown, and therefore remain an empirical 
question. This is a key issue of interest addressed in this paper.  
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While the extent of impact arising from stockholding activities on trade have not been ascertained, 
there are credible indications that some developing countries intend to increase stockholding 
activities considerably beyond WTO agreed levels. For example, Brazil, one of the major 
stockholding countries, intends to expand its public stockholding programs to support its large 
population under the zero hunger project (Fritz, 2014). Similarly, India plans to provide food from 
stocks to over 800 million people under its new food security law (Dreze, 2013; Fritz, 2014). Plans 
for significant public stockholding in the Economic Community of West African States, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Middle East and North Africa countries beyond six 
months of domestic consumption are well advanced (World Bank, 2012).   
 
This interest arose in response to the experiences that countries faced during the 2007/2008 and 
2010/2011 food crises. The food crises threatened food security for exporting and importing 
developing countries (DFID, 2013). In response, exports were restricted from some major 
agricultural producers including Ukraine, Russia, China and Argentina in order to protect their 
domestic food security (Sharma, 2011).  The absence of food stocks in low-income food deficit 
countries pushed over 75 million additional people into extreme poverty and hunger and increased 
demand for emergency food aid  (FAO, 2008; World Bank, 2009).  Rapsomanikis (2009) notes 
that the rapid increase in food prices translated into unanticipated and large import bills for food 
and, hence, foreign exchange problems for most countries which were already facing a range of 
food security challenges.  
 
With these considerable expansions in stockholding, the potential negative impacts on exporting 
countries is a subject for further investigation. This concern sparked opposition against the G-33 
proposal to allow the building of stockholding to be released from WTO disciplines.  The 
opposition to stockholding reforms reached a climax during the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 2014 
at Bali, Indonesia. India, the leader of the G-33 group of developing countries, threatened to block 
the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 17unless food security was tabled for consideration. Due 
to lack of consensus on stockholding, a Peace Clause was introduced at the WTO as an interim 
solution. The Peace Clause temporarily restrains countries from challenging stockholding 
                                                          
17 A WTO agreement aimed at harmonising customs practices across member countries in order to minimize the 
delays of goods at national borders 
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programs of other member countries until a permanent solution is negotiated (Kerr, 2015). The 
resistance against the policy also arises from the seemingly lack of transparency in public 
stockholding activities. Transparency is an issue because it is quite difficult to observe total stocks 
held in public and private hands in developing countries. The lack of accurate data makes it 
impossible to precisely estimate how an increase in public stock holding will impact international 
trade.  
Moreover, policy makers remain divided over the likely impact of unconstrained public 
stockholdings on trade and food security. The World Bank (2012) has argued that public stocks 
are not an efficient food security policy because they usually come with a large fiscal cost which 
outweighs the associated benefits of stabilization. Rather, international trade is considered to be 
more efficient in dealing with food security problems related to production shocks because 
countries are exposed to alternative sources of imports. However, evidence about the swiftness of 
the market response in Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that the trade response to consumption shocks 
in developing countries is slow.  This puts countries at risk if they rely on international trade to 
restore consumption in times of shocks. The low response is attributed to high transaction costs 
and limited trade openness, which reduces the swiftness of response needed to be able to assure 
food security in developing countries. Thus, short-term food security may need to be enhanced 
through stockholding in these countries.  Lamy (2011) argued that accepting the proposed 
regulations will also largely affect developing countries because approximately 60 percent of 
developing countries’ agricultural and food exports occur among themselves. The extent of the 
impact of public stockholding policies on trade, however, remains uncertain.   
Consequently, a number of studies set out to explore the relationships between trade and public 
stockholding to gain insights into the effects of stockholding on trade. Banga and Sekhar (2015) 
used descriptive analysis to explore the effects of past and projected grain export patterns from 
India’s public foodstock programs on African markets.   Their study concluded that India is 
unlikely to possess a sufficient grain surplus to meaningfully distort international markets. Das 
(2015) argued that India’s stockholding program will not distort trade because the government 
does not directly export grain. Instead, public foodstocks are sold to exporters in a competitive 
bidding process that removes the incentive to sell below the acquisition price. While these 
assumptions remain debatable, they studies by Das (2015) and Banga and Sekhar (2015) treat trade 
 118 
 
as exogenous. Hence, the effect of changes in stockholding activity on international markets across 
countries and time cannot be acertained. This paper addresses that issue.  
This study employs a 50 percent consumption target storage policy to gain insights into the extent 
to which stock acquisition and stock disposal activities of stockholding strategies can affect trade. 
The choice of 50 percent consumption target storage policy is in line with current thinking on 
storage levels in developing countries. In 1997, a study for the FAO, for example, recommended 
that countries hold stocks capable of lasting a minimum of four months against the risk of a supply 
shock (Lynton-Evans, 1997). The FAO four-month storage goal is based on the argument that 
countries require at least four months to access imports from international markets to restore 
consumption. However, with the recent spikes in food prices during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 
food crises and the growth of export restrictions, countries are considering a storage policy lasting 
over six months (World Bank, 2012).  The six-month consumption storage policy is converted to 
percent consumption by assuming that stocks lasting six months will constitute half a year’s 
consumption. This is approximated by a 50 percent consumption target storage policy and used to 
assess the impact of stockholding policies on trade. 
In particular, the study seeks to estimate the extent to which stock acquisition and stock disposal 
activities of public stockholding in importing countries will influence trade. It is assumed that 
public stocks are built by purely purchasing stocks from markets without subsidising domestic 
producers. The assumption is relevant because, in the worst case scenario where subsidies are not 
extended under WTO as being requested by the G-33 proposal, countries may just pursue their 
stockholding objectives by purchasing from the market.  This has implications for trade between 
exporters and importing countries. Secondly, for limited and unfavourable conditions, a 
considerable number of food security risk countries are likely to pursue their stockholding 
objectives by buying from international markets. This is because no amount of subsidies extended 
to their producers may be sufficient to induce the required stocks defined by their food security 
objectives. Hence, for such countries stockholding objectives can largely be pursued by buying 
from the market. The assumption is also important because the ongoing negotiations have not 
revealed the likely subsidy levels to be agreed upon by WTO members. Hence, any assumptions 
on subsidy induced-production may lead to results that have no importance for policy. 
Consequently, Case 1 and Case 2 above, which are contingent upon subsidy-induced production 
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cannot be assessed. For example, Case 1 requires subsidy-induced production to be substantially 
higher than stock levels needed under public stockholding programs in order to have an effect on 
trade. Nonetheless, the levels of subsidy to be extended in countries are unknown. Moreover, what 
even constitutes a substantially higher subsidy is also debatable. Subsidy-induced production 
effects of stockholding policies on trade can best be assessed once the negotiations have reached 
an agreement. 
The specific objectives of the paper include: (1) to simulate the extent to which the proposed 
stockholding policies could influence trade by focusing on stock acquisition and stock disposal; 
and (2) discuss the implications of the results for trade policy, public stockholding and food 
security in developing countries. The simulation is done for three cases: (1) policy implemented 
by all importing countries; (2) policy implemented by G-33 importing countries; (3) policy 
implemented by a small countries exposed to higher food security risk.   
The study focus on only importing countries because exporting countries are not demanding 
stockholding policies. Exporters have export taxes and embargos which are used to limit food 
exporters and manage their food security risk in times of food crisis, unlike importing countries. 
Further, quantifying the extent of impact of the proposed stockholding policy can be important in 
negotiating appropriate compensation schemes if the policy does lead to costly trade impacts. 
 The paper focus on rice, wheat and corn trade because these are the major cereals included in the 
food security and stockholding programs of developing countries. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows: section 4.2 is the conceptual framework; section 4.3 is an overview of 
stockholding policies in developing countries; section 4.4 reviews the relevant literature on stocks 
and trade interaction; section 4.5 develops the theoretical model; section 4.6 discusses the results; 
and section 4.7 provides conclusions and recommendations. 
 120 
 
4.2 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework underlying the impact of stockholding activities (i.e. stock acquisition 
and stock disposal) on trade are presented in this section. It is assumed that public stockholding 
programs are built by purely acquiring stocks from the market without subsiding domestic 
producers. Stockholding activities can be specified into three phases.  
 
Phase 1: Stock acquisition stage 
The first phase of public stockholding programs (i.e. Phase 1) refers to years of stock acquisition. 
Countries first commit resources to acquire stock levels defined by their food security objective. 
A hypothetical stockholding policy is one aimed at acquiring 100,000 tonnes of stocks for food 
security purposes.  Stock acquisition phase will lead to an increase in imports by food importing 
countries because the policy increase domestic demand for stocks relative to supply. Stockholding 
policy implemented by food exporting countries, however, leads to a decline in exports during the 
stock acquisition phase. This is because the diversion of food into storage programs reduce stocks 
available for exports. Stock acquisition by importing countries is therefore synonymous with trade 
creation because it increases imports while stock acquisition by exporting countries is synonymous 
with trade loss.    
 
Phase 2: Stock replacement/management stage18 
After government has built the stock size defined by its food security objective, the next stage is 
stock management/replacement (i.e. Phase 2). Stock management/replacement is necessary 
because agricultural products cannot be stored forever without loss of quality. Hence, old stocks 
must be sold out ahead of each harvesting season in order to acquire new ones as replacement. The 
stock replacement phase is therefore assumed to have a zero net impact on trade. This is 
irrespective of whether the stocks are being acquired by importing or exporting countries.  
 
 
                                                          
18 Stock management phase is operationalized as a time frame when actual stock level is held constant. Stock 
management phase comes to an end when government decides to deplete stocks. Hence, the policy does not 
actually exist indefinitely. The policy has very minimal impact on trade during the stock management stage.     
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Phase 3: Stock disposal stage 
Stock disposal phase refers to the stage where accumulated stocks are released into the market 
without replacement. A typical case is a change in government policy leading to a discontinuation 
of the stockholding policy. For food importing countries, stock disposed will increase domestic 
supply relative to demand. This can result in a decline in imports and negatively affect exports of 
the exporting countries. This is one of the major concerns of food exporting countries for opposing 
the G-33 proposal for stockholding in developing countries. Stock disposal by importing countries 
is therefore synonymous to trade loss because it decreases imports while stock disposal by 
exporting countries is synonymous to trade creation.    
The three phases of stockholding described above underlie the methodology developed to assess 
the impact of the proposed stockholding policy on trade. For simplicity, it is assumed that years of 
stock accumulation can be expressed in a single year, represented by t1. Also, since years of stock 
replacement do not affect trade, they can be excluded from any analysis without loss of generality. 
Further, years of stock disposal is another important aspect of stockholding programs. This is 
represented by t2. Thus, the stockholding impact on trade can effectively be reduced to a two-
period model where stocks are acquired in period t1 and disposed of in t2.  Hence, the time frame 
for the model used here, t, is a set of t1 and t2 defined as: 
t = (t1, t2)                            (4.1) 
The above simplification has some insights for infinite horizon models.  An infinite horizon model 
does not have stock disposal phase because stock replacement occurs forever. The policy will 
remain in place without closure, hence, the stock replacement decision happens over all time 
periods in the future. An infinite horizon stockholding, therefore, has only stock acquisition and 
stock management phases. Further, since stock replacement component does not noticeably affect 
trade, by assumption, the impact of stockholding on trade becomes a one-time effect which occurs 
during the stock acquisition.  
The above simplifications also has insights into the extent of impact that can arise from 
stockholding activities. In a real world situation, stock acquisition may be done over an extended 
period of time. Hence, the one time period stock acquisition (assumed here) estimates the 
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maximum impact that can arise as a result of stock acquisition. Where stock acquisition is done 
over an extended periods, the impacts will be relatively low. Similarly, stock disposal in a one-
term period (used here) represents the maximum impact on trade that can arise when accumulated 
stocks are disposed in a single year. The impacts will be lower if stock disposal is done over an 
extended period.  
In conclusion, the study seeks to provide insights into the maximum impacts on trade as a result 
of stock acquisition and stock disposal. 
 
4.3 Modelling trade and public stockholding in developing countries 
International trade and public stockholding have historically been important food security polices 
in developing countries. Trade is useful in distributing stocks from food surplus regions to deficit 
regions. Stockholding is perceived to dealing with contingencies, especially when the reliance on 
market to arbitrage between surplus and deficit areas is not swift or constrained by policy 
interventions.  
Attempts to quantify the interaction between public foodstocks and trade, however, has followed 
a variety of approaches. Gustafson (1958) developed a dynamic optimisation framework for 
determining intertemporal optimal stocks obtained through maximizing a discounted social 
welfare measure. A primary condition for storage in Gustafson’s framework is that the price 
difference between two periods must exceed/equal storage cost, or else storage does not occur. 
Williams and Wright (1982, 1991) expanded Gustafson’s framework to estimate optimal public 
stocks. Their studies argue that public stocks are only justified where market failures occur.  
Gustafson’s framework has been adapted for estimating optimal public foodstocks in open 
economies by Makki et al (2001), Gouel (2013),  Gouel and Jean (2015) and Larson et al (2014). 
This approach generally considers trade as exogenous, predetermined or non-existent (see, for 
example, Johnson and Sumner, 1976, pp. 265). Thus, because trade is treated as exogenous, a 
change in public stockholding policy does not produce a noticeable change in trade. As such, 
Gustafson’s framework has often been used in analysing the storage decisions of a country over 
time, but not the effects on other countries.  
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Models for analysing economic equilibriums where markets are separated by space and time are 
relevant in analysing the effects of stockholding decisions on trade.  These models, referred to as 
“spatial-temporal equilibrium models” were first advanced by Takayama and Judge (1971). Arndt 
and Schiler (1998) applied a spatial-temporal equilibrium trade model to the maize market in 
Mozambique. Their model specifies a twelve-month period and ten regions, each comprised of 
rural and urban centers. Further, Mango and Yanagida (2000) used a spatial-temporal model to 
examine the effects of trade liberalisation on Japonica rice trade using a two-period model 
involving 12 countries. Trade impact was modelled using a tariff variable which assumes a value 
prior to liberalisation and then is reduced to ascertain the impact on trade, prices, consumption and 
welfare. To minimize the data required, excess demand and excess supply functions were used, 
while transport costs were predicted using the distance in nautical miles between countries using 
Cramer’s et al (1991) estimates.  
 
The spatial-temporal model has two equilibrium conditions that make it appropriate for modelling 
the impact of stockholding on trade: the spatial equilibrium condition and the intertemporal 
condition. The spatial equilibrium condition require that trade occurs between regions if only their 
price difference is large enough to cover transportation cost; while storage occurs provided the 
intertemporal price difference is sufficient to cover storage cost. These two conditions characterise 
spatial-temporal models. The equilibrium solutions are obtained by maximizing the net social 
surplus.  The spatial and temporal equilibrium conditions of the “spatial-temporal equilibrium 
model” are compatible with stock management decisions in the real world.  
 
Stock management is an intertemporal decision making process, where the policy maker 
determines optimal carryout stocks from the current period (t1) to the next period (t2). Since the 
model maximizes the discounted surplus, the resulting storage and equilibrium trade outcomes are 
optimal. Hence, the model does not allow for sub-optimal decisions where a country can 
understore or overstore from the previous period to t2. Storage from period t1 to t2 is optimal. To 
illustrate how the spatial-temporal model works in managing stocks, however, let us assume the 
decision maker can understock or overstore in order to mirror real world outcomes. When a country 
gets to period t2 and realizes that stocks carried from the previous year were inadequate, two policy 
decisions are available to manage stocks. The policy maker can limit amount of stocks to be taken 
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out from period t2 to t3. Alternatively, since the country arrived at period t2 and realised that the 
stocks from t1 were low, this raises prices in that country relative to other countries. As a result, 
economic agents will realize the opportunity to import. Similarly, a country can increase carryout 
and/or exports if it overstocked from the previous year.  The availability of carryout (i.e. stocks 
stored from current period to the next) and trade options simultaneously in the spatial-temporal model 
produces solutions that are consistent with real world stock management decisions.  
 
For policy simulation, the spatial temporal model is first solved for benchmark solutions. 
Secondly, the model is re-solved to obtain new solutions which are compared with the benchmark 
case when parameter(s) of interest are changed. The change in equilibrium values are then 
attributed to the effects of the policy (Kryzan, 2015; Paris et al, 2011). In the study, the effect of 
public stockholding on trade are simulated for four cases:  
- Scenario 1: No stockholding policy (i.e. benchmark case) 
- Scenario 2: Policy implemented by all importing countries 
- Scenario 3: Policy implemented by G-33 food importing countries  
- Scenario 4: Policy implemented by small G-33 food importing countries 
In each case, the effects of the policy is determined by comparing trade levels with benchmark 
values. The spatial-temporal equilibrium used for the simulation is developed in the next 
subsection. 
 
4.4 The spatial – temporal equilibrium trade model 
The spatial-temporal model developed in this paper draws extensively on the work of Mango and 
Yanagida (2000).  The model is presented in steps which principally define the exporters market, 
the importers market, the spatial equilibrium condition, the storage equilibrium condition, and the 
public storage condition. The model is balanced by assuming that aggregate exports equal 
aggregate imports at all times.  
Exporting country model: Exporting countries participate in the world market through excess 
supply, implicitly derived from the difference between domestic demand (DC) and domestic 
supply (DS). A country becomes an exporter when domestic supply exceeds demand at the world 
price. For an exporting country (E), a rise in export price leads to a fall in domestic consumption, 
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an increase in supply and consequently increases excess supply which is available for export. 
Hence excess supply (ES) is a positive function of export price (EP) as: 
𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡 = ∅𝐸,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐸,𝑡  , for all t    (4.2) 
Where the subscript E stands for exporter; ∅Et is the intercept term representing export levels of a 
country even if world prices were zero19; and βE is a positive parameter representing the effect of 
a price increase on exports. The possibility for excess supply to come from exporting regions is 
imposed by assuming that domestic supply minus the amount in stocks (ST) must equal domestic 
consumption and exports (ES) (Magno and Yanagida, 2000). This is a feasibility constraint 
imposed in the model to ensure that exports arises only from exporting countries.  This is stated 
mathematically as: 
𝐷𝑆𝐸,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑇𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡    for all t     (4.3) 
Importing country model: Importing countries participate in the world market through excess 
demand, implicitly derived from the difference between domestic demand (DC) and domestic 
supply (DS) at prevailing world price. A country is an importer when domestic consumption 
exceeds supply at going world price. For an importing country (I), excess demand is negatively 
affected by import price (IP). A rise in import price decreases domestic consumption while 
increasing domestic supply. The two effects combine to decrease imports. Hence, excess demand 
and import price are negatively related as: 
𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡 = 𝜃𝐼,𝑡 − 𝛿𝐼,𝑡𝐼𝑃𝐼,𝑡               (4.4) 
Where the subscript I stands for importer; 𝜃𝐼,𝑡  is a constant representing import levels of a country 
even at a zero world price20, that is, some amount of trade will still prevail among countries at zero 
prices; and 𝛿𝐼,𝑡 is the coefficient measuring the effects of import price on excess demand. We 
impose the restriction that domestic consumption, for an importer, is the sum of stocks, domestic 
supply and imports such that there cannot be exports from importing regions. This is a feasibility 
                                                          
19 Note that this is only a notational value arising from the linear assumption imposed on the excess export supply 
curve.  
20 Note that this is only a notational value arising from the linear assumption imposed on excess import demand 
curve. 
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constraint imposed in the model to ensure that imports arises only from importing countries. This 
is stated as: 
𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡         (4.5) 
Spatial arbitrage condition: The spatial arbitrage condition (i.e. spatial law of one price) requires 
that trade only occurs between two countries provided their price difference equals the per unit 
transport cost (equation (4.6)). When the reverse holds such that the price difference between the 
countries is less than transport costs, there will be no trade (equation (4.7)). Although policies such 
as export taxes and import tariffs also act to increase the price in importing countries, for 
simplicity, the study focus on per unit transport cost (h). Spatial arbitrage condition is incorporated 
in the model as:  
𝑃𝐼,𝑡 − ℎ = 𝑃𝐸,𝑡, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 > 0                     (4.6) 
𝑃𝐼,𝑡 − ℎ ≤ 𝑃𝐸,𝑡, 𝑁𝑂 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸                      (4.7) 
Where PI and PE are prices in importing and exporting countries respectively.  
 
Intertemporal storage condition: The intertemporal price condition (i.e. intertemporal law of one 
price) requires that storage from period t to t+1 occurs if only the price difference is large enough 
to cover per unit storage cost(c). In this paper, t and t+1 are represented by t1 and t2 respective. 
This is defined by equation (4.8), and for no storage (equation (4.9)).   
𝑃𝑡1 − 𝑐 = 𝛿𝑃𝑡2, 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 > 0                     (4.8) 
𝑃𝑡1 − 𝑐 ≤ 𝛿𝑃𝑡2, 𝑁𝑂 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸                      (4.9) 
 
Where Pt and Pt+1 are current and future price respectively. Expected prices are discounted by a 
factor δ (= (1/ (1+r)), where ‘r’ is the discount rate.  
 
Stockholding policy: The public storage policy considered in this paper is a 50 percent 
consumption target. Therefore, total stocks acquired in each country is expected to last for a 
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minimum of six months. Representing the policy target — measuring stock duration — by the 
letter ‘z’, stock held at a given time (STt) as a percentage of consumption is defined as:  
𝑆𝑇𝑡 ≥ 𝑧 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   (4.10) 
Where z=0.5 for the six month storage policy (i.e. 50 percent consumption target).  
Algebraically, setting policy target (equation 4.10) as a function of consumption leads to undefined 
determinant because domestic consumption (DC) is also included as a constrain in the model (i.e. 
equation 4.4). As a result, the model cannot be solved. To make the model solvable, average 
consumption values from 2010 to 2014 were first used to calculate target stock levels in equation 
4.10.   Since target storage now assume parameters (instead of a function), consumption and policy 
target are delinked and the model can be solved.  Target storage levels of importing countries used 
in the simulation are shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4. 1 Target storage levels of importing countries (million tonnes) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
Market clearing condition: For the model to close, it is assumed that the sum of imports must equal 
exports at a given time.  
 ∑ 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼,𝑡 − ∑ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸,𝑡 = 0    for all t                   (4.11) 
The market clearing condition is a feasibility condition required to ensure that total exports 
generated from exporting countries are sufficient to meet total imports at equilibrium.  
 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
China 68.0 88.0 56.7 
Nigeria 2.5 4.5 1.8 
Indonesia 19.0 5.0 3.0 
Philippines 6.5 3.5 1.2 
EU-28 1.6 32.8 - 
Middle East 4.1 8.5 27.5 
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Solving the model:  The model is solved by choosing prices in importing and exporting countries 
that maximizes the discounted social welfare as:  
Maximize W= Wt1 + Wt2/ (1+r)
t-1         (4.12) 
Where: 
𝑊𝑡1 = ∑ (𝜃𝐼,𝑡1
𝐼,𝑡1
𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑡1 − 0.5𝛿𝐼,𝑡1𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑡1
2 ) − ∑ (∅𝐸,𝑡1
𝐸,𝑡1
𝑃𝐸𝐸,𝑡1 + 0.5𝛽𝐸,𝑡1𝑃𝐸𝐸,𝑡1
2 ) 
𝑊𝑡2 = ∑ (𝜃𝐼,𝑡2
𝐼,𝑡2
𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑡2 − 0.5𝛿𝐼,𝑡2𝑃𝐼𝐼,𝑡2
2 ) − ∑ (∅𝐸,𝑡2
𝐸,𝑡2
𝑃𝐸𝐸,𝑡2 + 0.5𝛽𝐸,𝑡2𝑃𝐸𝐸,𝑡2
2 ) 
Subject to:  
1) Spatial price equilibrium condition 
𝑃𝐼,𝑡 − ℎ = 𝑃𝐸,𝑡, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 > 0   for all t 
2) Intertemporal storage equilibrium  
 
𝑃𝑡1 − 𝑐 = 𝛿𝑃𝑡2, 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 > 0   for all importers and exporters 
 
3) Excess demand condition for importing regions 
                                        𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡  for all t      
4) Excess supply condition for exporting regions 
                                                     𝐷𝑆𝐸,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑇𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡  for all t      
5) Excess supply function 
 
            𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡 = ∅𝐸,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐸,𝑡  for all t 
6) Excess demand function 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡 = 𝜃𝐼,𝑡 − 𝛿𝐼,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐼,𝑡  for all t 
7) Market clearing condition 
 
∑ 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸,𝑡   for all t 
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The model is first solved to obtain the benchmark solutions (i.e. the base case). The model is solved 
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) where computer programmable codes are 
written to execute the model. The GAMS programming has been used extensively for spatial 
equilibrium and spatial-temporal trade modelling to solve a series of algebraic equations to 
generate optimal values for policy simulation.  
 
To simulate the effect of the policy on trade, the stockholding policy (𝑆𝑇𝑡 ≥ 𝑧 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ) 
condition is included and re-solved. The level of storage needed to achieve 50 percent of domestic 
consumption is known in advance. Hence, each stock level is entered as a parameter. In the base 
case where storage is not allowed, stock parameters are set to zero. The model is solved by 
choosing price levels that maximizes total welfare subject to the constraints. The observed 
difference between the new equilibrium trade and benchmark solutions represent the policy effect 
of stockholding in scenario 2, scenario 3 and scenario 4. The specific steps involve in 
implementing the stockholding conditions are illustrated below.  
 
4.4.1 Steps in implementing stockholding constrains in the model 
Step 1: The benchmark case 
The stockholding policy is implemented through excess demand and excess supply constraints 
discussed above. These are restated as:  
Excess demand condition:       𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡 for all t  
Excess supply condition:         𝐷𝑆𝐸,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑇𝐸,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡 for all t  
Stockholding is a policy that leads to accumulation of stocks in implementing countries. Hence, to 
assess the policy’s impact on trade it is assumed that storage does not occur during the benchmark 
case. Countries are allowed to trade under the benchmark case but not permitted to hold stocks. 
The zero stockholding policy implies that 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡 = 0 and 𝑆𝑇𝐸,𝑡 = 0. Hence, the excess demand and 
excess supply conditions for the benchmark case becomes:  
Excess demand condition:       𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡 = 0 + 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡  for all t 
Excess supply condition:         𝐷𝑆𝐸,𝑡 − 0 = 𝐷𝐶𝐸,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑆𝐸,𝑡  for all t 
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With these restrictions imposed, the model is solved to determine equilibrium trade values that 
arises under the assumption of ‘no stockholding’ (i.e. Scenario 1 above). These serve as benchmark 
values for the simulation. 
 
Step 2: Stockholding policy implementation21 
Once the benchmark model is solved, the effect of increasing stocks as a result stockholding policy 
can now be assessed by observing the change in equilibrium trade values before and after 
stockholding. Stockholding policy has three stages – a stock acquisition stage, a stock management 
stage, and a stock disposal stage. It is assumed that stock management stage does not noticeably 
affect trade.  As a result, only the stock acquisition and stock disposal effects of stockholding are 
modelled. The implementation of stock acquisition and stock disposal policies in the model are 
discussed below. 
  
Step 2.1: Stock acquisition stage 
Stock acquisition occurs in period t1. Given a no storage excess demand condition:  
  𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡1 = 0 + 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡1 
The diversion of stocks (STt1) into stockholding reduces the amount available for consumption. 
Consequently, the resulting excess demand condition becomes: 
𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡1 = 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1 
DS is domestic supply and ST is the amount of domestic supply taken out of the market for storage. 
Consequently, the amount effectively supplied in the market for domestic consumption has 
declined. The decline in effective supply is stated as:   
[𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1] ↓ 
                                                          
21 While shocks often arise from global production falls, shocks can also arise from domestic crop failures and other 
calamities and countries may hold stocks to mitigate shocks of domestic origin. The stockholding policy modelled 
herein focuses on government held stocks in the domestic economy.  
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Hence, the excess demand condition is stated as:  
𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡1 = [𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1] ↓ +𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡1 
Given that effective supply has declined, domestic prices will increase as a result to induce imports 
in order to restore consumption. If imports increase by amount of stocks put into stockholding, the 
policy’s impact on trade will exactly equal to levels of storage. However, where imports does not 
increase accordingly, domestic prices will rise and lead to a decline in consumption. Consequently, 
stock acquisition in importing countries may increase prices, increase imports or decrease 
consumption in importing countries. This is summarised as: 
↓ 𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡1 = [𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1] ↓ +𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡1 ↑ 
 
Step 2.2: Stock disposal stage  
Stock disposal occurs in period t2. It is important to note that stocks disposed in period t2 must be 
equal to stocks acquired in period t1. Thus, STt2 = STt1. The disposal of STt1 increase effective 
domestic supply in period t2. This is stated as: 
[𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡2 + 𝑆𝑇𝑡1] ↑ 
The increased effective domestic supply leads to a decline in prices, increased consumption 
reduces imports by the importing country. Thus, stock disposal leads to a decline in international 
prices which affect exports. This is a major concern for countries opposing the stockholding in 
importing countries.  The impact of stock disposal can be summarised as:  
↑ 𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡2 = [𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡2 + 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1] ↑ +𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡2 ↓ 
Stock acquisition and stock disposal can be implemented sequentially in GAMS to analyse the 
impact of stockholding policy on trade. The excess demand conditions in t1 and t2 become:  
𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡1 = 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡1 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1 and: 𝐷𝐶𝐼,𝑡2 = 𝐷𝑆𝐼,𝑡2 + 𝐸𝐷𝐼,𝑡2 + 𝑆𝑇𝐼,𝑡1 
The model is solved by incorporating the stockholding condition in the model to obtain the new 
equilibrium trade values. The observed difference between the new equilibrium trade and 
benchmark values represent the effects of stockholding in scenario 2, scenario 3 and scenario 4.  
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4.5 Data  
The 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 consumption, stocks, production and trade data is used to calibrate 
the benchmark model for the simulation. As indicated by Paris et al. (2011) and  Kryzan (2015), 
for simulation models to have relevant policy implications, the benchmark model must closely 
predict real world values. For good predictions, it is important to select years which represent a 
normal case. The 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 are selected because: 
1. No major distortions to production, consumption or trade are known to have occurred in 
these years.  
2. The 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 provides the most recent data available. Hence, analysis 
based on current data is important for current policy and also going forward.  
Consumption, stocks, production and trade data are available online from USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Services.  USDA data is reported in marketing years which span across calendar 
years.  The years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 are designated as t1 and t2 respectively.  Storage cost 
and cost of capital were assumed at $25 and 20 percent per annum respectively.  
The main G-33 developing countries of interest are China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and The 
Philippines. These are large consumption countries whose stockholding activities can have 
significant impact on trade. Turkey and Pakistan which are also large consumption G-33 countries 
were, however, excluded because of their limited impact on trade in cereals. While the most 
important cereal in Turkey’s food consumption is wheat, Turkey’s wheat imports and export are 
approximately the same. Hence, its impact on global trade is approximately zero. Further, despite 
rice being a major export in Pakistan, it is, however, relatively insignificant compared to India and 
Thailand. Hence, its influence in global market can be negligible. To ensure that the estimates 
approximate observed trade data, relevant non-G33 trading countries were included. These are 
Thailand, EU-2822, Middle East and the United States.    
The United States serves as the exporter country for corn and wheat in the model due to its large 
influence in wheat and corn export markets. The United States has had close to 50 percent and 25 
                                                          
22 List of countries in the EU-28 region by USDA classification include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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percent of corn and wheat export markets respectively since 2013. Thailand and India served as 
rice exporting countries because of their substantial exports in the international markets in 2013 
and 2014. The importing countries are China, Nigeria, Indonesia, The Philippines, EU-28 
(exempted for wheat) and the Middle East23. Corn and wheat prices in US are available from World 
Bank Commodity group. Further, export prices of rice in India and Thailand were determined by 
taking a ratio of export values to export quantities using FAO data. Similarly, import values of 
cereals were divided by import quantities to determine prices in importing countries.  
Obtaining data on transport cost is a challenge in spatial equilibrium analysis. As a result, 
economists often use regression analysis to estimate per unit transport cost. Cramer et al (1991), 
for instance, used a regression (equation 4.11) to estimate cost per tonne(TC) of shipping grain 
between ports of trading nations using nautical mile distance (DIST) and nationality of shipping 
vessel (US) as explanatory variables as:  
“TCie=0.0124 DISTie -0.000000875 DISTie2 + 57.3648 US;”                   
             (9.96)                (-6.07)                       (17.17) 
“R2=0.772; Std. Error =17.19, d.f. =106” 
Where, US is a dummy variable for shipment occurring on US vessels.  Cramer et al (1991)’s 
approach is adapted to estimate per unit trade cost as it also focuses on cereals. The approach is, 
however, adapted with some modifications. First, shipment on US flagged ships are very expensive 
relative to non-US flagged ships due to the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. As a result, commercial 
shipments does not occur on US flagged ships with exception of cereal sourced in the US for food 
aid purposes, which are required by law to be shipped on US flagged ships to recipient countries 
(Prof. W. A. Kerr, personal communication, June 2016). Hence, the dummy variable representing 
US flagged ship was given the value zero.   
Secondly, while some studies prefer to use nautical distance between ports to predict trade cost, 
this is problematic for landlocked countries.   As a result, nautical distance between national 
capitals were used.  Brussels served as capital city for EU-28 because it is administrative capital 
                                                          
23 List of countries in the Middle East by USDA classification include Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Yemen 
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of European Union. However, no definite form of integration exist among the Middle East 
countries.  As such the most popular city, Dubai, was used as a proxy for the capital city of the 
Middle East. These were used to estimate per unit transport cost between countries.  
Further, Cramer’s estimates reflect transport cost for 1991. As such, the values were adjusted for 
inflation using consumer price index (CPI) data available from U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The US CPI is preferred because Cramer’s transport cost are measured in US dollars per tonne. 
The annual average CPI in 1991 is estimated at 136.2 while CPI for 2012, 2013 and 2014 were 
estimated at 230, 233 and 237 respectively. It is assumed that transport cost did not change 
significantly over the period of 2012 to 2014. The average of the three CPI known as ‘Average 
CPI in current years’ was calculated and used to adjust for inflation as: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑖𝑛 1991
∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡    (4.12) 
The resultant per unit transport costs adjusted for inflation are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
 Table 4. 2 Transport costs ($/tonne) between countries adjusted for inflation 
  Importers 
 
 
China Nigeria Indonesia Philippines EU Middle East 
E
x
p
o
rt
er
s India 37 62 47 45 32 21 
Thailand 33 71 24 23 40 46 
US 74 67 71 75 32 74 
 Source: Author’s computation.  
 
The elasticities of demand and supply were derived from the literature to estimate intercept and 
slope parameters of the excess demand and supply functions24 for 2012/2013 and 2013/2014.  The 
list of intercepts and coefficients used to calibrate rice, corn and wheat base case models are 
presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.  
                                                          
24 See Appendix 4.2 for the derivations excess demand and excess supply intercepts and coefficients.  
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 Table 4. 3 Intercepts and coefficients of excess demand and excess supply functions of rice 
 t1 t2 
 Intercept  
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient Intercept 
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient 
Importing countries     
China 40.6 -0.08 36.3 -0.07 
Nigeria 12.9 -0.02 13.1 -0.02 
Indonesia 14.5 -0.03 14.8 -0.03 
The Philippines 10.6 -0.02 10.3 -0.02 
EU-28 45.7 -0.09 39.7 -0.08 
Middle East 49.0 -0.09 43.6 -0.08 
     
Exporting countries     
India -122.7 0.30 -124.7 0.31 
Thailand -29.4 0.08 -24.7 0.08 
US - -   
  Source: Author’s computation. 
 
Table 4. 4 Intercepts and coefficients of excess demand and excess supply functions of corn 
 t1 t2 
 Intercept 
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient Intercept 
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient 
Importing countries     
China 86.3 -0.23 76.7 -0.21 
Nigeria 7.4 -0.02 10.4 -0.03 
Indonesia 13.5 -0.03 10.6 -0.02 
The Philippines 14.6 -0.04 7.6 -0.02 
EU-28 122.3 -0.33 112.0 -0.30 
Middle East 60.6 -0.14 56.5 -0.13 
     
Exporting countries     
India     
Thailand     
US -254.0 0.95 -239.0 0.98 
  Source: Author’s computation. 
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Table 4. 5 Intercepts and coefficients of excess demand and excess supply functions of 
wheat 
 t1 t2 
 Intercept 
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient Intercept 
(million tonnes) 
Coefficient 
Importing countries     
China 114.8 -0.31 122.0 -0.33 
Nigeria 15.2 -0.03 11.0 -0.02 
Indonesia 14.6 -0.02 17.8 -0.03 
The Philippines 14.5 -0.03 10.8 -0.02 
Middle East 72.7 -0.15 62.3 -0.13 
     
Exporting countries     
India     
Thailand     
US -201.0  0.82 -206.3  0.88 
   Source: Author’s computation. 
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4.6 Results and Discussion 
 
4.6.1 The Benchmark model results 
This section presents the benchmark equilibrium prices, trade and welfare levels for rice, corn and 
wheat from the spatial-temporal equilibrium models.   
 
4.6.1.1 Benchmark equilibrium prices 
Public stockholding for food security purposes is a policy aimed at increasing stock levels in 
developing countries. To assess the impact of this policy on trade, it is important to assume that 
the base case (i.e. benchmark) stocks are zero for all countries. With zero stockholding in the in 
base case, the effect of increasing stocks — as a result of stockholding — can be ascertained by 
comparing the change in equilibrium trade relative to the base case. Thus, the model is solved to 
produce zero initial stocks of rice, wheat and corn to serve as initial (i.e. benchmark) values.   
The shadow prices associated with the base case are presented in Table 4.6. Shadow prices reflect 
equilibrium prices that will prevail in importing and exporting countries if countries were to trade 
but not permitted to hold stocks. In all cases, the equilibrium price of rice, corn and wheat in t1 are 
generally higher than price levels in t2. For instance, shadow price of rice in Nigeria are 
approximately US$505/tonne and US$495/tonne in period t1 and t2 respectively. In China, shadow 
prices for wheat in t1 and t2 are approximately US$363/tonne and US$352/tonne respectively; 
while shadow price for corn in US for t1 and t2 are approximately US$291/tonne and US$276/tonne 
respectively. The higher prices in t1 relative to t2 is consistent with the zero stockholding condition 
imposed on the base case. Intuitively, since future prices are expected to be lower than present 
prices, there is no incentive to stock grain from the present to future in both exporting and 
importing countries.  Further, shadow prices are generally higher in importing countries than in 
exporting countries. This presents an economic incentive to export grain to importing countries.  
In the next sub-section, the equilibrium trade levels existing under the base case scenario are 
presented.  
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Table 4. 6 The benchmark equilibrium prices ($/tonne) 
Source: Author’s computation.  
 
4.6.1.2 The benchmark equilibrium trade 
The equilibrium trade results for the benchmark case are presented in Table 4.7. Total rice traded 
in t1 and t2 are approximately 16 million and 19 million tonnes respectively. Rice imports by China, 
Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines in t1  are approximately 2.8 million, 2.8 million, 0.6 million 
and 1.3 million tonnes respectively; while imports in t2 are approximately 4.2 million, 3.2 million, 
1.3 million and 1.3 million tonnes respectively.  Similarly, the equilibrium exports from Thailand 
and India are approximately 5.8 million and 10.2 million tonnes respectively in t1; while 
corresponding exports in t2 are approximately at 9.3 million and 9.5 million tonnes respectively.   
The values in parenthesis are percentage error25 between actual and the base case (i.e. 
benchmark/initial) trade values. For the individual countries, the error of discrepancy between 
observed and base case equilibrium trade values are within ± 15 percent. 
Aggregate corn traded in t1 and t2 is 22.5 million and 31.5 million tonnes respectively. The 
benchmark equilibrium corn import for China, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines in t1 are 
approximately 2.3 million, 0.2 million, 2.8 million and 0.1 million tonnes respectively; while the 
                                                          
25 Percentage error = ((Predicted-Actual)/Actual)*100. Actual trade equals absolute value of net trade (i.e. |observed 
imports – observed exports|)   
 Rice Corn Wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China 473 459 365 350 363 352 
Nigeria 505 495 358 343 356 345 
Indonesia 464 450 362 347 360 349 
Philippines 463 449 366 351 364 353 
EU-28 495 478 348 333 - - 
Middle East 464 454 365 350 363 352 
       
Exporters       
India 443 433 - - - - 
Thailand 440 426 - - - - 
United States - - 291 276 289 278 
 139 
 
corresponding imports, in t2, are 3.2 million, 0.1 million, 3.7 million and 0.6 million tonnes 
respectively. Error of discrepancy is generally less than 15 percent for all cases with the exception 
of EU in period t1, where the benchmark model under predicts actual corn imports by 18.5 percent.  
The benchmark model also over-predict and under-predict observed US corn exports by 56 percent 
and 34 percent in t1 and t2 respectively.  
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   Table 4. 7 The benchmark equilibrium trade (million tonnes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: Author’s computation. 
    Note: Values in parentheses are percentage error of discrepancy between equilibrium benchmark trade values and the observed trade.  
 
 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China 2.8 (0.0%) 4.2 (+11.0%) 2.3 (-11.5%) 3.2 (-3.0%) 2.3 (+15.0%) 5.7 (-1.7%) 
Nigeria 2.8 (0.0%) 3.2 (+14.3%) 0.2 (0.0%) 0.1 (0.0%) 4.5 (+12.5%) 4.1 (+2.5%) 
Indonesia 0.6 (-14.3%) 1.3 (+8.3%) 2.8 (+3.7%) 3.7 (+5.8%) 7.4 (+7.2%) 7.3(+2.8%) 
Philippines 1.3 (-7.1%) 1.3 (+8.3%) 0.1 (0.0%) 0.6 (-14.3%) 3.6  (+3.0) 3.7 (+5.7%) 
EU-28 1.3 (+8.3%) 1.5 (+15.0%) 7.5 (-18.5%) 12.1 (-13.5%) - - 
Middle East 7.2 (-1.4%) 7.3 (+13.5%) 9.5 (-13.6%) 12.0 (-10.8%) 18.2 (-13.3%) 17.5 (-16.7%) 
Total (million tonnes) 16.0 18.8  22.5 31.5 36.0 38.3 
       
Exporters       
India 10.2 (-3.8%) 9.5 (-10.3%) - - - - 
Thailand 5.8 (-5.0%) 9.3 (-13.1%) - - - - 
United States - - 22.5 (+56.0%) 31.5 (-34.0%) 36.0 (+33.3%) 38.3(+40.0%) 
Total (million tonnes) 16.0 18.8 22.5 31.5 36.0 38.3 
1
4
0
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Further, the aggregate wheat trade are estimated at 36 million and 38.3 million tonnes in t1 and t2 
respectively. In the base case, China imports approximately 2.3 million and 5.7 million tonnes of 
wheat in t1 and t2 respectively; while Indonesia imports are estimated at about 7.3 million tonnes 
in both years. The Philippines, on the other hand, has aggregate wheat imports in t1 and t2 of 
approximately 3.6 million and 3.5 million tonnes respectively. The error of discrepancy between 
observed and predicted imports, for each country, is within ±15 percent in most cases with 
exception of the Middle East where the benchmark model under-predicts observed wheat imports 
by 16 percent . The model over-predicts aggregate US wheat exports by 33.3 percent and 40 
percent in t1 and t2 respectively. In conclusion, apart from US where error of discrepancy is 
relatively large, all other trade flows are predicted to acceptable degree of accuracy. The 
benchmark model predicts actual trade with minimal errors and, thus, serves as a reasonable basis 
for evaluating the impact of stockholding policy on trade.  
 
4.6.1.3 Benchmark welfare 
The estimated values for society’s welfare are presented in Table 4.8 below. The welfare estimates 
are social surplus to society arising from efficient allocation of grain to trade and consumption 
across countries. In the base case, the welfare to society for efficient allocation of rice to 
consumption and trade over the two periods is approximately $150 billion. Similarly, aggregate 
welfare estimate for corn and wheat trade in the base case are approximately $117.4 billion and 
$111.0 billion respectively.  In the next section, the impact of the stockholding policy on trade are 
assessed.  
 
Table 4. 8 The benchmark equilibrium welfare26 (million $) 
Cereal Total (billion $) 
 
Rice 150.0 
Corn 117.4 
Wheat 111.0 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
                                                          
26 Welfare measures do not capture the reduced risk of food insecurity associated with stockholding.  
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4.6.2 Impact of stockholding policies on trade  
The impact of public stockholding policies on cereal trade are discussed in three scenarios.  
Stockholding across all importing countries (Scenario 2); stockholding across G-33 importing 
countries (Scenario 3); and stockholding by small G-33 importing countries (Scenario 4). 
  
4.6.2.1 Importing countries implement storage policy (Scenario 2) 
The section examines the extent of impact on trade that arises due to stock acquisition and stock 
disposal from a 50 percent consumption target storage policy. In this section, t1 and t2 are years of 
stock acquisition and stock disposal respectively. The impacts on rice, wheat and corn trade are 
presented in Table 4.9 below. The importing countries (i.e. all importing countries) are China, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines, EU and the Middle East. 
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 Table 4. 9 Impact of stockholding policy on trade - Importers implement policy27 (Scenario 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
                                                          
27 The model uses point elasticities to extrapolate and analyse the impact of stockholding on trade. Hence, the changes in trade should be interpreted with caution 
because the confidence level regarding such estimates declines as the degree of extrapolation increases. 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China +28% -27% +25% -26% +24%  -21% 
Nigeria +36% -34% +32% -30% +33% -35% 
Indonesia +37% -34% +35% -32% +34% -36% 
Philippines +41% -38% +37% -41% +35% -32% 
EU-28 +23% -25% +25% -24% - - 
Middle East +25% -26% +22% -18% +18% -25% 
Total trade in million tonnes 23.5 (+30.6%) 13.2 (-42.4%) 28.3(+25.0%) 24.3(-23.4%) 45.1(+25.3%) 27.4(-28.5%) 
       
Exporters       
India +27.7% -17.7%     
Thailand +35.3% -43%     
US   +25.0% -23.4% +25.3% -28.5% 
Total trade in million tonnes  23.5 (+30.6%) 13.2 (-42.4%) 28.3(+25.0%) 24.3(-23.4%) 45.1(+25.3%) 27.4(-28.5%) 
1
4
3
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4.6.2.1.1 Impact of stock acquisition on trade (t1) 
The results suggest that a 50 percent consumption target storage policy in importing countries will 
increase trade considerably during stock acquisition (i.e. t1). The model predicts equilibrium rice, 
corn and wheat traded at approximately 23.5 million; 28.3 million tonnes and 45.1 million tonnes 
respectively (Table 4.9).  This represent an increase in trade of 30.6 percent; 25 percent and 25.3 
percent for rice, corn and wheat respectively relative to the base case.  Rice imports by China, 
Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines increase by 28 percent, 36 percent, 37 percent and 41 
percent respectively relative to base case as a result of the policy.  Corn imports increase by 
approximately 25 percent, 32 percent, 35 percent and 37 percent for China, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
the Philippines respectively relative to the base case. The storage policy leads to 24 percent, 33 
percent, 35 percent increase in wheat import by China, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines 
respectively.  
Trade increase because the additional stocks required for storage programs are imported from 
international markets. The increased demand for imports for storage programs translates into 
increased demand for exports. Consequently, rice exports from Thailand and India increased by 
more than 27 percent while corn and wheat exports from United States increase by more than 25 
percent as a result of stockholding policies in importing countries. Further, the increased demand 
for stocks also drive up cereal prices during the stock acquisition phase. Wheat prices increase by 
more than 15 percent in Indonesia and Philippines as a result of stock acquisition for stockholding 
programs (Table 4.10). The acquisition of stocks also leads to rise in corn and rice prices for the 
Philippines and Nigeria by approximately 10 percent due to acquisition.  
The increase in trade represent the maximum positive impact that can arise if stock acquisition 
were carried out in a single year. The benefits to exporters will be relatively less if public stocks 
are to be acquired over an extended period of time.  
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Table 4. 10 Stockholding policy impact on prices -Importers implement policy (Scenario 2) 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
 
 
This, results, which suggest that stockholding will increase trade is not what WTO members that 
do not want the limits on AMS lifted expect. They expect that raising the limits on AMS will lead 
to stock being accumulated solely from domestic producers. The results, however, do have some 
useful insights into how stockholding in importing countries can affect trade. The results imply 
that in an integrated market system, when importers pay higher prices to acquire stocks from their 
domestic markets, domestic prices are bound to rise. This will induce imports from international 
markets. Thus, it is inconsequential as to whether stocks are acquired from domestic or 
international producers. In this particularly instance, the results suggest that a 50 percent 
consumption target storage policy could increase trade by more than 20 percent during stock 
acquisition.  
Nonetheless, exporting countries have concerns about the impact that can arise when accumulated 
stocks are disposed of. Thus, the next subsection discusses the extent to which a 50 percent 
consumption target policy could affect trade during stock disposal.  
 Rice Corn wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China +2.1% -2.0% +0.7% -0.6% +0.5% -0.4% 
Nigeria +10.3% -9.8% +0.8% -0.9% +15% -15.5% 
Indonesia +1.6% -1.5% +9.2% -8.4% +15% -16.1% 
Philippines +5.8% -5.4% +0.3% -0.3% +10.6% -10.5% 
EU-28 +0.6% -0.7% +1.1% -0.9%   
Middle East +2.3% -2.2% +3.3% -4.1% +6.1% -8.3% 
       
Exporters       
India +2.0% -2.2%     
Thailand +5.2% -4.3%     
United States - - +2.0% -1.8% +4.0% -4.4% 
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4.6.2.1.2 Impact of stock disposal on trade (t2) 
The disposal of accumulated stocks is a concern for food exporting countries. The sale of 
accumulated stocks increase domestic supply relative to consumption in importing countries 
resulting in a decline of prices. This is a major concern for exporting countries because falling 
international prices negatively affect their exports. In this analysis, the period t2 presents the impact 
imposed on trade when accumulated stocks are disposed. As shown in Table 4.9, wheat prices 
decline by more than 15 percent in Nigeria and Indonesia as result of stock disposal. This 
consequently led to a decline in trade between countries.  
The model predicts aggregate rice, corn and wheat traded at approximately 13.2 million, 24.3 
million and 27.4 million tonnes respectively as a result of stock disposal (i.e. t2).  This represent a 
decline in rice, corn and wheat trade by 42.1 percent; 23.4 percent and 28.5 percent respectively 
relative to the base case (Table 4.9). The disposal of accumulated stocks of rice in importing 
countries lead to decline in exports from Thailand and India by 43 percent and 17.7 percent 
respectively relative to the base case. Similarly, stock disposal leads to a decline in corn and wheat 
exports from United States by 23.4 percent and 27.4 percent respectively relative to the base case.  
This results therefore imply that stock disposal in importing countries can have substantial negative 
impact on future trade.  
The decline in trade represent the maximum negative impacts that can arise if accumulated stocks 
were disposed of in a single year. Where accumulated stocks are disposed of over an extended 
period of time, the impacts will be relatively small. Secondly, given that stock acquisition might 
increase trade gains to exporting countries, the negative impacts of the policy (accounting for 
gains) can also relatively lower.    
 
4.6.2.1.3 Impact of stockholding policy on welfare 
The above impact of stockholding activities suggest two conclusions. First, 50 percent 
consumption stockholding program can enhance trade to the benefits of exporting countries during 
stock acquisition. However, considerable negative impact can arise when accumulated stocks are 
disposed of. Despite these respective gains and losses, the policy leads to overall negative effects 
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on social welfare. In particular, social welfare declines by 24 percent, 28 percent and 32 percent 
for rice, corn and wheat respectively relative to the base case (Table 4.11). Welfare declines 
because stock acquisition diverts large volumes into storage beyond optimal levels and creates 
food scarcity, while stock disposal increase supply beyond optimal levels resulting in a glut.   
 
 Table 4. 11 Policy impact on welfare 
Cereal Welfare (billion $) % change over base case 
 
Rice 114.0 -24% 
Corn 84.5 -28% 
Wheat 74.8 -32% 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
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4.6.2.2 G-33 importing countries implements policy (Scenario 3) 
The main G-33 importing countries considered are China, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Stockholding in G-33 importing countries produces impacts similar to the case where the policy 
is implemented by all importing countries (Scenario 2). Total rice, corn and wheat stocks required 
by G-33 for stockholding purposes as percentage of stocks required by all importing countries are 
94 percent, 71percent and 70 percent respectively. Consequently, the impacts arising from G-33 
stockholding activities largely approximate impacts arising from stockholding activities by all 
importing countries.  
The policy drives up prices during stock acquisition (t1) and reduces prices during stock disposal 
(t2). Rice price rose by 1.6 percent, 8.3 percent, 1.3 percent and 4.2 percent in China, Nigeria, 
Indonesia and the Philippines relative to the base case during stock acquisition (Table 4.12). Corn 
prices increase by more than 8 percent in Indonesia. Similarly, wheat price rose by more than 8 
percent in Nigeria, Indonesia and Philippines. Price increase because of increased demand for 
stocks in G-33 countries. Rice, corn and wheat price, on the other hand, declined by more than 13 
percent in most G-33 countries as a result of stock disposal. Stock disposal also results in falling 
cereal prices in the EU and Middle East. 
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Table 4. 12 Policy impact on prices (Scenario 3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
 
4.6.2.2.1 Stock acquisition effects on trade 
Stock acquisition by the G-33 implementing countries (i.e. China, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Philippines) increase imports by more than 20 percent for rice, corn and wheat and similar to 
scenario 2. The policy increases imports because the additional stocks for storage leads to an 
increase in imports.  However, the rise in prices as a result of stockholding in G-33 negatively 
affect imports of other countries. Rice imports by Middle East and EU decline by 34 percent and 
5.8 percent respectively. In all, the policy increase aggregate rice trade by 12.5 percent relative to 
the base cases. Similarly, aggregate corn and wheat trade increase by 13 percent and 16 percent 
respectively relative to the base case as a result of stock acquisition.  In terms of food security, the 
policy suggest that stock acquisition by some large importers could actually make other importing 
countries worse-off due to rising global prices. 
. 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China +1.6% -1.5% +0.4% -0.3% +0.3% -0.3% 
Nigeria +8.3% -9.1% +0.7% -0.8% +12% -13% 
Indonesia +1.3% -1.2% +8.3% -8.0% +12% -13% 
Philippines +4.2% -3.8% +0.2% -0.2% +8.2% -8.0% 
EU-28 +0.4% -0.2% +0.9% -0.7% -  
Middle East +2.0% -1.6% +3.1% -3.8% +5.3% -6.0% 
       
Exporters       
India +1.8% -2.0%     
Thailand +4.1% -3.2%     
United States - - +1.5% -1.2% +3.3% -3.8% 
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Table 4. 13 Impact on trade: G-33 implement policy (Scenario 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
 
 
 Rice Corn wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China +35% -29% +28% -27% +28% -20% 
Nigeria +40% -35% +36% -34% +36% -31% 
Indonesia +41% -36% +37% -34% +37% -20% 
Philippines +43% -32% +41% -38% +41% -30% 
EU-28 -34% +25% -12% +8.3%   
Middle East -5.8% +8.7% -9.5% +7% -12% +18% 
Total trade in million tonnes 18 (+12.5%) 16.57 (-11.8%) 22.8 (+1.3%) 31.0(-1.5%) 35.1(+2.5%) 36.5(-4.6%) 
       
Exporters       
India +8% -6%     
Thailand +15% -18.6%     
US   +1.3% -1.5% +2.5% -4.6% 
Total trade in million tonnes  18.0 (+12.5%) 16.57 (-11.8%) 22.8 (+1.3) 31.0(-1.5%) 35.1(+2.5%) 36.5(-4.6%) 
1
5
0
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4.6.2.2.2 Stock disposal effects on trade 
Stock disposal leads to a decline in prices and trade. However, the declining prices tend to increase 
imports by other countries. Rice, corn and wheat imports by China, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Philippines decline by more than 25 percent due to stock disposal. This is partially offset, however, 
by the rising imports for the Middle East and the EU. Rice, corn and wheat imports by the Middle 
East increase by more than 5 percent due to depressed global prices. In the end, stock disposal 
leads to a decline in aggregate rice, corn and wheat trade by 11 percent, 1.5 percent and 4.6 percent 
respectively (Table 4.13). In terms of food security, the results suggest that stock disposal by a 
section of importing countries could actually make others better off due to declining food prices. 
 
4.6.2.2.3 Impact on welfare 
The policy leads to changes in social welfare. Overall, society’s welfare decline by 15%, 19.2% 
and 16.1% for rice, wheat and corn models respectively (Table 4.14). This is attributed to the 
distortions created by the policy. Stock acquisition leads to food scarcity in the society while stock 
disposal creates a distortion in the form of a glut. In all, overall value to society is not maximized 
as a result. 
 
Table 4. 14 Policy impact on welfare 
Cereal Welfare (billion $) % change over base case 
Rice 126.8 -15.5% 
Corn 94.9 -19.2% 
Wheat 93.1 -16.1% 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
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4.5.2.3 Small countries implement policy (Scenario 4)28 
The main small countries considered are Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines. The impact of 
storage policies by small importing countries leads to negligible impacts on trade and welfare. 
Total stock required by ‘small importing countries’ as a percentage of stock required by all 
importing countries for stockholding purposes are 27.5 percent, 9 percent and 6.5 percent 
respectively. Hence, stock required by small importing countries are comparably low. As a 
consequence, its impact on prices and trade are relatively lower.  Stock acquisition drive up prices 
marginally, by less than 2 percent across rice, corn and wheat, while causing prices to decline by 
less than 3 percent during disposal (Table 4.15).  This suggest that storage policies by small 
countries may not result in significant impacts on trade.  
 
Table 4. 15 Policy impact on prices (Scenario 4) 
Source: Author’s computation. 
                                                          
28 Sensitivity analysis for large importing countries using China as a focal point was also conducted. However, the 
results were very similar in magnitude to those of Scenario 3. As a result they are not reported.  
 Rice Corn wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) 
Nigeria +1.1% -0.9% +0.2% -0.2% +1.1% -1.2% 
Indonesia +0.3% -0.2% +1.2% -1.0% +3.0% -3.2% 
Philippines +0.5% -0.3% + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) +0.6% -0.5% 
EU-28 + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) - - 
Middle East + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) 
       
Exporters       
India + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%)     
Thailand + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%)     
United States - - + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) + (<0.1%) - (<0.1%) 
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4.6.2.3.1 Stock acquisition effects on trade 
Stock acquisition increase rice, corn and wheat imports by Nigeria, Philippines and Indonesia by 
more than 20 percent, similar to scenario 3. The policy increases imports because the additional 
demand for stocks for storage increase demand relative to supply, raise prices and induce imports. 
However, the rise in prices negatively affect imports by other importing countries. Rice, corn and 
wheat imports decline by less than 4 percent in China, Middle East and EU. Consequently, the 
policy’s impact on trade is lessened because the increase in demand for stocks by Nigeria, 
Indonesia and Philippines is partly offset by the fall in demand for imports by other countries. 
 
4.6.2.3.2 Stock disposal effects on trade 
Stock disposal leads to a decline in prices and trade. The disposal of accumulated stocks by small 
food security risk countries leads to a decline in prices but less than price declines under Scenario 
2 and 3. At equilibrium, rice, corn and wheat imports decline by less than 6. The fall in prices due 
to stock disposal, however, increase demand by other importing countries. Imports to China, EU 
and Middle East rise but less than 15 percent for most cases. However, the fall in imports is not 
fully offset by the increase in demand (by other importing countries) which leads to an overall 
decline in trade.  This policy implies that stock disposal activities in small importing countries may 
have negligible impact on global prices, trade and food security. Hence, allowing stockholding in 
small countries faced with considerable food security risk may not produce noticeable impacts on 
trade.  
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Table 4. 16 Policy impact on trade (Scenario 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Importers       
China -15% +2.3% -4.5% +3.1% -4.5%  +7% 
Nigeria +40% -36% +33% -32% +35% -36% 
Indonesia +38% -37% +35% -33% +36% -35% 
Philippines +44 -36% +38% -40% +33% -33% 
EU-28 -12% +6.6% -6.6% +1.6% - - 
Middle East -6.5% +1.3% -6.3% +0.01% -28% +23% 
Total trade in million tonnes 16.7 (+4.3%) 17.8 (-5.3%) 22.3 (+0.01%) 30.8(-0.02%) 36.3 (+0.01%) 37.4 (-0.02%) 
       
Exporters       
India +3.9% -6.3%     
India +5.2% -4.3%     
US   +0.01% -0.02% +0.01% -0.02% 
Total trade in million tonnes  16.7 (+4.3%) 17.8 (-5.3%) 22.3 (+0.01%) 30.8(-0.02%) 36.3 (+0.01%) 37.4 (-0.02%) 
1
5
4
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4.6.2.3.3 Impact on welfare 
The policy leads to marginal changes in social welfare. Overall, society’s welfare declines by 2%, 
1.3% and 4% for rice, wheat and corn respectively (Table 4.17). This is attributed to the distortions 
created by the policy. Stock acquisition creates a distortion by creating food scarcity in the society 
while stock disposal creates a distortion in the form of glut. Overall value to society is not 
maximized as a result. The welfare distortions are, however, small compared to scenario 2 and 3, 
where large countries implement the policy.  
 
Table 4. 17 Policy impact on welfare 
Cereal Welfare (billion $) % change over base case 
Rice 140.4 -6.4% 
Corn 113.1 -3.7% 
Wheat -105.7 -4.8% 
Source: Author’s computation from the model. 
 
4.6.3 Summary results and implications for WTO negotiations  
The impact of the proposed stockholding policies on trade are summarised in Table 4.18 below. 
The results shows that stockholding policy implemented across food importing countries could 
yield significant positive effects (Scenario 2). Stock acquisition could increase trade in rice, corn 
and wheat by 30.6 percent, 25 percent and 25.3 percent respectively. Despite these significant 
gains, exporting countries are primarily concerned about the negative impacts that can arise due to 
stock disposal. The most important concern of food exporters focuses on these negative 
consequences.  
The results shows that disposal could lead to a decline in rice, corn and wheat trade by 42.4 percent, 
23.4 percent and 28.5 percent respectively when the policy is implemented across all importing 
countries. Scenario 3 investigates the extent of impacts that arises when stockholding are allowed 
only in G-33 importing countries. These countries include China, Nigeria, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.  The negative impacts due to stock disposal of rice, corn and wheat are approximately 
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11 percent, 1.5 percent and 4.6 percent respectively. Thus, with the exception of rice, stockholding 
impacts are largely below 5 percent. Scenario 4 investigates the case where small G-33 countries 
are allowed to hold stocks. These countries include Nigeria, Philippines and Indonesia. The effects 
of stock disposal on trade are less than 1 percent for corn and wheat, and about 5 percent for rice.  
While the results suggest that the negative impacts of stockholding considered for a section of 
countries may be small, those impacts can be significantly large when the policies is implemented 
across large consumption countries.   
The results suggest that the negative effects of stock disposal in importing countries are inevitable. 
However, the extent of impact varies depending on the size of the implementing countries. 
Particularly, stockholding activities in small countries faced with considerable food security risk 
could be allowed since their impacts on trade are negligible. Allowing stockholding in all 
importing countries or G-33 countries can lead to significant negative impacts on trade.  Large 
consumption countries seeking to implement stockholding policies must establish appropriate 
compensation schemes to minimise their policies impact on affected countries.  
 
Table 4. 18 Summary of policy impacts on trade (%) 
 Rice Corn Wheat 
 acquisition  disposal acquisition disposal acquisition disposal 
Scenario 2 +30.6 -42.4% +25.0% -23.4% +25.3% -28.5% 
Scenario 3 +12.5% -11.8% +1.3% -1.5% +2.5% -4.6% 
Scenario 4 +4.3% -5.3% +0.01% -0.02% +0.01% -0.02% 
Source: Author’s computation. 
 
The estimated values are potential maximum impacts that can arise as a result of stock acquisition 
or stock disposal. This is because it is assumed that stock acquisition or stock disposal happens in 
one year. If acquisition took place over ten years, for example, to reach the 50 percent consumption 
target, then the impacts will be considerably smaller. Similarly, if stocks were run down over ten 
years the effects would be less. Secondly, considerable positive benefits can accrue to exporting 
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countries as a result of stock acquisition. These impacts, when taken into consideration can 
substantially reduce the overall negative impacts perceived by exporting countries.  Thus, the 
concerns of exporting countries may not be particularly realistic – and the case against 
stockholding may be weak.  
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Appendix  
 
4A. Derivation of coefficients and intercept terms:  
 
Excess supply elasticity (Es) of an exporting country is calculated as: 
𝐸𝑠 = 𝑒𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
− 𝑒𝑑 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
        (4.13) 
Excess demand (Ed) of an importing country is derived as: 
𝐸𝑑 = 𝑒𝑑 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
− 𝑒𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
      (4.14) 
The production, consumption, exports and imports used to estimate Es and Ed are averages of 
2012/2013 and 2013/2014. The es and ed are elasticities of supply and demand respectively in each 
country. Given Es and Ed, the intercept and coefficients of excess demand of an exporting country 
(e) and excess demand of an importing country (i) can be derived as follows:  
A linear excess demand function is specified for an exporter e as: 
                        𝐸𝑆𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑒,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑒,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑡                   (4.15) 
Where, EP, a, b and ES are export price, intercept, coefficient and export quantity at time t 
respectively. The Es is derived from equation 4.15 as  
                                                               𝐸𝑠 =
𝐸𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑆𝑡
∗
∆𝐸𝑆
∆𝐸𝑃
                             (4.16) 
                             𝐸𝑠 =
𝐸𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑆𝑡
∗ 𝑏𝑒,𝑡                              (4.17) 
Therefore,                                            𝑏𝑒,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑆𝑡
∗
1
𝐸𝑠
                                (4.18)             
The intercept term is derived as: 
                               𝑎𝑒,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑃𝑒,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑒,𝑡𝐸𝑆𝑡                (4.19) 
A linear excess demand function is specified for importer i as: 
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                              𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑡                (4.20) 
Where, IP, c, d and ED are import price, intercept, coefficient and import quantity at time t 
respectively. The coefficient (𝑑𝑖,𝑡) and intercept (𝑐𝑖,𝑡) can be determined as: 
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝐷𝑡
∗
1
𝐸𝑑
                     (4.21) 
                                                   𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑃𝑒,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑒,𝑡𝐸𝐷𝑡         (4.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
5.1 Summary of finding and conclusions  
The food crises in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 initiated dramatic changes to food security policies 
of developing countries. The food crises led to significant increase in food prices and threatened 
food security in food exporting and importing countries alike. As a consequence, food exports 
were restricted from a number of major agricultural exporting countries including Argentina, India, 
China, Russia and Ukraine, among others. Food export restrictions is estimated to have increased 
food insecurity levels and pushed over 75 million people into extreme hunger in developing 
countries.  As a result, many developing countries want to build public food stocks which can be 
used to mitigate food crisis in times of supply shocks. However, the levels of stockholding a 
country is permitted to have is disciplined by the WTO’s de minimis restriction on subsidies agreed 
in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
As per the de minimis agreement, subsidy support levels cannot exceed 10 percent of the value of 
domestic production. A group of developing countries (known as the G-33) concerned that the de 
minimis restriction would constrain stockholding efforts petitioned the WTO for a relaxation of 
the agreed limits. The proposal has, however, been opposed at the WTO because the building of 
public stocks is, arguably, trade distortionary. Some member countries also argue that the current 
WTO regulations provide sufficient policy freedom for developing countries to address their food 
security issues without the need to relax stockholding policies.  This thesis provides information 
pertaining to two key questions: (1) Whether or not there is the need for public stockholding in 
developing countries. (2) What the implications are for the proposed changes in stockholding 
commitments on trade?  Wheat, rice and corn have been the focus of this analysis given their 
importance in food security. The conclusions regarding these two questions and the broader 
implications for food security and public stockholding are presented below.  
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5.1.1 Is public stockholding necessary in developing countries? 
The first paper (presented in Chapter 2) explored the need for stockholding in developing 
countries. The study concludes that the market response to consumption shocks are slow in 
developing countries. This implies that relying on the market — specifically international trade — 
to restore consumption in times of shock is not a wise policy. Hence, there is a legitimate need for 
government intervention, including the use of stockholding, to enhance food security. The results 
indicates that markets can restore at most 46 percent of cereal consumption distortion in 
developing countries in a timely fashion. The estimated market response to shocks ranges from 12 
to 41 percent for rice; 14 percent to 31 percent for corn; and 22 to 46 percent in the case of wheat. 
The response rates are considered to be slow because more than 50 percent of the distortions to 
food needs cannot be restored by relying on the market following a shock. The weak response is 
attributable to issues with trade openness and transaction costs which delay the ability to respond 
to price incentives. The conclusions, therefore, support the general call for food security stocks in 
developing countries.  
As a robustness check, market responses were also estimated for net food importing developing 
countries, net food importing developed countries and net food exporting developed countries.  
The responses are faster in these cases compared to net food importing developing countries. This 
suggest that they are generally better at restoring consumption than net food importing developing 
countries.  Given that net food exporting developing countries face similar transaction costs and 
trade openness as net food importing developing countries, the higher responses can be attributed 
to the availability of policy instruments to limit exports in times of food crisis, which enable a 
quicker restoration of consumption. Such policy instruments include the use of export taxes and 
embargos to keep food within national bothers. Further, developed countries are highly integrated 
in regional trade agreements. This, together, with low transaction costs and good infrastructure 
arguably support quicker responses in developed countries. Thus, net food importing developing 
countries are the most at risk. The study also finds that trade openness and income enhance long-
run consumption in developing countries.  
The second paper (presented in Chapter 3) also analyses the need for stockholding policy in 
developing countries by focusing on the restrictiveness of the current de minimis policy. The study 
considered each G-33 country to determine whether or not it was constrained by the de minimis 
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policy. For a number of these countries, the results shows that the current de minimis policy are 
constraining on their ability to hold sufficient stocks to address food security. Hence, there is the 
need to expand the current limits for these countries. The results, in particular, indicates that the 
de minimis policy is highly restrictive across most high food security risk countries. These include 
Barbados, Botswana, and Mongolia, among other. In the case of corn, for example, public stocks 
required in Botswana are about 80 times the current stock levels permitted under the WTO. This 
is an extreme restriction given that Botswana’s major cereal is corn. Hence, expanding the policy 
to allow vulnerable countries to have sufficient stocks levels is important. Such high restrictions 
underline the need for public stockholding policies in these countries. The current limit is highly 
restrictive in the case of wheat compared to other cereals. The heavy restriction implies that these 
countries simply require exemptions to enhance their food security with regards to wheat 
consumption. Further, while India and China are spearheading the public stockholding policy 
debate at the WTO, the results shows that the current de minimis policy is largely not constraining 
on them.  
In conclusion, the research identifies the need for stockholding policy based on two issues. First, 
the ability of the market to restore consumption is slow and yields less than 50 percent of what is 
needed. Secondly, the de minimis AMS policy is restrictive on optimal public stockholding for 
food security purposes. However, the requirements differ across countries. Some countries such 
as India and China, to a large extent, do not need the current limit to be expanded.  
 
5.1.2 What are the potential impact of the proposed policy on trade? 
The third paper investigated the impact of stockholding policy on trade. The impact of the proposed 
stockholding were analysed using a hypothetical 50 percent consumption target policy aiming to 
meet  consumption requirements for six months. The estimated are maximum trade impacts that 
can arise as a result of stock acquisition or stock disposal in developing countries.  
The results shows that tock acquisition could increase exports significantly by over 20 percent. 
This is, however, not the concern of food exporters. Food exporting countries are concerned about 
the potential negative impacts that can arise as a result of stock disposal. Insights from the 50 
percent consumption target policy shows that stock disposal could increase trade losses by 30 
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percent for exporters of rice; 27 percent for corn; and 40 percent for wheat. This can translate to 
significant income losses across net food exporting countries. However, when the policy is 
implemented by small countries, the impacts (whether negative or positive) are relatively less than 
5 percent in most cases. Hence, this policy can be considered for small countries faced with food 
security risk countries without substantially affecting trade. Large consumption countries seeking 
to implement stockholding policies must establish appropriate compensation to minimise their 
policies’ impact on affected countries.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
The above sets out two main recommendations regarding stockholding policies in developing 
countries. The study recommends that stockholding policies may be expanded for small countries 
faced with high food security risk without considerably affecting trade. However, where large 
importing countries intend to pursue the policies trade can be substantially affected.  Hence, there 
is the need to establish appropriate compensation schemes to mitigate the impacts on other 
countries when large countries implement stockholding policies.    
 
 5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The paper on market response used trade openness to measure the extent of integration into the 
world trade system. Future research could consider the use of export restrictions faced by 
individual countries in their estimations. Further, the analysis of de minimis restrictiveness were 
examined in a two-period time frame. The restrictiveness analysis focused on a two-period model 
using a specific food crisis. Future research can enhance knowledge by having several simulations 
for a country and then creating a distribution to determine the probability that an individual country 
violates its restriction. The simulation can also be done using long-duration models. 
In paper 3, a hypothetical 50 percent consumption target policy is used to gain insights into the 
implications of stockholding on trade. The subsidy induced-production impacts have largely been 
ignored because the policy negotiations are still ongoing. It is recommended that future research 
examines the impact of stockholding from a subsidy-induced production perspective once the 
negotiations are concluded.  
